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IX. CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
A. Search and Seizure
The fourth amendment to the Constitution protects this country's in-
habitants from unreasonable searches and seizures.' The framers
designed the amendment to guard against intrusion upon an individual's
reasonable expectation of privacy.2 To come within the fourth amend-
ment, police action must constitute a "search and seizure." For example,
no breach of fourth amendment protection occurs when law enforcement
officials routinely inspect s or inventory vehicles in their custody,4 seize
abandoned property,5 or when welfare officials conduct home visits of re-
cipients.' Similarly, no illegal search or seizure occurs when law enforce-
ment officials examine an object in an open field, even though the field is
privately owned.7 Additionally, if a search and seizure does take place,
fourth amendment constraints do not apply unless government officials
are involved in the action.8
Warrantless searches and seizures are per se unreasonable unless
made pursuant to consent or within certain narrowly drawn exceptions.'
1 U.S. CONST. amend. IV provides: "The right of the people to be secure . . . against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue. but
upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the
place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized." See generally N. LASSON, THE
HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTrru-
TION (1937).
2 A person has a reasonable expectation of privacy if he intends to keep his effects
confidential. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 352-53 (1967). The constitutionality of
a search and seizure does not turn upon whether officials committed a trespass in order to
seize evidence. Id. at 353; Note, From Private Places to Personal Privacy: A Post Katz
Study of Fourth Amendment Protection, 43 N.Y.U.L. REV. 968, 976-77 (1968). The test,
clarified by Justice Harlan, is whether the victim of the search had an actual and reasonable
expectation of privacy. 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring); see 1 W. LAFAvE, SEARCH
AND SEIZURE § 2.1, at 227-33 (1978) [hereinafter cited as W. LAFAvE]. See generally O'Brien,
Reasonable Expectations of Privacy: Principles and Policies of Fourth Amendment-Pro-
tected Privacy, 13 NEW ENG. L. REV. 663 (1978); see also United States v. White, 401 U.S.
745, 786 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
3 See Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 442, 448 (1973); Harris v. United States, 390
U.S. 234, 236 (1968); Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58, 61 (1967).
' See South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 375-76 (1976). See also note 90 infra.
5 See Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217, 240-41 (1960).
6 See Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309, 317-18 (1971).
7 See Air Pollution Variance Bd. v. Western Alfalfa Corp., 416 U.S. 861, 864-65 (1974);
Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57, 58-59 (1924).
8 See Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465, 475-76 (1921) (fourth amendment inapplica-
ble to search and seizure by private individual since not police action).
Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 454-55 (1971). See generally Bloodworth,
Where Search and Seizure is Today-An Outline of Fourth Amendment U.S. Supreme
Court Decisions, 40 ALA. LAw 444 (1978). The fourth amendment warrant requirement, see
note I supra, helps assure that police intrusions are reasonable. A warrant, however, does
not automatically make a search reasonable. While the fourth amendment dictates a proba-
ble cause standard for the issuance of warrants, see note 1 supra, it does not require police
to obtain warrants. Thus, the applicable test is whether a search is reasonable, not whether
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The presence of exigent circumstances, for example, will relieve police of-
ficers of the obligation to obtain a warrant prior to search. 10 Also, police
may conduct a warrantless search of the area within a suspect's immedi-
ate control incident to a lawful arrest.1 '
Probable cause is the general standard that governs warrantless
searches,'2 though in specific instances probable cause may be determined
in light of other considerations. The legality of a search is strictly deter-
mined with respect to a dwelling, while the determination in the case of
an automobile is made with flexibility.'3 A lesser standard than probable
cause may in some cases be constitutionally permissible. Thus, police of-
ficers may "stop and frisk" a person whom they reasonably suspect to be
armed, dangerous, and planning criminal activity. 4 This reasonable sus-
picion standard also applies to immigration' 5 and customs' 6 searches con-
ducted away from the border. No probable cause or even reasonable sus-
picion is required to undertake customs searches at the actual border 7 or
officers can procure a search warrant. See United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 65-66
(1950).
10 Exigent circumstances are present when there is an emergency situation and the op-
portunity to search is fleeting. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 (1968); McDonald v. United
States, 335 U.S. 451, 454-56 (1948); Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 15 (1948); Carroll
v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 153 (1925). Compare Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 298-
99 (1967) (search of house valid when police in hot pursuit of suspect); Schmerber v. Cali-
fornia, 384 U.S. 757, 770-71 (1966) (extraction of blood immediately after arrest from person
charged with drunken driving permissible to prevent disappearance of evidence); Carroll v.
United States, 267 U.S. at 153 (search of automobile easily removable from jurisdiction au-
thorized) with Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 460-64 (1971) (no exigent circum-
stances where vehicle regularly parked on private property and defendant had no access to
it after police arrived); Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364, 368 (1964) (search of car not
incident to arrest when undertaken after suspects in custody and car impounded); Johnson
v. United States, 333 U.S. at 16 n.7 (search not within "hot pursuit" doctrine where suspect
not in flight and surrounded by agents before becoming aware of their presence).
" See United States v. Edwards, 415 U.S. 800, 806 (1974); Chimel v. California, 395
U.S. 752, 762-63 (1969). A search incident to arrest may be as broad as necessary to prevent
the suspect from resisting or escaping. Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 299 (1967).
12 See note 1 supra. Police officers may establish probable cause based on their aware-
ness of facts and circumstances which would cause a man of prudence and caution to believe
that a crime was or is being committed. Stacey v. Emery, 97 U.S. 642, 645 (1878). This
reasonable belief must be based on reasonably reliable information. Brinegar v. United
States, 338 U.S. 160, 175-76 (1949). The evidence upbn which the officers base their belief
need not be admissible at trial. Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307, 311 (1959); see Jones
v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 270-71 (1960). However, suspicion alone is insufficient to
support probable cause. Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20, 33 (1925).
13 See Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 48 (1970).
14 Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 147-48 (1972); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968).
Reasonable suspicion exists when a man of reasonable caution would believe, under the to-
tality of the circumstances, that police action is wise. Id.
15 See Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 268, 272-73 (1973); 8 U.S.C. §§
1357(a)(3), (c)(1976); 8 C.F.R. § 287.1 (1979).
"e United States v. Martinez, 481 F.2d 214, 219 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S.
931 (1974); 19 U.S.C. § 482 (1976); 19 C.F.R. §§ 162.7, .21 (1979).
1" See Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 154 (1925); Boyd v. United States, 116
1980]
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searches of pervasively regulated businesses.'5
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit recently
decided several cases concerning exceptions to the fourth amendment
warrant requirement. The Fourth Circuit reversed a lower court decision
holding a third party consent search valid,19 but upheld a warrantless au-
tomobile search and a warrantless extended border search.2' The court
also rejected a fourth amendment challenge to a search because the ap-
pellants had no standing to object to the admission of the seized
evidence.
22
Third Party Consent to Search and Seizure
Third persons as well as the target of a search may consent to an oth-
erwise illegal warrantless search by law enforcement officers.23 Consent
searches promote effective law enforcement because they help assure that
innocent persons are not tried for crimes.24 The validity of the search,
regardless of the existence of probable cause, depends upon the authority
of the consenter.25 In United States v. Block,26 the Fourth Circuit ruled
that a third party cannot waive another's fourth amendment rights in
property over which the consenter has no authority, when the victim has
a legitimate expectation of privacy in the object searched.
27
During an investigation into suspected organized drug traffic, state po-
lice received information concerning the involvement of a friend of the
defendant. After securing a warrant for the friend's arrest and receiving
information that thp friend was visiting the defendant at the defendant's
U.S. 616, 623 (1886); 19 U.S.C. § 1581(a)(1976); 19 C.F.R. §§ 162.3(a)(1), .5, .6 (1979). Proba-
ble cause or reasonable suspicion is not required to search and seize mail of international
origin. See United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606, 620-23 (1977). But cf. Ex parte Jackson,
96 U.S. 727, 733 (1877); 39 U.S.C. §§ 404, 3623(d)(1976)(exception to warrant requirement
inapplicable to first class, domestic mail).
18 See United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311, 314-16 (1972); Colonnade Catering Corp.
v. United States, 397 U.S. 72, 77 (1970). A warrantless search limited in time, scope, and
duration poses a minimal threat to privacy. Given the government's interest in regulated
industries, a licensee is presumed to know of inspection requirements prior to entering the
industry. See 406 U.S. at 316.
1 United States v. Block, 590 F.2d 535 (4th Cir. 1978); see text accompanying notes 23-
65 infra.
20 United States v. Newbourn, 600 F.2d 452 (4th Cir. 1979); see text accompanying
notes 66-103 infra.
21 United States v. Bilir, 592 F.2d 735 (4th Cir. 1979); see text accompanying notes 104-
48 infra.
22 United States v. Jackson, 584 F.2d 653 (4th Cir. 1978); see text accompanying notes
149-96 infra.
23 See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 248 (1973); Coolidge v. New Hamp-
shire, 403 U.S. 443, 487-90 (1971).
24 See 412 U.S. at 227-28, 231-32.
25 See Comment, Third Party Consent Searches: The Right to Exculpate, 69 J. CraM.
L. & CRIMINOLOGY 92, 92 (1978) [hereinafter cited as The Right to Exculpate].
18 590 F.2d 535 (4th Cir. 1978).
27 Id.; see note 2 supra.
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mother's home, the police proceeded to Mrs. Block's home.2 8 During the
course of a search of the defendant's bedroom, the officers noticed a
locked trunk.2 9 Although the officers knew Mrs. Block had no access to
the trunk,30 they obtained her consent to search and seize any potential
evidence in her son's room, including the contents of the trunk.31 Having
forced open the trunk, the officers discovered heroin.
3 2
The district court admitted the seized evidence over the defendant's
pretrial motion to suppress 3 and his objection at trial.3 Following his
conviction for narcotics offenses,3 5 the defendant appealed, challenging
the district court's admission of the heroin. He contended that his mother
had no authority to consent to the search of the footlocker."8 The Fourth
Circuit reversed the conviction, holding that the district court should
have granted the suppression motion.
3 7
Though the court upheld Mrs. Block's authority to consent to a search
of her son's room, the court of appeals concluded that her authority did
not extend to the trunk.3 8 The court found that Mrs. Block, who had ac-
cess to all rooms of the house, could consent to a search of items'in plain
view within this common area.3 9 The court reasoned, however, that her
consent did not reach the enclosed spaces of every item in plain view. The
court concluded that only the defendant, who had a reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy as to the trunk's contents, could consent to the search of
the trunk.40 Finding that the admission of the seized evidence was not
harmless error beyond a reasonable doubt, the court remanded the case
for a determination of the sufficiency of the remaining evidence."1
29 590 F.2d at 537.
:9 Id.
0 Id. at 538.
31 Id. at 537. Mrs. Block signed a consent form authorizing the officers to take potential
evidence from the defendant's bedroom. Though the testimony reflected a dispute as to
whether Mrs. Block signed the form before or after the search, the Fourth Circuit assumed
that her consent was voluntary. Id. at 537 & n.1. See also note 50 infra.
32 590 F.2d at 537-38.
33 See generally note 151 infra.
' 590 F.2d at 538-39.
8' Id. at 536. Block was convicted for conspiracy to procure, sell and distribute heroin
and possession of heroin with intent to distribute and dispense. 590 F.2d at 536; see 21
U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 846 (1976).
31 590 F.2d at 539 & n.4.
:7 Id. at 540.
8 Id. at 541-42.
39 Id. at 541.
40 Id.
4 Id. at 542-44. An appellate court must reverse a lower court judgment if the evidence
exclusive of that erroneously admitted was insufficient for conviction. See Harrington v.
California, 395 U.S. 250, 254 (1969). See also Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24
(1967)(tainted evidence must be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt). The test is whether
the tainted evidence had a substantial impact on the minds of the jury. See 395 U.S. at 254;
Wright v. Estelle, 572 F.2d 1071, 1072 n.2 (5th Cir. 1978) (court must decide whether defen-
dant would have been convicted in absence of error); Bradley v. Cowan, 561 F.2d 1213, 1215
(6th Cir. 1977) (remaining evidence must prove crime). Error is not harmless if the evidence
19801
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The Fourth Circuit's decision in Block was neither novel nor errone-
ous. The Supreme Court's test for the validity of a third party's consent
in United States v. Matlock"2 mandated reversal of the district court's
decision not to suppress the heroin. 43 The-Block decision represents an
exception to the general rule that a joint occupant assumes the risk that
another will consent to a search of the premises and the contents within.m "
In Matlock, the Supreme Court held that consent to search given by a
person having common authority over the premises is binding on an ab-
sent party.45 The Court stressed, however, that common authority does
not automatically accompany the third party's property interest in the
searched premises..4  The consenting party must have mutual use of the
item searched in order to allow a search by others.47 Like the third party
unconstitutionally admitted is a criminal instrumentality. E.g., Holloway v. Wolff, 482 F.2d
110, 112, 116 (8th Cir. 1973) (sawed-off shotgun used in robbery). Evidence related to a
collateral issue, however, generally is not prejudicial. See United States v. Reed, 392 F.2d
865, 8d7 (7th Cir. 1968). Had the seized heroin been excluded in Block, the prosecution
would have had no other direct evidence to support the possession charge. Likewise, convic-
tion on the conspiarcy count would have depended upon the highly circumstantial testi-
mony of two informants. 590 F.2d at 542. The harmless error rule is codified at 28 U.S.C. §
2111 (1976), and contained in FED. R. CR. P. 52(a). See generally Saltzburg, The Harm of
Harmless Error, 59 VA. L. REv. 988 (1973).
Principles of appellate review preclude a direction of acquittal when properly admitted
evidence could sustain the conviction. Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 80 (1942). Al-
though exclusion of the heroin rendered all the remaining evidence circumstantial, the
Fourth Circuit found that the remaining evidence could have supported the conviction. 590
F.2d at 543. See also United States v. Sherman, 421 F.2d 198, 199-200 (4th Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 398 U.S. 914 (1970); United States v. Ragland, 306 F.2d 732, 734-35 (4th Cir. 1962),
cert. denied, 371 U.S. 949 (1963).
The Fourth Circuit also found that Burks v. United States 437 U.S. 1 (1978), did not
control the case. In Burks, the Supreme Court distinguished insufficient evidence from mere
trial error to prevent abrogation of the fifth amendment double jeopardy clause. Id. at 14-
15. Mere trial error precludes determination of guilt or innocence. Id. at 15. See generally
Note, Burks v. United States: Redrawing Lines in Double Jeopardy, 1979 DMw. CoLL. L.
REv. 193. In Block, the Government did not secure a conviction on insufficient evidence,
because the jury could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that the two informants gave
sufficient non-hearsay testimony to tie the defendant to the narcotics conspiracy. 590 F.2d
at 543-44; see, e.g., United States v. Buschman, 527 F.2d 1082, 1085 (7th Cir. 1976).
42 415 U.S. 164 (1974).
41 See text accompanying note 47 infra.
44 See United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 170-71 (1974); United States v. Peterson,
524 F.2d 167, 180 (4th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1088 (1976).
45 Id. at 170; accord, United States v. Peterson, 524 F.2d 167, 180-81 (4th Cir. 1975).
The Matlock Court upheld a search of the closet in the bedroom shared by the defendant
and his live-in companion pursuant to the companion's consent. 415 U.S. at 177. See gener-
ally The Right to Exculpate, supra note 25, at 97-101.
46 415 U.S. at 171 n.7; accord, Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483, 489-90 (1964) (consent
by hotel clerk to search of hotel room occupied exclusively by paying guest invalid). Even
when an occupant is a guest, see note 48 infra, the host's possession of the premises does
not control the effectiveness of consent. Rather, the particular relationship between the host
dnd the guest and the degree of the privacy that the guest had in the object of the search
determine the validity of the host's consent. 2 W. LAFAvE, supra note 2, § 8.5, at 754-55.
"1 415 U.S. at 171 n.7.
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consenter in Matlock, Mrs. Block's common authority over the premises48
rested on her ownership of the house and her access to the defendant's
room for household purposes.49 Consequently, her voluntary consent to
the search of the defendant's room was valid.50
Although Mrs. Block's consent validated the room search, her author-
ity under Matlock did not extend to a search of the footlocker.5 1 The
trunk was the exclusive property of the defendant,2 and the record did
not show that Mrs. Block had ever opened the trunk for household pur-
poses.53 The defendant had made clear his intention that no one else have
access to the trunk by keeping it locked in his room when he was ab-
sent.5 ' Thus, the defendant had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the
contents of the footlocker.55 Because the defendant did not expect his
mother to allow a search of his trunk, the consent of Block's mother was
insufficient to uphold the search under Matlock.58
After concluding that Mrs. Block did not have actual authority to per-
mit the search, the Fourth Circuit held that the apparent authority doc-
trine could not justify the search of the trunk.5 Consent to a search is
valid under the apparent authority doctrine if officers have reason to be-
lieve that a third party has authority to consent.58 Therefore, the effec-
46 590 F.2d at 541. The Fourth Circuit upheld the district court's finding that the de-
fendant was a guest in his mother's house. Id. at 538 n.3, 541. Generally, the consent of a
host to search binds a guest because the host controls the use of the premises. See United
States v. Isom, 588 F.2d 858, 860-61 (2d Cir. 1978); United States v. Carter, 569 F.2d 801,
803 (4th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 973 (1978). But see note 46 supra.
49 590 F.2d at 538, 541.
go Id. at 541; accord, Woodard v. United States, 254 F.2d 312, 313 (D.C. Cir. 1958).
Only voluntary third party consent is valid. See Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543,
550 (1968).
:1 590 F.2d at 541; see United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 171 & n.7 (1974).
02 590 F.2d at 537. Mrs. Block told the officers that she did not have a key to the trunk.
Id.
53 Even if Mrs. Block had used the trunk for household purposes, the Block court may
still have reversed the lower court. In Reeves v. Warden, 346 F.2d 915 (4th Cir. 1965), the
Fourth Circuit struck down a search of a bureau drawer set aside exclusively for the use of
the defendant, a guest. The court held that the homeowner, who periodically replaced the
defendant's laundered clothes in his bureau, had a degree of access insufficient to amount to
mutual use. Id. at 924-25; accord, Weinreb, Generalities of the Fourth Amendment, 42 U.
Cm. L. REv. 47, 60-61 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Weinreb].
" See 590 F.2d at 538; e.g., United States v. Wilson, 536 F.2d 883, 884-85 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 982 (1976); United States v. Bussey, 507 F.2d 1096, 1097 (9th Cir.
1974). But see United States v. Isom, 588 F.2d 858, 861 (2d Cir. 1978) (consent valid where
owner of luggage disclaimed ownership).
00 590 F.2d at 541.
8' See 590 F.2d at 541. See also United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 171 n.7 (1974);
Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731, 740 (1969).
57 590 F.2d at 541.
as See id. at" 540; United States v. Peterson, 524 F.2d 167, 180 (4th Cir. 1975); United
States v. Sells, 596 F.2d 912, 914 (7th Cir. 1974); United States v. Miles, 480 F.2d 1217, 1219
(9th Cir. 1973); White v. United States, 444 F.2d 724, 726 (10th Cir. 1971); United States v.
Phifer, 400 F. Supp. 719, 733 (E.D. Pa. 1975), afl'd, 532 F.2d 748 (3d Cir. 1976). The Su-
preme Court has reserved the question of whether apparent authority of a third party is
1980]
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tiveness of the consent is measured by the reasonableness of the officers'
actions. 59 Applying this test, the Fourth Circuit observed that the officers
should have been on notice that a trunk, in which personal effects are
traditionally stored, is an item in which a person ordinarily has a reasona-
ble expectation of privacy.60 This fact was particularly true in Block, be-
cause the trunk was locked and the officers had to force it open.6 1 Fur-
ther, Mrs. Block had expressly disclaimed any right of access to the foot-
locker prior to the search . 2 Consequently, the Fourth Circuit properly
concluded that the officers' reliance on the mother's consent in searching
the trunk was unreasonable.
6 s
The Block decision balanced the authority of a property owner to con-
sent to a search of the premises over which she exercised control with the
right of an occupant to maintain his privacy. Following Supreme Court
precedent, the Fourth Circuit held that common authority of a third
party consenter over a part of the premises may justify a -warrantless
search by police officers.6 4 The court recognized, however, that a resident
in another's home does not surrender, by his occupancy, all of his privacy
rights. 5 The Fourth Circuit declined to permit a person's right to be se-
cure in his effects to be dependent upon the discretion of a private prop-
erty owner.
The Automobile Exception to the Warrant Requirement
Courts judge the lawfulness of a warrantless search more flexibly when
the object of the search is an automobile rather than a dwelling.6 While
the warrant requirement still applies when a car is the search target,
67
two doctrines authorize law enforcement officials to search a vehicle with-
out a warrant. The mobility doctrine allows officers to search an automo-
sufficient in itself to uphold a consent search. See United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164,
177 n.14 (1974). However, in Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483 (1964), the Court refused to
apply the doctrine under the facts of that case. Id. at 488. One commentator has asserted
that the exclusionary rule's deterrent purpose would not necessitate invalidating searches
where the police honestly mistake the authority of the consenter. See Comment, Relevance
of the Absent Party's Whereabouts in Third Party Consent Searches, 53 B.U.L. REv. 1087,
1110 (1973). For a discussion of the inapplicability of the apparent authority doctrine to
third party consent searches, see Weinreb, supra note 53, at 64; Comment, Third Party
Consent to Search and Seizure, 33 U. CHi. L. REv. 797, 801-04 (1966). For a criticism of
loose application of the doctrine, see Note, Third Party Consent to Search and Seizure,
1967 WASH. U.L.Q. 12, 32-34.
59 See United States v. Peterson, 524 F.2d 167, 180 (4th Cir. 1975).
80 590 F.2d at 541; accord, United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 13 (1977).
" 590 F.2d at 537, 541.
62 Id.; see text accompanying notes 29 & 32 supra.
63 590 F.2d at 541.
6 See text accompanying notes 45-50 supra.
85 See text accompanying notes 51-63 supra.
66 See Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 52 (1970).
67 Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 461-62 (1971).
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bile stopped on a highway based upon probable cause."' The protective
search doctrine authorizes police to search a vehicle in their custody if
they reasonably believe that it contains a dangerous weapon. 9 The
Fourth Circuit applied both of these doctrines to uphold a roadside
search of a locked automobile trunk in United States v. Newbourn.
70
In Newbourn, state police officers, acting on information they had re-
ceived from a reliable informant, saw the defendants in the process of
negotiating an illegal firearms sale on the side of a public highway. The
officers -arrested the defendants, opened the trunk of the vehicle, and
found guns. At a pretrial hearing, the defendants successfully contended
that the search was illegal because the officers had had the opportunity to
obtain a search warrant.71 On interlocutory appeal,7 2 the Fourth Circuit
reversed the district court order suppressing the seized firearms."3
Applying the mobility exception to the warrant requirement, the
Fourth Circuit reasoned that the search was valid because the officers had
probable cause to believe that the vehicle contained contraband and be-
cause exigent circumstances made obtaining a warrant impractical.
7 4
Probable cause arose when the officers saw the defendants on the side of
the road making the illegal transaction.7 5 At this time, the officers' need
to apprehend the defendants and immobilize the vehicle outweighed the
preference for a warrant; thus, exigent circumstances existed.7 6 An earlier
attempt by the officers to obtain a warrant probably would have been
unsuccessful, since affidavits in support of probable cause must satisfy
the fourth amendment particularity requirement.7 7 To satisfy the require-
ment, the officers would have had to provide a magistrate with facts suffi-
cient to enable him to determine that the informant was credible and his
information reliable. Also, the officers would have had to set forth some of
the underlying circumstances from which the informant concluded that
the suspects were about to engage in criminal conduct.78 Though the in-
formant initially telephoned one of the officers regarding the proposed
illegal sale a little over six hours before the search, the informant pro-
68 See Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 153 (1925); text accompanying notes 74-87
infra.
69 See Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 447-48 (1973); text accompanying notes 88-98
infra.
70 600 F.2d 452 (4th Cir. 1979).
71 Id. at 452-53.
72 See 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b)(1976).
73 600 F.2d at 453.
74 Id. at 457; see Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 153 (1925). Exigent circum-
stances exist when the occupants or someone else may remove the vehicle from the jurisdic-
tion before law enforcement officers can secure a warrant. Id.; see Comment, The Warrant-
less Automobile Search and Chambers v. Maroney, 28 BAYLOR L. REV. 151, 160 (1976).
75 600 F.2d at 456-57.
76 See generally text accompanying note 10 supra.
77 The fourth amendment requires that police seeking a warrant specifically describe
what they intend to search and seize before a warrant shall issue. See note 1 supra.
78 See Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 416 (1969); Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S.
108, 114-15 (1964).
1980]
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vided insufficient general information at that time.79 The informant com-
municated again with the officer on two occasions before the search, and
the court observed that this additional information may have made a
probable cause showing more convincing.80 However, the court found that
the exigency of the situation excused compliance with the warrant re-
quirement even after the officers received the additional information. The
officers did not have time to seek a warrant at this later time since they
were preparing to pursue the suspects based upon the informant's further
direction.8 1 When the police encountered the defendants in the negotiat-
ing process, the informant's tip was corroborated.82 At that moment, all
components of the mobility exception were satisfied. The officers had
probable cause to believe that the defendants' vehicle contained illegal
firearms.8 3 The defendants were standing close by with the keys, and
could have quickly removed the vehicle from the jurisdiction. 4 Therefore,
the officers were authorized to search the vehicle.8 5 The fact that the of-
ficers did not conduct the search until after the defendants were in cus-
tody and unable to move the car was irrelevant.8 6 For mobility exception
'9 600 F.2d at 456-57. During the initial call, the informant said only that one of the
defendants had offered to sell him some firearms and that both defendants would be coming
from Ohio to West Virginia in a motor vehicle the next morning. Id. at 453, 457. The first
prong of the particularity test, see text accompanying notes 77-78 supra, was satisfied at the
time of this call. The informant was known, had received his information first hand, and
had previously supplied reliable information. 600 F.2d at 453. See generally 1 W. LAFAvE,
supra note 2, § 3.3, at 536; Moylan, Hearsay and Probable Cause: An Aguilar and Spinelli
Primer, 25 MERCER L. REV. 741, 757-65 (1974). The second prong, however, was not satis-
fied. Traveling from Ohio to West Virginia in a motor vehicle is an innocent activity of a
public nature. See, e.g,, United States v. Smith, 598 F.2d 936, 940 (5th Cir. 1979). The
information was not sufficiently particular to demonstrate the informant's inside knowledge
of the suspects' criminal scheme. See, e.g., United States v. Montgomery, 554 F.2d 754, 757-
58 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 927 (1977).
80 600 F.2d at 457.
81 Id. A plain and ample opportunity to obtain a search warrant invalidates an other-
wise lawful warrantless search. Id.; accord, e.g., Niro v. United States, 388 F.2d 535, 539 (1st
Cir. 1968). However, police are not required to seek a warrant at the first possible moment.
Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583, 595 (1974). An exigency can arise at any time, and the fact
that police may have obtained a warrant earlier does not preclude a later warrantless search
on probable cause. Id. at 595-96.
82 600 F.2d at 457.
83 See id. Probable cause arises when the accumulated details supplied by a reliable
informant are found to be accurate upon observation by the officers, giving them reasonable
grounds to believe that the suspect is engaged in criminal conduct. See Draper v. United
States, 358 U.S. 307, 309, 312-13 (1959); United States v. Branch, 565 F.2d 274, 276 (4th Cir.
1977).
84 600 F.2d at 458. See generally note 74 supra.
85 600 F.2d at 458.
88 In Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970), the Supreme Court upheld the warrant-
less search of an automobile that police had stopped on a public road. The search took place
at the police station after the defendants were in custody. Id. at 44. The Court reasoned
that since the officers could have conducted a search on the roadside, they could do the
same at the station. Id. at 52; accord, Texas v. White, 423 U.S. 67, 68 (1975); United States
v. Chalk, 441 F.2d 1277, 1279 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 943 (1971). See generally
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purposes, '8 7 the vehicle was mobile when the defendants stopped it on the
highway.
After the suspects were arrested and the vehicle taken under police
control, the Fourth Circuit held that the search was also justified as a
protective inspection under the Supreme Court's decision in Cady v.
Dombrowski.8 In Dombrowski, the Court held that police, though not
searching for evidence of crime, may conduct a warrantless search of a
vehicle under their control if they reasonably believe the vehicle contains
a gun.89 Probable cause is not a requirement for safety inspections.9 " The
policy in Dombrowski was to protect the public from danger in case van-
dals gained access to the gun. 9' The Fourth Circuit stated that the facts
of Dombrowski and Newbourn were nearly identical.92 In both cases, state
police officers reasonably believed that weapons were contained in a
Note, Misstating the Exigency Rule: The Supreme Court v. The Exigency Requirement in
Warrantless Automobile Searches, 28 SYRACUSE L. Rav. 981 (1977). The apparent reason for
allowing a warrantless search after the police have immobilized the vehicle is that ill-
equipped police departments would face a tmendous burden if the fourth amendment re-
quired officers to transport impounded vehicles to some central location until they could
obtain a warrant. See Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 765 n.14 (1979). See also Note,
Warrantless Searches and Seizures of Automobiles, 87 HARv. L. REv. 835, 841-42 (1974)
[hereinafter cited as Searches and Seizures of Automobiles].
87 See Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 459-60 (1971); 600 F.2d at 458; Com-
ment, Warrantless Searches and Seizures of Automobiles and the Supreme Court From
Carroll to Cardwell: Inconsistently Through the Seamless Web, 53 N.C.L. Rav. 722, 741
(1975) [hereinafter cited as The Seamless Web]. But see United States v. Bradshaw, 490
F.2d 1097, 1101-04 (4th Cir. 1974) (search and seizure illegal where two agents could have
guarded vehicle while third obtained 'warrant).
- 413 U.S. 433 (1973). In Dombrowski, the defendant, who claimed to be a Chicago
policeman, was arrested for drunk driving, and his car impounded. An officer, remembering
that Chicago policemen were required to carry service revolver' at all times, searched the
car for the revolver pursuant to standard police department procedure. The Court upheld
the admission into evidence of blood-stained clothing from the trunk. Id. at 435-37, 448. See
generally Comment, The Automobile Inventory Search and Cady v. Dombrowski, 20 VmiL.
L. REV. 147, 172-79 (1974).
89 413 U.S. at 447-48.
90 See id. at 440-42. A police safety inspection or inventory, which requires no probable
cause, is distinguishable from an automobile search under the mobility exception, which
requires probable cause. A search under the mobility exception is for the specific purpose of
discovering criminal evidence. See Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 153 (1925). On the
other hand, police conducting routine inventories and safety inspections are usually not
looking for evidence. Thus, for constitutional purposes, a safety inspection is not a "search."
See South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 370 n.6 (1976)(citing cases); Cady v. Dom-
browski, 413 U.S. 433, 442 (1973); The Seamless Web, supra note 87, at 758; Searches and
Seizures of Automobiles, supra note 86, at 850-51. See also Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309,
317-18 (1971)(home visitation by welfare caseworker not fourth amendment search). The
Fourth Circuit, however, assumes that police safety inspections and inventories of
automobiles in custody are searches governed by the fourth amendment. See Cabbler v.
Superintendent, 528 F.2d 1142, 1146 (4th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 817 (1976); ac-
cord, South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. at 377 n.1 (Powell, J., concurring), 385 n.2 (Mar-
shall, J., dissenting).
91 413 U.S. at 448.
92 600 F.2d at 455.
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locked automobile trunk under their control.9 3 Further, the court rea-
soned that a more compelling situation existed in Newbourn, since the
officers had probable cause rather than reasonable belief to suspect that
the defendants' trunk was full of guns.94 Recognizing that the immediate
search minimized the danger to the police9 5 as well as to the public, the
court saw no reason to hold that the police should have delayed the
search until the vehicle reached the police station." Moreover, the Fourth
Circuit observed that the immediate search was a potentially lesser intru-
sion into the defendants' diminished. expectation of privacy.97 The court
justified this conclusion on the ground that the defendants could have left
the scene if the officers had discovered no criminal activity.98
The alternative rationale in Newbourn9 evidences the readiness of the
Fourth Circuit, pursuant to Supreme Court precedent, to sustain searches
of automobiles. Although the Supreme Court has declared that the war-
rant requirement is not excused when an automobile is the object of the
search,' " police in pursuit of a vehicle upon probable cause need not de-
tour to seek a warrant. 1 Notwithstanding probable cause, police officers
are authorized to search an automobile in their custody for the protection
of the public'02 as well as for various other reasons.' 3
93 Id.
, Id. Since the police in Newbourn had probable cause, their action was not a pretext
for a general investigatory search. Cf. South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 376
(1976)(standard inventory not concealment of unlawful police motive).
95 Custodians of an impounded vehicle may conduct a search for their own protection.
See Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58, 61-62 (1967).
96 600 F.2d at 455. Dombrowski requires only that police exercise custody or control
over the automobile prior to conducting an inventory search. See 413 U.S. at 442-43.
97 600 F.2d at 454, 455. The Supreme Court has permitted significant latitude in auto-
mobile searches on the theory that a lesser expectation of privacy exists regarding
automobiles. See South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 368 (1976); Cardwell v. Lewis,
417 U.S. 583, 590 (1974). Recently, however, the Court has restricted searches based upon
the limited privacy interest of a vehicle occupant. See Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753,
764-66 (1979); Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 663 (1979). But cf. United States v. Young,
567 F.2d 799, 802 n.3 (8th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1079 (1978)(no privacy in locked
car trunk since unlike suitcase carried in car trunk).
98 600 F.2d at 455. The driver' of a vehicle has two types of privacy expectations. He
expects to keep items contained in enclosed areas of the car secret and to maintain control
of his automobile. An immediate warrantless search briefly invades the driver's secrecy in-
terest. However, impoundment of his vehicle, while preserving his secrecy interest, deprives
him of control of the car and freedom of movement for a much longer period. See Searches
and Seizures of Automobiles, supra note 86, at 840-41.
99 See text accompanying notes 74-98 supra.
"I See text accompanying note 67 supra.
101 See text accompanying notes 74-87 supra.
102 See text accompanying notes 88-96 supra.
10s See South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 369, 375-76 (1976)(need to safeguard
owner's property and avoid claims against police department for lost or stolen property);
Harris v. United States, 390 U.S. 234, 236 (1968)(need to protect car); Cooper v. California,
386 U.S. 58, 61-62 (1967)(need to protect custodians). See also Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S.
143, 147-48 (1972)(police may conduct limited search of vehicle upon reasonable suspicion
that occupant about to commit crime).
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The Extended Border Search Doctrine
For purposes of national security, the United States may require trav-
elers coming into the country to identify themselves and their possessions
as legally entitled to entry.104 Consequently, customs agents have expan-
sive authority to search vessels,'05 persons, and effects 06 crossing the in-
ternational borders of the United States. A customs officer need only have
reasonable suspicion'°7 of finding imported contraband on a person or in
his baggage to conduct a search away from the actual border, or an "ex-
tended border search."'108 Circuit courts have often upheld these searches,
though the Supreme Court has never decided their constitutionality. 0 9 In
United States v. Bilir,"0 the Fourth Circuit applied the extended border
search doctrine to affirm narcotics convictions.
In Bilir, agents of the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) received in-
formation that seaman Bilir, with the assistance of two other persons of
Turkish or Greek nationality, would attempt to smuggle heroin into the
United States aboard a Turkish ship."' DEA agents kept the suspects
under virtually constant surveillance from the time the ship arrived at its
first port of call until it reached Baltimore, its last port of call." 2 Surveil-
lance continued in Baltimore, where DEA agents saw two suspects board
104 See Carroll v. United States, 367 U.S. 132, 154 (1925)(suspects apprehended with
illegal liquor in vicinity of international boundary). A sovereign has the unquestioned right
to exclude persons or objects from entry. United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606, 616, 619
(1977); XThe Schooner Exchange v. M'Faddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 478, 481 (1812).
105 19 U.S.C. § 1581(a)(1976) provides that customs officers may board vessels or stop
vehicles anywhere in the country or its customs waters to examine, inspect, or search the
vessel, vehicle, occupants, or contents.
106 19 C.F.R. § 162.6 (1979) provides that customs agents may search all persons, bag-
gage, and merchandise entering the United States.
107 Reasonable suspicion is a lower standard than probable cause. Probable cause re-
quires a law enforcement officer to be aware of facts which would lead a reasonable man to
believe that there is a high probability that a person or vehicle is carrying contraband. See
Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 162 (1925). See also note 12 supra. Reasonable suspi-
cion, however, requires only a possibility that a person or vehicle is carrying contraband. See
United States v. McGlone, 394 F.2d 75, 78 (4th Cir. 1968). See generally Note, Fourth
Amendment Applications to Searches Conducted by Immigration Officials, 38 ALB. L. REv.
962, 970 (1974).
208 See text accompanying note 16 supra. Since the First Congress, border searches on
less than probable cause have been deemed reasonable. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616,
623 (1886). See also Act of July 31, 1789, § 24, ch. 5, 1 Stat. 43. The constitutionality of
legislation derived from the first border search act has never been challenged. Ittig, The
Rites of Passage: Border Searches and the Fourth Amendment, 40 TENN. L. REv. 329, 332
(1973) [hereinafter cited as Ittig]; Comment, Border Searches and the Fourth Amendment,
77 YAE L.J. 1007, 1008 [hereinafter cited as Border Searches].
109 The Supreme Court has consistently denied certiorari to extended border search
cases. See Ittig, supra note 108, at 331; Note, From Bags to Body Cavities: The Law of
Border Search, 74 COLUM. L. REv. 53, 54 & n.6 (1974)[hereinafter cited as Bags to Body
Cavities].
220 592 F.2d 735 (4th Cir. 1979).
"I Id. at 736-37.
212 Id. at 737-38.
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the ship and leave shortly thereafter with defendant Bilir. The next
morning, agents stopped the suspects as they attempted to leave the city.
An agent searched a suitcase carried by one of the suspects and found
heroin. " 3 Later, during custodial interrogation, the searched suspect ad-
mitted smuggling drugs into the country from the ship.1 4 Prior to trial,
the district court denied the motion of the three defendants to suppress
the heroin. 115 Bilir was subsequently convicted of conspiracy to import
heroin."' The other two defendants were convicted of possession of her-
oin with intent to distribute'11 and conspiracy to distribute heroin,118 re-
spectively. On appeal, the defendants challenged the constitutionality of
the warrantless extended border search." 9
While acknowledging the right of persons lawfully within the country
to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures, 120 the Bilir court
stated that the difficulties involved in policing the international boundary
make extended border searches reasonable.2 ' The Fourth Circuit adhered
to a test of reasonableness under the circumstances to determine the va-
lidity of the search.' 2 ' Factors crucial to this reasonableness determina-
tion include the elasped time since the border crossing, 2' the, distance
from the border, 124 and, most importantly, the manner and extent of sur-
veillance. 25 Time and distance factors aid in establishing the critical
"I Id. at 738.
.1. Id. at 738-39.
119 Id. at 736. See generally note 151 infra.
11 See 18 U.S.C. § 2 (1976); 21 U.S.C. §§ 952(a), 963 (1976).
11 See 21 U.S.C. § 841(a) (1976).
18 See 18 U.S.C. § 2 (1976); 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a), 846 (1976).
"19 592 F.2d at 736.
120 Id. at 739 (quoting Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 153-54 (1925)). The fram-
ers devised the fourth amendment probable cause requirement to guard against the evil of
general investigatory searches within the borders. See Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616,
625, 626-27 (1886).
121 592 F.2d at 740. The Bilir court pointed out that a search might occur some distance
from the border because officers will not have seen the suspect cross the border. Id. The
cases where officers actually observe a suspect's border crossing, follow him, and conduct a
deliberately delayed search usually reveal two justifications. Id. at 740 n.9. Officers may find
it necessary to delay the search either to buttress marginal suspicion, see, e.g., United States
v. Brom, 542 F.2d 281, 283 (5th Cir. 1976), or to place themselves in the position to catch
confederates of the suspects. See, e.g., United States v. Fogelman, 586 F.2d 337, 344 (5th
Cir. 1978). See generally Ittig, supra note 108, at 339; Border Searches, supra note 108, at
1010.
122 592 F.2d at 740; accord, United States v. Martinez, 481 F.2d 214, 218 (5th Cir. 1973),
cert. denied, 415 U.S. 931 (1974); United States v. McGlone, 394 F.2d 75, 78 (4th Cir. 1968);
Alexander v. United States, 362 F.2d 379, 382-83 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 977
(1966).
121 592 F.2d at 740; United States v. McGlone, 394 F.2d 75, 78 (4th Cir. 1968); Thomas
v. United States, 372 F.2d 252, 255 (5th Cir. 1967); Alexander v. United States, 362 F.2d
379, 382 (9th Cir. 1966).
12, 592 F.2d at 740; United States v. McGlone, 394 F.2d 75, 78 (4th Cir. 1968); Alexan-
der v. United States, 362 F.2d 379, 382 (9th Cir. 1966); Marsh v. United States, 344 F.2d
317, 324-25 (5th Cir. 1965).
125 592 F.2d at 741; see King v. United States, 348 F.2d 814, 816 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
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nexus between the suspect and the border.126 Surveillance, even if not
continuous, supports the belief that the condition of the search target has
not changed from the time the target crossed the border to the time of
the search. Consequently, surveillance allows customs agents to be rea-
sonably certain that any contraband found had been present at the time
of the border crossing. 27 The factors of time, distance, and surveillance,
along with other circumstances of the particular case, must support rea-
sonable suspicion for the search away from the actual border. 128 Applying
the reasonableness test 2 9 to the facts of Bilir, the Fourth Circuit found
382 U.S. 926 (1965). But see United States v. Cusanelli, 357 F. Supp. 678, 680 (S.D. Ohio
1972), affd, 472 F.2d 1204 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 953 (1973). For a discussion of
factors utilized in assessing the reasonableness of extended border searches, see Bags to
Body Cavities, supra note 109, at 57-72.
128 See 592 F.2d at 740; United States v. Bursey, 491 F.2d 531, 533 (5th Cir. 1974). An
extended border search must occur within a reasonable time and distance from the border.
See King v. United States, 348 F.2d 814, 816 (9th Cir. 1964). However, no circuit prescribes
any specific time or distance beyond which an extended border search is per se unreasona-
ble. See Note, In Search of the Border: Searches Conducted by Federal Customs and Im-
migration Officers, 5 N.Y.U.J. INT'L. L. & POL. 93, 102-03 (1972) [hereinafter cited as In
Search of the Border]. Even if a reasonable distance were prescribed by statute -or regula-
tion, cf., e.g., 8 C.F.R. § 287.1 (1979)(reasonable distance of 100 air miles from border for
immigration searches), proximity to the border would not automatically make a search rea-
sonable. See United States v. McDaniel, 463 F.2d 129, 132-33 (5th Cir. 1972)(massive
searches in downtown Cleveland or Buffalo probably not valid border searches). See also
United States v. Barbera, 514 F.2d 294, 298-99 (2d Cir. 1975).
127 592 F.2d at 741; accord, United States v. Martinez, 481 F.2d 214, 218 (5th Cir. 1973);
Alexander v. United States, 362 F.2d 379, 382 (9th Cir. 1966). Continuous surveillance best
assures that contraband found at the time of the search has an international origin. Bags to
Body Cavities, supra note 109, at 59. If breaks in surveillance are so brief that the suspects
could not have obtained the contraband from domestic sources, then customs officers will
have satisfied the surveillance factor. See, e.g., United States v. Martinez, 481 F.2d at 218-19
& 218 n.9; United States v. Terry, 446 F.2d 579, 582 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 946
(1971). See generally Bags to Body Cavities, supra note 109, at 58-61.
128 592 F.2d at 740; see United States v. Martinez, 481 F.2d 214, 219 (5th Cir. 1973);
United States v. McGlone, 394 F.2d 75, 78 (4th Cir. 1968). The requirement of reasonable
suspicion protects an individual's privacy rights by guarding against searches at any place in
the country no matter how long he has been in the country. See United States v. Warner,
441 F.2d 821, 833 (5th Cir. 1971).
129 The Fourth Circuit's test for the validity of an extended border search is a combina-
tion of the Ninth and Fifth Circuits' tests. The Ninth Circuit test is whether customs agents
can be reasonably certain that any merchandise found was on the person or in the vehicle at
the time of entry into the country. See Alexander v. United States, 362 F.2d 379, 382 (9th
Cir. 1966). Surveillance is crucial to meet this reasonable certainty standard. See United
States v. Garcia, 415 2d 141, 144 (9th Cir. 1969). No reasonable suspicion of a customs law
violation is necessary under the Ninth Circuit test. A search conducted away from the bor-
der after continuous surveillance is merely a later assertion by customs agents of their power
to search any vehicle at the actual border without any suspicion. See Bags to Body Cavities,
supra note 109, at 57-59; In Search of the Border, supra note 126, at 98-100. Reasonable
certainty has nothing to do with suspicion of crime. Customs agents need only be reasonably
certain that any merchandise that might be hidden accompanied the vehicle or person ac-
cross the border, though agents will not likely initiate surveillance without suspicion that
the merchandise is contraband. Bags to Body Cavities, supra note 109, at 58 & n.28. The
Fifth Circuit test is one of reasonable suspicion that the suspects have violated customs
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all of the crucial factors satisfied. The search, carried out seven hours
after the agents observed the suspects in the border area and three to
four miles away from the border, fulfilled the time and distance factors.13 0
Virtually continuous surveillance3 1 substantiated the officers' theory that
laws. See United States v. Martinez, 481 F.2d 214, 219 (5th Cir. 1973); Note, Border
Searches in the Fifth Circuit: Constitutional Guarantees v. Immigration Policy, 8 CUM. L.
REv. 107, 141 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Border Searches in the Fifth Circuit]. Surveil-
lance is important, though not crucial, to substantiate suspicion formed at the actual border
or to raise unfounded suspicion to reasonable suspicion during the watching period under
the Fifth Circuit test. See 481 F.2d at 218-19; Bags to Body Cavities, supra note 109, at 61.
Both the Ninth and Fifth Circuits also consider time, distance, and the surrounding circum-
stances. See, e.g., United States v. Hill, 430 F.2d 129, 131 (5th Cir. 1970); Alexander v.
United States, 362 F.2d 379, 382 (9th Cir. 1966). The Foukh Circuit test encompasses the
Ninth Circuit surveillance requirement, the Fifth Circuit reasonable suspicion requirement,
and the time, distance, and surrounding circumstances factors of both circuits. See text
accompanying notes 123-28 supra.
The Ninth and Fifth Circuit tests usually lead to the same result upon application,
since customs agents would not likely follow a person from the border without suspicion, nor
would they ordinarily have a basis for reasonable suspicion of a customs law violation unless
they observe a suspect from the time of a border crossing. See 3 W. LAFAvE, supra note 2, §
10.5, at 301; Bags to Body Cavities, supra note 109, at 62. The outcome in Bilir would have
been the same under either test. See text accompanying notes 131-35 infra. The twvo tests,
however, may sometimes demand divergent results. For example, in United States v.
Reagor, 441 F.2d 252 (5th Cir. 1971), customs agents searched defendant's vehicle 60 miles
from the border without maintaining surveillance. The Fifth Circuit upheld the search,
holding that the officers had reasonable suspicion of a customs law violation. The court
pointed out that the 60-mile portion of the road contained no junctions and that the area on
either side was virtually uninhabited. Id. at 253-54. The Ninth Circuit continuous surveil-
lance test would probably invalidate a Reagor-type search, since the defendants in that case
could have obtained the contraband from another vehicle or a house along the road. See
Bags to Body Cavities, supra note 109, at 62 n.46.
130 592 F.2d at 741. The court observed that other circuits had upheld searches under-
taken much longer after crossing and a great deal farther away from the actual border. See,
e.g., United States v. Fogelman, 586 F.2d 337, 344 (5th Cir. 1978) (20 hours, 254 miles);
United States v. Martinez, 481 F.2d 214, 219 (5th Cir. 1973) (142 hours, 150 miles); Rodri-
guez-Gonzales v. United States, 378 F.2d 256, 258 (9th Cir. 1967) (15 hours, 20 miles). But
see United States v. Majourau, 474 F.2d 766, 768, 769 (9th Cir. 1973)(search conducted over
80 miles and 3 hours from border without continuous surveillance too remote in time and
distance). The Fourth Circuit considered time and distance factors to be of little signifi-
cance unless related to surveillance. See 592 F.2d at 741; accord, Castillo-Garcia v. United
States, 424 F.2d 482, 485 (9th Cir. 1970).
151 See 592 F.2d at 738. Surveillance was broken on three occasions in Baltimore. The
agents lost sight of two of the suspects for an hour from the time they left downtown Balti-
more until they boarded the ship. Id. The agents lost sight of Bilir when he left Baltimore
with the two other suspects. He boarded the ship over two hours before the other suspects,
unobserved, and Bilir was not relocated by the agents until he subsequently departed from
the ship. Id. at 743 (Winter, J., dissenting). The agents lost sight of the searched suspect for
two or three minutes when the suspect stopped in a bar enroute to the hotel from the ship.
Id. at 738. The majority ignored these breaks in surveillance. See id. at 741. The dissent
contended that these interruptions were crucial to the determination of reasonable cause to
suspect illegal importation of heroin because the defendants would have had ample opportu-
nity to procure heroin from a domestic source. Id. at 743-44 (Winter, J., dissenting).
While the defendants could have obtained the heroin from domestic sources during the
first two breaks, these breaks were insignificant since they occurred before the defendants
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the seized heroin had been concealed on the searched suspect when, he
departed from the border area.13 2 Finally, the information that sparked
the investigation, the knowledge obtained during forty-two days of pur-
suit, 33 and the suspects' behavior at the time of arrest,"" provided other
circumstances to give the agents reasonable suspicion that the heroin had
just crossed the border. 85
After upholding the district court ruling under the extended border
search doctrine, the Fourth Circuit rejected the defendants' contention
that the Supreme Court's decision in Almeida-Sanchez v. United
States3" necessitated reversal of the convictions.3 7 Striking down a rov-
ing immigration border patrol search conducted away from the border ab-
sent consent or probable cause, 38 the Almeida-Sanchez Court stated that
agents may undertake warrantless searches at the border or its "func-
entered the border area. As to the third break, the searched suspect probably could not have
carefully placed 13.4 lbs. of heroin, see id. at 738, on his person in three minutes. See gener-
ally note 127 supra.
132 592 F.2d at 741. The Fourth Circuit erroneously stated that the searched suspect
had crossed the border, see id., when in fact he was an alien residing in the United States at
the time of the search. Nothing indicated that he had been a seaman or passenger on the
ship. See Brief for Appellee at 8. A person who boards a ship in United States waters has
crossed no border and normally would not be subject to border search. Cf. Carroll v. United
States, 267 U.S. 132, 154 (1925)(persons lawfully within country have right to free passage
without interruption). Officers may search on reasonable suspicion if the person, vehicle, or
thing has a critical nexus with the border. See, e.g., United States v. Weil, 432 F.2d 1320,
1323 (9th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 947 (1971); United States v. McGlone, 394 F.2d
75, 78 (4th Cir. 1968). The suspect in Bilir was a member of the searchable class because he
had been in the border area and in close contact with Bilir, who was a seaman on a foreign
vessel. See 592 F.2d at 738; accord, United States v. Glaziou, 402 F.2d 8, 13-14 (2d Cir.
1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1121 (1969); United States v. McGlone, 394 F.2d 75, 78-79 (4th
Cir. 1968).
133 See 592 F.2d at 736-38. Other DEA agents had informed the searching officer that
one of the defendants and another person had followed the ship from its first port of call to
its last. 592 F.2d at 741. Reasonable suspicion may be based on both firsthand information
and reliable information communicated to the searching officer. See United States v. Mc-
Glone, 394 F.2d 75, 76, 78-79 (4th Cir. 1968).
134 See 592 F.2d at 738. Prior to the search, the suspects attempted to flee when they
saw the officers. The searched suspect lied to the agents when they stopped and questioned
him. Id. These actions supported reasonable suspicion. Id. at 741; accord, United States v.
Glaziou, 402 F.2d 8, 14-15 & 15 n.5 (2d Cir. 1968) (suspect's nervousness justified search);
Ramirez v. United States, 263 F.2d 385, 386 n.1, 387 (5th Cir. 1959)(suspect's nervousness,
evasiveness, and lying justified search).
135 592 F.2d at 741.
'6 413 U.S. 266 (1973) In Almeida-Sanchez, border patrol agents, without a warrant or
probable cause, stopped the defendant on a highway approximately 25 miles from the bor-
der. After determining that the defendant was lawfully within the country, the agents
searched the car and found marijuana. Id. at 267-68..The Court held that the search vio-
lated the defendant's fourth amendment rights. Id. at 273. See generally Note, The Extent
of the Border, 1 HASTINGS CONsT. L.Q. 235 (1974).
137 592 F.2d at 741-42.
" See 413 U.S. at 273. The Court pointed out that the officers did not even have rea-
sonable suspicion. Id. at 268.
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tional equivalent."' 13 9 The Fourth Circuit assumed that Almeida-Sanchez,
an immigration patrol case, applied to Bilir, a customs patrol case.140
Since the search in Bilir did not take place at the actual border or its
functional equivalent,141 the Almeida-Sanchez doctrine did not apply. In
any event, the agents did have reasonable suspicion that the searched
suspect possessed recently imported contraband,14' and therefore the case




The Fourth Circuit's test for the validity of an extended border search
offers favorable safeguards.' 4 ' Reasonable certainty of the presence of the
contraband at the time of the border crossing and reasonable suspicion of
a customs law violation at the time of the search ensure against selective
law enforcement."45 Moreover, the test provides the protection demanded
by the Supreme Court against harassment of innocent travelers within
the country. 14 The result in Bilir, however, evidences the uniquely broad
power of customs agents to undertake warrantless extended border
searches.147 Once a person has had significant contact with the border, he
may expect to be subject to search for a substantial period after leaving
the border area.1
48
Standing to Contest Warrantless Searches and Seizures
A criminal defendant must have standing when he seeks to challenge
the admissibility of evidence on the basis of an unconstitutional search
139 Id. at 272.
140 592 F.2d at 742; accord, United States v. Brennan, 538 F.2d 711, 719 (5th Cir. 1976),
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1092 (1977); United States v. Solmes, 527 F.2d 1370, 1372-73 (9th Cir.
1975). But see Roa-Rodriquez v. United States, 410 F.2d 1206, 1208-09 (10th Cir. 1969). See
generally 36 Fed. Reg. 13,410 (1971); Border Searches in the Fifth Circuit, supra note 129,
at 142-43; Article, Border Searches: Beyond Almeida-Sanchez, 8 U. CAL. D.L. REv. 163, 171-
72 (1975).
141 592 F.2d at 742. An established checking station near the border and at the intersec-
tion of a road leading from the border or an inland airport receiving nonstop flights from
abroad may be the functional equivalent of a border. Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413
U.S. 266, 272-73 (1973). Because the railroad station where the Bilir search occurred was not
the functional equivalent of a border, the officers were required to have reasonable suspi-
cion. See 592 F.2d at 742. See also United States v. Gallagher, 557 F.2d 1041, 1044 (4th
Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 870 (1977); United States v. Solmes, 527 F.2d 1370, 1372-73 (9th
Cir. 1975).
142 See text accompanying notes 129-35 supra.
1413 592 F.2d at 742.
144 See 3 W. LAFAVE, supra note 2, § 10.5, at 300-01.
141 See generally Comment, Minority Groups and the Fourth Amendment Standard of
Certitude: United States v. Ortiz and United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 11 HARv. C.R.-C.L.
L. REV. 733 (1976).
14' See generally text accompanying note 120 supra.
147 See text accompanying notes 104-08 & 121 supra.
148 See text accompanying notes 122-35 supra.
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and seizure.""' Since fourth amendment rights are personal rights, 5 " the
requirement of standing assures that a person moving to suppress evi-
dence' 5' is a proper party to assert the claim.152 In United States v. Jack-
son, '5 the Fourth Circuit analyzed the standing of two defendants to ob-
ject to the search of a house which neither of them owned, and the
subsequent seizure of gambling slips used against them in an illegal gam-
bling business prosecution. The court held that the defendants did not
have standing to contest the search because they lacked a reasonable ex-
pectation of privacy in the room searched. 5 4 Adopting a novel approach
to standing, "5 the Fourth Circuit determined that defendant Jackson, as
owner of the objects seized, had standing to contest the warrantless
seizure, but not the search. 156
Executing a warrant to search defendant Jackson, state police officers
went to the home of a third party, who informed the officers that Jack-
son, a suspected gambling business operator, had recently dropped a bag
of numbers slips in an empty adjacent house.15 The officers looked in the
window of the empty house placarded for rent, 58 saw the bag, conducted
a warrantless search of one of the rooms, and found the numbers slips in
Jackson's bag. 9 Prior to trial, the district court denied the suppression
motion 10 of Jackson and his co-defendant, McKenzie." ' At trial, a jury
4' See Jones v. United'States, 362 U.S. 257, 261 (1960). A person has standing to con-
test an unconstitutional search and seizure if he was the victim of the unlawful police ac-
tion. Id.; Trager & Lobenfeld, The Law of Standing Under the Fourth Amendment, 41
BROoKLYN L. REv. 421, 422 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Trager & Lobenfeld]. His interest in
the premises must be of such nature as to give him a reasonable expectation of freedom
from police search. Mancusi v. DeForte, 392 U.S. 364, 368 (1968).
15 See Simmons v. United States, 390 U:S. 377, 389 (1968); Katz v. United States, 389
U.S. 347, 351 (1967). A personal constitutional right is one which cannot be vicariously as-
serted. Thus, a person cannot derive standing from a co-conspirator or co-defendant. Alder-
man v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 171-72 (1969). But see Jones v. United States, 362 U.S.
257, 263-65 (1960).
5 See FED. R. CR. P. 41(f); 12(b)(3). A person aggrieved by an unlawful search and
seizure may move to suppress the evidence obtained during an unconstitutional search. A
successful movant is entitled to have the evidence excluded at trial and returned to him. See
id. 41(e).
1"2 See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962).
153 585 F.2d 653 (4th Cir. 1978).
15 See id. at 658, 659. See generally note 2 supra.
'15 See 585 F.2d at 656-58. Prior to Jackson, the Fourth Circuit had determined stand-
ing on the basis of whether the search was directed at the defendant. See, e.g., Patler v.
Slayton, 503 F.2d 472, 477-78 (4th Cir. 1974); United States v. Cobb, 432 F.2d 716, 719-20
(4th Cir. 1970). See also Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 261 (1960). Prior to Supreme
Court disposition of this issue, the Jackson court expressly rejected this "target theory" as
an independent basis for standing. See 585 F.2d at 658 n.9; accord, Rakas v. Illinois, 439
U.S. 128, 133-38 (1978).
1*1 See 585 F.2d at 656-57; United States v. Lisk, 522 F.2d 228, 231 (7th Cir. 1975), cert.
denied, 423 U.S. 1078 (1976).
157 Id. at 656.
I" See note 189 infra.
659 585 F.2d at 656.
6 See generally note 151 supra. In denying the suppression motion, the district court
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convicted both defendants of operating an illegal gambling business.
162
The defendants appealed, contending that the warrantless search of the
room was unconstitutional.
163
The Fourth Circuit rejected the two grounds advanced by Jackson to
establish his claim of standing. The court found that the defendant did
not have automatic standing to challenge the search."" A person auto-
matically has standing if possession of the seized property is an essential
element of the crime charged."1 5 Jackson, however, was charged with an
offense which only required that the Government prove his participation
in a criminal enterprise26 and the numbers slips were not essential ele-
ments of the crime charged. In addition, the court decided that Jackson
lacked standing because he had no interest in the premises searched.
167
Inasmuch as his interest was only in the objects seized 68 the court ap-
found that the search was reasonable, ignoring the issue of standing. Brief for Appellee at
10.
1261 See 585 F.2d at 656.
182 Id. at 654; see Brief for Appellee at 2. See also 18 U.S.C. § 1955 (1976); VA. CODs §§
18.2-325, -328 to 331 (Repl. 1975).
1 585 F.2d at 656.
164 Id.
18I Brown v. United States, 411 U.S. 223, 227, 229 (1973); Jones v. United States, 362
U.S. 257, 263-64 (1960). See also United States v. Cobb, 432 F.2d 716, 720-22 (4th Cir.
1970). In most cases, a person claiming standing must show some interest in the premises
searched. See note 149 supra. The purpose of the automatic standing rule is to prevent the
Government from denying that a person had a sufficient interest in the seized property to
confer standing, and later asserting at trial that he shouldbe convicted for possession. Jones
v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 261-65 (1960). See generally 3 W. LAFAvE, supra note 2, §
11.3, at 582-600; Trager & Lobenfeld, supra note 149, at 423-44.
1 8 See 585 F.2d at 656. See also Sanabria v. United States, 437 U.S. 54, 70 & n.26
(1978). Operation of a gambling business, not possession of numbers slips, violates 18 U.S.C.
§ 1955 (1976). See 437 U.S. at 70; note 162 supra.
1 585 F.2d at 658. A person has standing to contest a search if he has a reasonable
expectation of privacy in the premises, which need not stem from legal possession or owner-
ship. See Combs v. United States, 408 U.S. 224, 227 (1972); Mancusi v. DeForte, 391 U.S.
364, 368 (1968). Jackson could not claim standing because he had no possessory or proprie-
tary interest in the premises, 585 F.2d at 658, and had not received permission to place the
bag in the empty house. Id. at 659; see Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 267 (1960). See
generally Trager & Lobenfeld, supra note 149, at 447-48; Knox, Some Thoughts on the
Scope of the Fourth Amendment and Standing to Challenge Searches and Seizures, 40
Mo. L. REv. 1, 38-39 (1975); see also United States v. Lang, 527 F.2d 1264, 1266 (4th Cir.
1975); Johnson v. Smith, 414 F.2d 645, 647-48 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 951
(1970).
168 585 F.2d at 656. The Supreme Court has implied that an interest in the property
seized may be sufficient to confer standing. See Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 148-49
(1978); Brown v. United States, 411 U.S. 223, 228 (1973); Jones v. United States, 362 U.S.
257, 261 (1960); United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48, 51 (1951). Since the underlying theory
of property ownership is the right of the owner to exclude, the Court apparently recognized
that privacy rights are usually inluded in property rights. See generally Rakas v. Illinois,
439 U.S. at 143 n.12; United States v. Hunt, 505 F.2d 931, 936-37 (5th Cir. 1974), cert.
denied, 421 U.S. 975 (1975). However, the Court has expressly held that a defendant does
not have standing if he was not on the premises at the time of the search, had not proprie-
tary or possessory interest in the premises, or was not charged with a crime of which posses-
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plied a new standing theory and held that Jackson had standing to con-
test the seizure, but not the search.16 9
The Fourth Circuit's bifurcation of search and seizure is consistent
with the Seventh Circuit's approach to standing in United States v.
Lisk. 170 In Lisk, the defendant received permission to leave a bomb in a
third party's car. The police seized the bomb during an unlawful search of
the car.' 7' The Seventh Circuit held that since Lisk's interest was in the
bomb and not in the car, he had standing to object to the seizure of the
bomb, but not to the search of the car.1 7 2 This search-seizure dichotomy
emphasizes that only persons whose fourth amendment rights are vio-
lated by the search itself may assert standing to object to the search.
1 7 3
Like the defendant in Lisk, Jackson left his property in a place where he
had no reasonable expectation of privacy, and thereby lost his right to
challenge the search.' 74 Seizures, however, are not in themselves subject
to this constitutional requirement. 75 Hence, Jackson, as owner of the bag,
could contest its seizure.1
7 6
Jackson's co-defendant, McKenzie, 1 7 had no ownership rights in the
seized bag, but she did have permission from the owner of the empty
house to store furniture in the house.7 s According to the Supreme Court,
sion of the seized evidence is an essential element. See Brown v. United States, 411 U.S.
223, 229 (1973).
18' See 585 F.2d at 657.
270 522 F.2d 228 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1078 (1976); accord, United
States v. Galante, 547 F.2d 733, 739 n.11 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 969 (1977).
See generally Recent Development, 13 AM. Cram. L. REv. 801 (1976) [hereinafter cited as
AM. CRIM. L. REV.]; Recent Development, 64 GEO. L.J. 1187 (1976) [hereinafter cited as
GEo. L.J.].
:71 522 F.2d at 229.
172 Id. at 231. In United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48 (1951), the Supreme Court ex-
pressly declined to separate the search and seizure components of the fourth amendment.
Id. at 52. However, Jeffers is distinguishable from Lisk because the defendant in Lisk was
not the target of the search. See 522 F.2d at 232-33. Additionally, the defendant in Jeffers
had standing to contest the search on the basis of his interest in the premises. See 342 U.S.
at 50-51, 52; GEo. L.J., supra note 170, at 1191. But see AM. CRIM. L. REv., supra note 170,
at 808-09.
173 See Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 171-72 (1969).
174 See 585 F.2d at 658. A person has no standing if all objective facts suggest that he
abandoned the seized property. Abandonment need not be complete in the common law
sense. Rather, the test is whether the person retained a reasonable expectation of privacy in
the property at the time of the search and seizure. See, e.g., United States v. Jackson, -544
F.2d 407, 409 (9th Cir. 1976); United States v. Colbert, 474 F.2d 174, 176 (5th Cir. 1973).
175 See W. RINGLE, SEARCHES AND SEIzuRES, ARRESTS AND CONFESSIONS § 161, at 195
(1975) (seizures not in themselves prohibited by Constitution).
176 See 585 F.2d at 657. Since the numbers slips were not contraband, the defendant
could challenge the seizure. See United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48, 52-54 (1951).
177 585 F.2d at 656. The defendants also challenged a search of other premises, where
officers found numbers slips in McKenzie's possession, on the ground that the officers had
failed to knock before forcefully entering the premises as required by 18 U.S.C. § 3109
(1976). 585 F.2d at 661. While holding that the knock and announce requirement had been
met, the Fourth Circuit determined that the officers' need to prevent destruction of the
evidence would have excused noncompliance. Id: at 662.
178 585 F.2d at 659.
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a defendant legitimately on the premises at the time of the search has
standing." Since McKenzie was storing a stove in the house when the
search took place, she was legitimately on the premises.180 Notwithstand-
ing her interest in the house, the Fourth Circuit held that McKenzie had
no standing to object to the search.181 For purposes of standing, the
"premises" were the room searched, not the entire house, since only that
room was searched. The co-defendant had stored nothing in the searched
room,' 8' and was unaware of the presence of the bag in the house. 83 Be-
cause McKenzie had not been using the searched room'8' and was not
present at the time of the search, 85 she suffered no constitutional inva-
sion of privacy.188
Though finding no basis to sustain a claim of standing on McKenzie's
part, the Jackson court in dicta stated that McKenzie's objection to the
search wolild have failed on the merits. 18 7 The Fourth Circuit conceded
that the officers intruded upon the property when they looked in the win-
dow of the house. The intrusion, however, did not amount to an unrea-
sonable invasion of privacy. s88 The vacancy of the premises did not give
McKenzie a reasonable expectation of privacy in the open area surround-
ing the house. 89 Therefore, the officers acted reasonably when they
looked through the window,9" and were justified in searching the room
119 See Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. U.S. 257, 267 (1960).
18 See 585 F.2d at 659. Compare United States v. Harwood, 470 F.2d 322, 325-26 (10th
Cir. 1972)(defendant who stored seized articles on premises with permission had standing)
with United States v. Grunsfeld, 558 F.2d 1231, 1241 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 872
(1977)(defendant who merely had key and permission to enter premises had no standing).
181 585 F.2d at 659.
182 Id.; cf. United States v. Abbarno, 342 F. Supp. 599, 604 (W.D.N.Y. 1972) (tenants
had no standing to object to search of unrented part of premises where they stored equip-
ment without owner's permission).
18 585 F.2d at 659.
18, Id.; cf. Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217, 241 (1960)(hotel guest had no standing
to contest search of room he vacated). See generally 3 W. LAFAVE, supra note 2, § 11.3, at
556-63.
'" See 585 F.2d at 655; Brown v. United States, 411 U.S. 223, 229 (1973)(defendants
had no standing because, among other things, not on premises when search occurred).
188 See 585 F.2d at 659.
187 Id. A person may have standing to assert a fourth amendment claim and yet lose on
the merits. See Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 189 n.2 (1969)(Harlan, J., concur-
ring in part and dissenting in part). See also Patler v. Slayton, 503 F.2d 472, 478 (4th Cir.
1974)(defendant had standing but search and seizure conducted in open field lawful).
188 585 F.2d at 659-60.
18 Id. at 660. The court stated that premises placarded for rent invite members of the
public to come upon the land and examine the fixtures and property to decide whether they
would like to rent. Id. (citing Ponce v. Craven, 409 F.2d 621 (9th Cir. 1969)). The Fourth
Circuit analogized the vacant lot surrounding the house to a public passageway. In Ponce,
the Ninth Circuit held that police officers who observed the actions of the defendant
through an open window from a motel parking lot did not conduct an illegal search. The
Ponce court found that the parking lot was a public passageway. 409 F.2d at 624-25; accord,
United States v. Coplen, 541 F.2d 211, 214 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1073
(1977).
18 585 F.2d at 660.
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after they had observed the criminal evidence. 91
The Fourth Circuit's decision in Jackson is consistent with the Su-
preme Court's declaration that fourth amendment rights are personal
rights and cannot be asserted by those claiming prejudice only from the
introduction of damaging evidence.1 9 2 To better demonstrate the differ-
ence between privacy rights and property rights, the court adopted the
reasoning of United States v. Lisk and dichotomized the right to object
to a search and the right to contest a seizure.19 3 A person's ownership of
seized property, without more, is insufficient to accord standing to object
to a search of the premises in which police discovered the object; though
he may object to the seizure.1 9 4 Further, a person's presence on one part
of the searched premises may not necessarily grant him standing to object
to a search of another portion of the premises unoccupied by him.1 95 Fi-
nally, though a person may have standing to contest a search and seizure,
191 585 F.2d at 660-61; see Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 465-70 (1971). See
generally Moylan, The Plain View Doctrine: Unexpected Child of the Great "Search Inci-
dent" Geography Battle, 26 MERCER L. REV. 1047, 1073-78, 1081-88 (1975); see also 1 W.
LAFAvE, supra note 2, § 2.2, at 243-44.
Before undertaking the search, the officers sought the advice of the Commonwealth's
attorney, who informed them that they did not need a warrant. 585 F.2d at 656. Relying
solely on United States v. Johnson, 561 F.2d 832 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 432 U.S. 907
(1977), the Fourth Circuit accepted the district court's determination that the officers had
acted reasonably and in good faith. 585 F.2d at 661. In Johnson, the police looked through
the defendant's basement window and observed a large quantity of narcotics. The officers
then called an assistant United States attorney, who advised them to search the premises
without a warrant, since the defendants would probably remove the evidence before the
officers could obtain a warrant. Id. at 834-35. The Johnson court upheld the search because
the prosecutor's advice was of sufficient probative value for the district court to find that
the officers acted in good faith. Id. at 843. The proposed "good faith" exception to the exclu-
sionary rule allows evidence unconstitutionally -seized to be admitted at trial if the seizing
officers acted in the good faith belief that their conduct was constitutional and they had a
reasonable basis for that belief. See Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 537-42 (1976) (White, J.,
dissenting); accord, id. at 496-502 (Burger, C.J., concurring); Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590,
606-16 (1975)(Powell, J., concurring). See generally Ball, Good Faith and the Fourth
Amendment: The "Reasonable" Exception to the Exclusionary Rule, 69 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 635 (1978); Wright, Must the Criminal Go Free if the Constable Blunders? 50
Tax. L. REv. 736, 738-41 (1972). See also Peltier v. United States, 422 U.S. 531, 535-38
(1975).
In adopting the Johnson reasoning, the Fourth Circuit implied that the search was also
valid because the officers needed to effect immediate entry to prevent the destruction or
removal of the evidence. See 585 F.2d at 661 (citing United States v. Johnson, 561 F.2d at
843). The Supreme Court has implied that it might uphold a warrantless search under cir-
cumstances where police must act quickly to prevent destruction of potential evidence. See
McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 455 (1948); Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10,
15 (1948); 2 W. LAFAva, supra note 2, § 6.5, at 433. See also United States v. Rubin, 474
F.2d 262, 268-69 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 833 (1973).
:'2 See text accompanying notes 167 & 177-86 supra.
,3 See text accompanying notes 170-76 supra.
14 See text accompanying notes 167-69 & 172-76 supra.
"9' See text accompanying notes 177-86 supra.
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he must show an infringement of his reasonable expectation of privacy to
prevail on the merits. 196
HENRY DARNELL LEwis
B. Prisoners'Rights
Many prisoners use section 1983 of Title 42 of the United States
Code" to assert evolving constitutional rights.2 Federal courts are becom-
ing more active in prisoners' rights cases by abandoning the traditional
policy of judicial restraint,' awarding compensatory damages against
prison officials4 and fashioning comprehensive injunctive relief for viola-
196 See text accompanying notes 187-91 supra.
- 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976). Section 1983 provides that every person who, under color of
state law, deprives any person within the United States of any rights, privileges, or immuni-
ties secured by the Constitution and laws shall be liable to the person injured in an action at
law or equity. Id. See generally Potuto, The Right of Prisoner Access: Does Bounds Have
Bounds?, 53 IND. L.J. 207 (1977-78) [hereinafter cited as Potuto]. Section 1983 actions apply
to the rights of citizens generally, and are of fundamental importance to constitutional juris-
prudence. See Bounds v. Smi, -, 430 U.S. 817, 827 (1977) (prisoners' right to adequate law
library or to adequate assistance from persons trained in the law). States may not deprive
prisoners of their constitutional right to assert claims under § 1983. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418
U.S. 539, 556 (1974) (good time credit and disciplinary proceedings and inspection of mail
did not comply with due process). A cognizable claim under § 1983 arises as a result of an
infringement of a constitutionally protected right. E.g., Johnson v. Levine, 588 F.2d 1378,
1381 (4th Cir. 1978) (violation of prisoners' eighth amendment rights held actionable). See
generally A. KERPER & J. KERPER, LEGAL RIGHTS OF THE CONVICTED 357-59 (1974) [hereinaf-
ter cited as KERPER & KERPER]; Goldfarb & Singer, Redressing Prisoners' Grievances, 39
GEo. WASH. L. REV. 175 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Goldfarb & Singer]; Turner, When
Prisoners Sue: A Study of Prisoner Section 1983 Suits in Federal Courts, 92 HARV. L. REV.
610, 611-615 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Turner]; Note, Developments-Section 1983, 90
HARv. L. REV. 1133 (1977); Note, A Review of Prisoners' Rights Litigation Under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983, 11 U. RICH. L. REV. 803 (1977).
2 Prisoners are using § 1983 to assert claims such as the right of access to the courts,
see text accompanying notes 9-63 infra, the right to be free from cruel and unusual punish-
ment, see text accompanying notes 64-116 infra, and the limited due process right to a fair
determination of parole. See text accompanying notes 117-184 infra.
3 Courts traditionally viewed prison problems as complex and intractable, and not sus-
ceptible of resolution by decree. See Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 404-05 (1974); The
traditional judicial attitude known as the "hands off" doctrine left the internal administra-
tion and operation of state correctional institutions to the discretion of state officials. See
Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215 (1976); 416 U.S. at 404-05. The Supreme Court recently
determined that a policy of judicial restraint cannot justify a failure to recognize valid con-
stitutional claims. Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 832 (1977); see Turner, Establishing the
Rule of Law in Prisons: A Manual for Prisoners' Rights Litigation, 23 STAN. L. REV. 473,
503-11 (1971); Comment, Confronting the Conditions of Confinement: An Expanded Role
For Courts in Prison Reform, 12 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 367, 367-68 (1977) [hereinafter
cited as Prison Reform]; Note, Decency and Fairness: An Emerging Judicial Role in Prison
Reform, 57 VA. L. REV. 841, 841-42
4 See, e.g., Sostre v. McGinnis, 442 F.2d 178, 205 n.52 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404
U.S. 1049 (1972) (prisoner entitled to $25 per day of incarceration of $9,300 compensatory
damages against warden).
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tions of prisoners' constitutional rights.5 Recent Fourth Circuit decisions
have expanded and defined the obligations owed by states to prisoners in
areas such as access to libraries' and prison files,7 and the right to consti-
tutionally acceptable prison conditions.8
One of the most fundamental rights a prisoner possesses is the right to
communicate meaningfully with the courts.9 The Supreme Court first rec-
ognized a prisoner's right of meaningful access to the courts in Younger v.
Gilmore.1° Without citing authority, the Gilmore Court affirmed a district
court opinion11 requiring the State of California to expend funds to pro-
vide either law libraries or legal services to prisoners. 12 The district court
held that meaningful access was constitutionally required, but failed to
define the constitutional source of the right."'
Recently, the Supreme Court further defined the right of meaningful
access to the courts. In Bounds v. Smith, 4 the Court held that the consti-
tutional right of access to the courts requires that state prison authorities
assist inmates in the preparation and filing of meaningful legal papers by
providing adequate law libraries or adequate assistance from persons
trained in the law.1 5 Applying this test, the Supreme Court affirmed
North Carolina's plan to provide prisoners in the state's decentralized
prison system 6 with transportation to seven law libraries.1 7 The Bounds
Court primarily sought to protect the ability of inmates proceeding pro
sell to prepare petitions or complaints. 9 The Supreme Court held that a
5 E.g., Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 683:85 (1978).
6 See Williams v. Leeke, 584 F.2d 1336, 1339 (4th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 99 S. Ct.
2825 (1979); see generally text accompanying notes 24-47 infra.
7 See Paine v. Baker, 595 F.2d 197, 199 (4th Cir. 1979); see generally text accompany-
ing notes 118-146 infra.
' See Johnson v. Levine, 588 F.2d 1378 (4th Cir. 1978); see generally text accompany-
ing notes 70-98 infra.
9 Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 827 (1977).
. 404 U.S. 15 (1971). A convicted prisoner traditionally forfeited his liberty and all of
his personal rights except those the state chose to accord him. Ruffin v. Commonwealth, 62
Va. (21 Gratt.) 790, 795-96 (1871); see Goldfarb & Singer, supra note 1, at 178-79. The
Supreme Court first concluded that state prisoners had a right of access to federal courts in
Ex parte Hull, 312 U.S 546, 549 (1941) (petition for writ of habeas corpus). The Supreme
Court subsequently held that a state could not prohibit inmates from assisting other in-
mates in the preparation of writs unless the state provided some available alternative such
as legal assistance. Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483, 490 (1969).
11 Gilmore v. Lynch, 319 F. Supp. 105, 112 (N.D. Cal. 1970), affd sub nom. Younger v.
Gilmore, 404 U.S. 15 (1971).
12 404 U.S. at 15.
' Gilmore v. Lynch, 319 F. Supp. at 109; see Potuto, supra note 1, at 210-11.
14 430 U.S. 817 (1977).
" Id. at 828.
18 The North Carolina Department of Corrections housed 10,000 prisoners in eighty
units situated in sixty-seven counties. Smith v. Bounds, 538 F.2d 541, 542 (4th Cir. 1975,
af:'d, 430 U.S. 817 (1977).
17 430 U.S. at 821.
18 A person proceeds pro se when he petitions the court without counsel.
29 430 U.S. at 828 n.17. The complaint and other papers of pro se parties are held to
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meaningful right of access to the courts was a fundamental right, though
the Court again failed to specify the precise constitutional basis for its
holding.2 0 The Court reasoned that inmates proceeding pro se were capa-
ble of using law books,2 1 and that access to an adequate law library was
necessary to prepare legal papers.2 2 Alternatively, access to trained legal
counsel would insure that the inmate's constitutional right to the courts
was meaningfully exercised.
28
The Fourth Circuit in Williams v. Leeke 24 recently applied the
Bounds mandate that states provide prisoners with meaningful access to
less stringent standards than the formal pleadings of lawyers. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S.
519, 520 (1972); see note 58 infra.
20 430 U.S. at 826-27. One of the dissents in Bounds persuasively argued that nothing
in the Constitution provides for a fundamental right of access to the courts. Id. at 837
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Justice Rehnquist noted that under Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600
(1974), the right of meaningful access to the courts is limited to the first appeal of right. 430
U.S. at 840-41. There is no right of access for the discretionary second appeal from the court
of appeals to the state court of last resort or from the state court of last resort to the Su-
preme Court. Id. Thus Justice Rehnquist reasoned in his dissenting opinion that since a
prisoner who pursues a direct appeal has no constitutional right to state-appointed counsel
on a second appeal, an incarcerated prisoner has no constitutional right to meaningful ac-
cess when he collaterally attacks his conviction. Id. Chief Justice Burger noted in a separate
dissenting opinion that there was no broad constitutional right to collateral attack. Id. at
834 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). Burger concluded that the state's obligation to provide access
to the courts is statutory rather than constitutional. Id. The Constitution, however, prohib-
its a state from interfering with the individual's exercise of his federal right of access to the
court. Id. Burger noted that prohibiting the state from interfering with federal statutory
rights is fundamentally different from directing the state to provide affirmative assistance
for this exercise. Id. at 835.
21 430 U.S. at 826-27. Justice Stewart argued in a dissenting opinion that meaningful
access to courts cannot be advanced by simply making law libraries available to the untu-
tored inmate. Id. at 836 (Stewart, J., dissenting). Proceeding pro se is often futile. See Tur-
ner, supra note 1, at 625. Most inmates' pro se complaints will not survive screening by
court clerks, while others languish on the court docket. Id. Prisoners arguably do not have
the knowledge to conduct discovery and move the case to trial. Id.
22 430 U.S. at 826-27. The library approved in Bounds did not contain any legal citators
or digests. 430 U.S. at 819 n.4. Arguably, the Court implied that library books could be
brought to the prisoner's cell. See Potuto, supra note 1, at 241. Since prisoners would have
difficulty locating needed materials without a digest or citator, the Bounds Court considered
an inmate's physical presence in a library to be unnecessary. Id.
Several courts and commentators have found that providing an adequate law library
alone would not satisfy the goal of providing inmates with assistance in the preparation of
meaningful legal papers since a high percentage of inmates are totally or functionally illiter-
ate. See Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 836 (Stewart, J., dissenting); see, e.g., Wetmore v.
Fields, 458 F. Sulp. 1131, 1143 (W.D. Wis. 1978) (ignorant and unskilled inmates have right
of access to an adequate law library through the assistance of other willing inmates); Battle
v. Anderson, 457 F. Supp. 719, 731 (E.D. Okla. 1978), remanded, 595 F.2d 786 (10th Cir.
1979) (use of library for two hours per week where only thirty percent of the inmates have
the intelligence to do legal research does not provide meaningful access to the courts). See
generally Note, Prison Law Libraries: Meaningful Access To The Courts, 7 CAP. U. L. REV.
469 (1978); Resource Center on Correctional Law and Legal Service, Providing Legal Ser-
vices to Prisoners, 8 GA. L. REPv. 363 (1974).
23 430 U.S. at 828.
24 584 F.2d 1336 (4th Cir. 1978).
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the courts. In Williams, inmates incarcerated in state penal institutions
and a prisoner confined in a city jail brought various actions claiming that
state officials denied the prisoners' right to adequate access to legal
materials.2 The district courts dismissed the prisoners' complaints.26 The
prisoners appealed and the Fourth Circuit consolidated the cases for
hearing.
27
One of the appellants in Williams was confined in a South Carolina
maximum security facility.28 Though the state denied the inmate direct
access to a law library, guards escorted him to a library cell upon re-
quest.29 In addition, the state provided the inmate with legal assistance in
the preparation of habeas corpus petitions.30 However, South Carolina
did not allow state funds to be used for legal assistance inthe preparation
of claims for money damages 31
The Fourth Circuit held that the combination of the law library pro-
gram and the state funded programs designed to provide trained legal
assistance to inmates satisfied the Bounds mandate.3 2 The Williams
Court recognized that the state would be justified in taking reasonable
precautions to insure that maximum security prisoners did not use their
right to access to a library under Bounds for illegal purposes.3 3 Had the
inmate been an ordinary prisoner not confined in the maximum security
center, the state's library program probably would have been unconstitu-
tional.3 4 A prisoner ordinarily should have direct access to a law library.3 5
Simply providing a prisoner with books in his cell does not give a prisoner
a meaningful chance to explore legal materials.3 6 However, the court did
not reach the question of whether South Carolina's use of the library cell
for maximum security prisoners was reasonable since the state also pro-
vided the prisoners with assistance from persons trained in the law.37 The
2" Id. at 1338.
26 Id.
27 Id.
28 Id. Appellant Williams was incarcerated in the South Carolina Maximum Detention
Retraining Center.
29 Id. The maximum security section in which Williams was confined only had a meager
library. Id. However, books could be ordered from another library which contained a selec-
tion of materials, similar to the library found to be constitutionally adequate in Bounds. Id;
see Smith v. Bounds, 538 F.2d 541, 543-44 (4th Cir. 1975). See also note 22 supra. Prisoners
were allowed to use the library cell from 8:00 a.m. to 3:00 p.m. without interruption. 584
F.2d at 1338. There usually was a one to two week period between the prisoners' request to
be given access to the library cell and the time that the request was granted. Id.
30 584 F.2d at 1338. South Carolina provided legal assistance from a public defender's
office and a prisoner assistance project operated by law students. Id.
31 Id.
32 Id. at 1339.
33 Id. The Williams court suggested that appellant Williams might use the library as a
cover to smuggle contraband to his cell. Id.
34 Id.
35 Id.
36 Id. A prisoner cannot be expected to know which legal materials he needs to consult.
Id. But see note 22 supra.
27 584 F.2d at 1339. Similar to appellant Williams, two other appellants in Williams
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Williams court noted that since state funds could not be used for money
damage claims, no constitutional problem arose so long as the state pro-
vided "some" law library.3 8 The Fourth Circuit reasoned that prisoners
could discover the existence of meritorious claims by using legal materi-
als.39 Additionally, private counsel probably would be available on a con-
tingent fee basis to assist the inmates in pursuit of meritorious claims for
money damages.
40
While South Carolina placed maximum security prisoners in a library
cell, Virginia restricted the amount of time allowed in a library by an-
other appellant who was incarcerated in a city jail.41 Virginia limited this
appellant's access to an adequate law library to three forty-five minute
periods a week.42 The trial record revealed no evidence as to whether Vir-
ginia provided legal assistance to prisoners confined in city jails.4 3 The
Fourth Circuit applied Bounds and held that a prisoner serving a "sub-
stantial sentence of confinement" in a local jail is entitled to reasonable
access to the courts. 44 Reasoning that sufficient legal research on most
legal problems cannot be done in forty-five minute intervals, the Fourth
Circuit remanded the case to the district court.' 5 On remand, the state
were incarcerated in a-Virginia state prison and denied meaningful access to a law library.
Id. at 1338. Appellant Hughes had no access to a law library as a result of his confinement
in maximum security, while appellant Armstrong had access three times a month. Id. The
Fourth Circuit held, however, that Virginia satisfied the Bounds mandate by providing pris-
oners with assistance from a state-funded legal assistance program. Id. at 1339. Virginia
provides for the appointment of legal counsel to indigent inmates regarding any legal matter
relating to their incarceration. VA. CODE § 53-21.2 (Cum. Supp. 1979); cf. text accompanying
notes 30-31 supra. (South Carolina provides legal assistance only for habeas corpus peti-
tions). The Fourth Circuit found that the state's system adequately insures that prisoners
will have their claims presented to the courts since notice of the statutory right is posted in
all units of the state prison system. 584 F.2d at 1338-39; see note 47 infra.
35 584 F.2d at 1339.
39
40 Id.
41 Id. at 1338. In Williams, appellant Brown was incarcerated in a Richmond city jail.
The Williams court did not note why or for how long Brown was sentenced to jail.
42 Id.
43 Id. at 1338-39; see note 47 infra.
44 584 F.2d at 1340. Although Bounds required that the state provide "meaningful ac-
cess" to the courts, 430 U.S. 817, 826-27 (1977), the Williams Court termed the requirement
"reasonable access" when referring to prisoners in local jails. 584 F.2d at 1340. The differ-
ence in adjectives could illustrate the Fourth Circuit's recognition that meaningful access
may allow the states to adopt any reasonable means to satisfy the Bounds mandate. The
Supreme Court in Bounds allowed such flexibility when the Court stated that economic
factors could be considered in providing access to the courts so long as there is not a total
denial of meaningful access. 430 U.S. at 825.
15 584 F.2d at 1341. The Fourth Circuit noted that the quality of access to library re-
search is the significant element in determining whether a prisoner is being allowed mean-
ingful access to the courts.Id. at 1340. Though appellant Brown was allowed to spend an
amount of time per month in the library as prisoners in the North Carolina prison system
found adequate in Bounds, Brown's access was comparatively restricted. Id. at 1340-41. The
North Carolina prisoners could explore their legal problems over the course of a full day,
while Brown's short forty-five minute intervals did not allow for this uninterrupted pursuit
of different avenues of research. Id. at 1340 n.2.
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must bear the burden of proving that the appellant had adequate access
to the library because of the simple nature of his claim.4 The Fourth
Circuit also directed the district court to determine whether Virginia pro-
vided statutory legal assistance to prisoners in city jails and, if so,
whether the prisoners had notice of the right to counsel.
47
A narrow reading of Bounds calls into question the Fourth Circuit's
approval of South Carolina's system for providing maximum security
prisoners with access to the courts. Even though Bounds requires the
states to provide either adequate access to a law library or an adequate
legal assistance program,48 the Williams court held that a combination of
insufficient access to a law library49 and a deficient legal aid program50
satisfied the Bounds mandate.5 1 Thus Bounds should not be read too re-
strictively. The Supreme Court has stated that federal courts must evalu-
46 584 F.2d at 1340. Brown's claim, by itself, might be so simple that he could meaning-
fully research the claim in forty-five minutes. Id. Had appellant Brown brought his action as
a class action claim, there would have been greater likelihood that the court would have
found that the class of prisoners were denied meaningful access. Id.
47 Id. at 1340. There was no finding in the record that prisoners in city and county jails
have a right to seek appointment of counsel under VA. CODE § 53-21.2 (Cum. Supp. 1978)
(current version at VA. CODE § 53-21.2 (Cum. Supp. 1979)); which, before the 1979 amend-
ment, provided for the appointment of legal counsel to indigent inmates confined in a prison
farm or a unit of the Bureau of Correctional Field Units. See 584 F.2d at 1338. The record
did not state whether Brown requested any assistance. Id. Subsequent to the Williams deci-
sion, the Virginia statute was amended to apply to state correctional institutions which,
under VA. CODE § 53-19.18 (Repl. Vol. 1978), include every jail, jail farm, lockup, or other
place of detention owned, maintained and operated by any political subdivision of the Com-
monwealth. See VA. CODE § 53-21.2 (Cum. Supp. 1979) (court shall on motion of common-
wealth's attorney, when requested by superintendent or warden, appoint counsel to indigent
inmates regarding any legal matter relating to their incarceration).
Virginia's statutory system provides counsel to indigent inmates "regarding any legal
matter relating to their incarceration." VA. CODE: § 53-21.2 (Cum. Supp. 1979). Under this
siction, Virginia need not provide counsel to inmates concerning legal matters not related to
incarceration. However, the Supreme Court in Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971),
has suggested that due process may require that counsel be provided for indigent inmates in
such cases. In Boddie, the Court concluded that persons forced to settle their claims in court
must have an opportunity to be heard. Id. at 382-83. Arguably, an opportunity to be heard
requires assistance of counsel or reasonable access to a law library. In any event, VA. CODE §
8.01-229(A)(3) provides that imprisonment is a disability which tolls the statute of limita-
tions. VA. CODE §§ 53-305 through 53-312.1 (Repl. Vol. 1978). Therefore, in Virginia mean-
ingful access to the courts is not being denied inmates, but merely delayed. See generally,
Goldfarb & Singer, supra note 1, at 246; Potuto, supra note 1, at 218-22.
"' See text accompanying note 15 supra.
", See text accompanying notes 34-36 supra.
50 See text accompanying notes 38-40 supra.
51 584 F.2d at 1339. Making law books available to a prisoner without actual physical
access to a library also might satisfy Bounds. See note 22 supra. See generally Twyman v.
Crisp, 584 F.2d 352, 357 (10th Cir. 1978) (restricted access to law library of two hours per
week, then sixteen per week, not per se denial of access to the courts); Nadeau v. Helgemoe,
561 F.2d 411, 418 (1st Cir. 1977) (though use of library was better than the North Carolina
plan approved in Bounds, inmates were unconstitutionally deprived of full access since full
access could be provided at little costs); Battle v. Anderson, 457 F. Supp. 719, 737 (E.D.
Okla. 1978) (state shall provide civilian legal advisers and additional library).
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ate the total state plan to determine whether the plan complies with the
requisite standard of meaningful access to the courts.5 2 The flexibility al-
lowed by Bounds supports the Fourth Circuit's conclusion that a state
which provides some trained legal assistance to prisoners may limit a
prisoner's access to a law library if the prisoner is a known security risk.5 3
A state should be able to take reasonable steps to preserve prison security
when dealing with maximum security prisoners.
54
The Fourth Circuit's application of Bounds to local jails goes beyond
the Supreme Court's holding which, narrowly read, applies only to state
penal institutions."" The Williams decision should not be read more
82 430 U.S. at 828.
" See 584 F.2d at 1339.
" In United States v. Chatman, 584 F.2d 1358 (4th Cir. 1978), the Fourth Circuit con-
sidered the application of Bounds to an inmate who was a known security risk in circum-
stances different from those in Williams. The Chatman court held that once the govern-
ment appointed counsel for a prisoner, the requirement of Bounds is satisfied and the
prisoner need not receive access to legal materials to prepare his defense. Id. at 1360. While
in prison, Chatman sent a letter to a judge threatening the judge's life. Id. at 1359-60. The
government offered appointed counsel to Chatman to represent him against the resulting
federal criminal charges. Id. Chatman voluntarily and with knowledge of his rights waived
his right to counsel and asserted his constitutional right to proceed pro se under Faretta v.
California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975). Since Chatman was in maximum security, the government
did not allow Chatman access to legal materials to prepare his defense. 584 F.2d at 1360.
The Fourth Circuit reasoned that Bounds did not apply because Bounds applied only to
provide post-conviction relief. Id. Even if applicable, the Fourth Circuit concluded that the
Bounds decision does not allow the prisoner to elect between a law library or legal assis-
tance. Id. The government properly could determine that greater security was needed for
persons in segregated confinement. Id. But see United States v. West, 557 F.2d 151, 153 (8th
Cir. 1977) (appointment of "standby counsel" satisfies Bounds); Potuto, supra note 1, at
228-40; Note, The Jailed Pro Se Defendant and the Right To Prepare a Defense, 86 YALE
L.J. 292, 293-303 (1976).
In Nadeau v. Helgemoe, 423 F. Supp. 1250 (D.N.H. 1976), aff'd in part, vacated and
remanded in part, 561 F.2d 411 (1st Cir. 1977), the district court held that states may not
use the security status of a prisoner as a justification to interfere with the inmate's right of
access to the courts. Id. at 1273. However, reasoning that compelling state interests may
justify infringement of the fundamental right of access, the district court held that a state
may limit the inmate's access .o a library to accommodate the rights of other prisoners. Id.;
cf. Bauer v. Sielaff, 372 F. Supp. 1104, 1111 (W.D. Pa. 1974) (prisoner in maximum security
not denied reasonable access to the courts where he failed to sustain proof of denial, intent
to deny and actual damages).
8 See 430 U.S. at 819; 584 F.2d at 1341 (Hall, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
Prior to the 1977 decision in Bounds, the Supreme Court remanded a lower court's dismissal
of a complaint by prisoners in a county jail that they were denied access to an adequate law
library in light of Younger v. Gilmore, 404 U.S. 15 (1971). Cruz v. Hauck, 404 U.S. 59 (1971);
see text accompanying notes 10-12 supra. On remand, the Fifth Circuit held that access to
the courts may be achieved by providing legal materials, counsel or any other appropriate
device that the jail authorities are able to prove to be an adequate alternative. Cruz v.
Hauck, 515 F.2d 322, 331-32 (5th Cir. 1975). The jail at issue in Cruz performed the func-
tions of a state penal institution and contained approximately 700 inmates, making it com-
parable to other state penal institutions. Id. at 332. However, neither the size of the institu-
tion nor its functions should affect whether an inmate is entitled to meaningful access to the
courts. The size of the institution might be relevant insofar as the economic cost of provid-
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broadly than holding Bounds applicable to inmates serving a substantial
sentence of confinement." Providing meaningful access to the courts
should be weighed against the economic costs of equipping every local
jailhouse with a constitutionally adequate library or providing legal assis-
tance to every person incarcerated in local jails.5 7 Prisoners serving short
sentences are not denied their right of access by virtue of the failure of
state authorities to conform to the Bounds mandate.58 The appropriate
question should be whether the prisoner has an alternative route of access
to the courts.5 9 Most claims of prisoners incarcerated for a short period
can be litigated upon the prisoner's release or transfer to a more perma-
nent facility to which Bounds applies.60 Requiring a prisoner to wait a few
weeks before he can research his claim is no different than requiring a
prisoner to wait a few weeks in one prison before his request to have ac-
cess to the prison library is honored.
6 1
ing access to an adequate library is insignificant such as in the situation where the institu-
tion already provides a law library. The First Circuit noted that the cost of providing access
to a library could be used in favor of the prisoner. Nadeau v. Helgemoe, 561 F.2d 411, 418
(1st Cir. 1977). In Bounds, North Carolina could not have given the prisoners additional
access without large expenditures, but in Nadeau, it would have cost New Hampshire very
little to allow the inmates to use the library, which was located only three to four floors from
their cells. Id. Thus even though New Hampshire's plan in Nadeau was better than the
North Carolina plan approved in Bounds, it was unconstitutional because the cost of pro-
viding additional access was insignificant. Id.
" 584 F.2d at 1340. The Fourth Circuit stated that misdemeanants serving up to twelve
months in local jails should not be left wholly without resources to prosecute habeas corpus
or civil rights claims. Id.
57 See note 55 supra. The dissent in Williams suggested that the right of access to a
library should be considered in connection with the prisoner's length of incarceration, the
number of prisoners housed in the facility, the purpose of the facility and the inmate's ac-
cess to counsel as a matter of right. 584 F.2d at 1343 (Hall, J., concurring in part, dissenting
in part). The Fifth Circuit recently stated that prisoners in a county jail under a final judg-
ment of conviction would have a cause of action to bring suit against state officials for deny-
ing their right of access to the courts. Jones v. Diamond, 594 F.2d 997, 1024-25 (5th Cir.
1979) (dictum), rehearing granted, 602 F.2d 1243 (5th Cir. 1979). But see Page v. Sharpe,
487 F.2d 567, 569 (1st Cir. 1973) (county sheriff not required to supply law books).
55 See 584 F.2d at 1341 (Hall, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). In Gordon v.
Leeke, 574 F.2d 1147 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 970 (1978), the Fourth Circuit held
that the district court had an affirmative duty to assist a pro se petitioner. Id. at 1152.
Relying upon Gordon, Circuit Judge Hall argued in Williams that persons housed in a
short-term prison facility need not have access to a library because the district court has a
duty to inquire into facts to determine whether a colorable claim has been stated. 584 F.2d
at 1344 (Hall, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). However, the Supreme Court in
Bounds concluded that it could not assume that a trial judge will evaluate facts pleaded in
light of the relevant law. 430 U.S. at 826. The trial judge could easily overlook meritorious
claims without the benefit of an adversary presentation. Id. See generally Fourth Circuit
Review-Habeas Corpus and Prisoners' Rights, 36 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 379, 610-19 (1979).
:9 See text accompanying note 52 supra.
o 584 F.2d at 1341 (Hall, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). Judge Hall argued
that six to twelve months should not prejudice a valid prisoner's complaint. Id. A prisoner
does not lose a claim because of the statute of limitations since most states have statutes
that make imprisonment a disability which tolls the statute of limitations. See Goldfarb &
Singer, supra note 1, at 246; see, e.g., VA. CODE § 8.01-229(A)(3) (Cum. Supp. 1979).
62 In Williams, one appellant had to wait one to two weeks before the guards granted
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The significance of the Bounds holding that states must provide pris-
oners with meaningful access to the courts is apparent when it is recog-
nized that prisoners are at the mercy of administrative officials who man-
age the prisoners' total existence from "sundown to sundown. 6 2 Although
lawful incarceration results in a withdrawal or limitation of many rights
and privileges, 3 persons are placed in prison as punishment, not to be
punished.6 4 Federal courts are using the cruel and unusual punishment
clause of the eighth amendment 5 to check the potential that exists for
prison officials to punish inmates beyond constitutional limitations. The
cruel and unusual punishment clause is a progressive doctrine, which ac-
quires meaning from public opinion and evolving standards of decency.6
Increasingly, the courts are providing prisoners with relief not only from
acts of cruelty, but also from generally poor prison conditions.67 The
Fourth Circuit recently found in Johnson v. Levine 6 that the conditions
in an overcrowded state prison reached such proportions that the aggre-
gate effect amounted to cruel and unusual punishment.69
In Johnson, prisoners in two Maryland State penal institutions filed
civil rights class action suits alleging that the conditions of their confine-
ment violated the eighth amendment prohibition of cruel and unusual
punishment.7 0 The general population areas of the two prisons were over-
his request to escort him to the library cell. See note 29 supra. This delay apparently was
not significant to the court. All circumstances should be considered in assessing whether a
delay interferes with a prisoner's rights under Bounds. See text accompanying note 54
supra.
11 See Prison Reform, supra note 3, at 387.
63 See Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 827-28 (1974)' (statute prohibiting press inter-
views with prisoners not unconstitutional). See also Jones v. N.C. Prisoners Labor Union,
Inc., 433 U.S. 119, 125-26 (1978) (limitation of first amendment rights because of needs of
penal institution and fact of confinement).
'4 Battle v. Anderson, 564 F.2d 388, 395 (10th Cir. 1977).
05 The cruel and unusual punishment clause states: "Excessive bail shall not be re-
quired, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishment inflicted." U.S.
CONsT. amend. VIII. The eighth amendment was first applied to the states through the
fourteenth amendment in Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962). See generally Com-
ment, Overcrowding in Prisons and Jails: Maryland Faces a Correctional Crisis, 36 MD. L.
REV. 182, 188-91 (1976).
6 See Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 99-104 (1958) (denationalization of Trop which left
him stateless because of desertion from the Army is cruel and unusual punishment barred
by the eighth amendment); Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 358, 380-82 (1910) (sen-
tence of fifteen years for falsifying a public document constitutes cruel and unusual punish-
ment). See also Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102-06 (1976) (deliberate indifference to a
prisoner's serious medical needs is grounds for relief under § 1983).
07 See note 102 infra.
68 588 F.2d 1378 (4th Cir. 1978) (per curiam).
61 Id. at 1380-81. But cf. Hite v. Leeke, 564 F.2d 670, 671 (4th Cir. 1977) (double occu-
pancy of cells initially designed for single occupancy not per se unconstitutional).
70 588 F.2d at 1378, 1380. The Fourth Circuit in Johnson consolidated two lower court
decisions, Johnson v. Levine, 450 F. Supp. 649-50 (D. Md. 1978) and Nelson v. Collins, 455
F. Supp. 727 (D. Md. 1978). The prisoners filed federal class actions. 455 F. Supp. at 728;
450 F. Supp. at 651. The class of prisoners included those prisoners who are now or will in
the future be confined in the Maryland House of Corrections and the Maryland
Penitentiary.
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crowded, causing the Maryland prison officials to double cell 1 most of the
prisoners.72 The overcrowded conditions resulted in suicidess7 3 increased
risk of sexual attack,74 excessive noise levels, increased stress, extensive
idleness,7 5 and deplorable ventilation problems.76 The conditions in two
specific areas were even more severe than the overall conditions in the
general population area. In the Special Confinement Area, which housed
inmates with psychological or psychiatric problems, only one correctional
officer was responsible for the security and feeding of forty-nine prison-
ers 7 7 and the Area had only one shower.7 8 Some cells in the Special Con-
finement Area had no beds or toilets.7 9 The inmates were confined to
their cells twenty-three hours per day and received no psychiatric treat-
ment.8 0 A second section, known as the six-cell isolated confinement sec-
tion, housed those prisoners who appeared to constitute a threat to them-
selves or others.8 ' Inmates were confined to this section for extended
periods of time without receiving proper medical attention.8 2
Emphasizing the double celling in the general prison areas, the district
courts held that the overcrowded conditions were unconstitutional." The
district courts rejected Maryland's proposal that involved the construc-
tion of a new facility and the early release of certain prisoners with the
objective of eliminating overcrowded conditions within twenty-four
months.84 The district courts found Maryland's plan insufficient to meet
the needs of the class of prisoners and ordered that the overcrowded con-
ditions be eliminated within twelve months.85 The district courts also
71 Double celling is the double occupancy of a cell initially designed for single occu-
pancy. 588 F.2d at 1380; see Hite v. Leeke, 564 F.2d 670, 674 (4th Cir. 1977).
71 See 455 F. Supp. at 734; 450 F. Supp. at 651.
73 Fifty-three instances of attempted suicide occurred at the Maryland House of Cor-
rections in 1977. 450 F. Supp. at 655.
7' Double ceiling decreased the ability of prison guards to protect the weaker inmates
from homosexual assaults. Id. at 656. Only one guard at a time could enter a cell when a
disturbance occurred. 455 F. Supp. at 734.
75 450 F. Supp. at 655. Prisoners remained in their cells even during the day.
76 588 F.2d at 1380. Only one inmate at a time could move around the cell; the other
was forced to remain in his bunk. An inmate could never be more than a few feet from the
other when using the available toilet facilities. 455 F. Supp. at 734.
71 450 F. Supp. at 657. The Special Confinement Area was located in the Maryland
House of Corrections. Id. at 651-52.
7s Id. at 652.
79 Id. at 657.
&0 Id. The average stay in the Special Confinement Area was six to eight months. Id. at
651. The district court found that confinement to this area amounted to greater punishment
than confinement to the administrative segregation unit, even though the prisoners in the
Special Confinement Area had broken no rules. 450 F. Supp. at 657-58. :11
at The six-cell isolated confinement area was located in the Maryland Penitentiary. 455
F. Supp. at 734.
82 Id. at 735.
455 F. Supp. at 734; 450 F. Supp. at 654, 657.
455 F. Supp. at 737; 450 F. Supp. at 661.
ss 450 F. Supp. at 661. The district court noted that although a lawfully convicted and
sentenced state prisoner necessarily must suffer the loss of rights and privileges, federal
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found that conditions in the Special Confinement Area and in the six-cell
isolated confinement section were so severe that immediate relief was re-
quired."' The district court ordered the state to close the Special Confine-
ment Area,8 7 and give prompt and adequate medical care to the prisoners
in the isolated confinement section.88
The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district courts' finding that the over-
crowded conditions were unconstitutional, but remanded the cases to the
district courts with directions to incorporate Maryland's proposed plan
into the judicial decree.8 9 In addition, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the
granting of injunctive relief regarding the Special Confinement Area and
the punitive isolation unit.90 The Fourth Circuit reasoned that the elimi-
nation of substantial overcrowding would ameliorate the deficiencies in
general services and medical facilities.9 1 However, because the conditions
were not as extreme as in some reported cases,92 the Johnson court de-
ferred to the plan proposed by the Maryland officials to eliminate over-
crowding.8 3 The court held that Maryland's plan was practical and rea-
sonable,9 4 adding that only a new facility could completely eliminate the
unconstitutional conditions.95
The Fourth Circuit correctly found that overcrowding is not per se
unconstitutional, but may become unconstitutional when the conse-
quences of overcrowded conditions become severe.96 No single prison
condition has been held to be cruel and unusual punishment.9 7 However,
courts have to intervene in the internal affairs of prison management because of overcrowd-
ing. 450 F. Supp. at 653. However heinous the crimes committed by the prisoners, they still
retain certain constitutional rights. 450 F. Supp. at 654. The district court further noted
that there was no prisoners' lobby present in the legislature to compete with other powerful
pressure groups for a share of the tax dollar. Id. Therefore, the district court concluded that
judicial intervention is necessary to implement the basic constitutional rights of prisoners.
Id.
86 455 F. Supp. at 735.
7 450 F. Supp. at 654, 662. The district court ordered-that the Special Confinement
Area be closed and suggested that actively psychotic prisoners be transferred to the appro-
priate state mental hospital. Id. at 658. The disposition of the prisoners in the Special Con-
finement Area after the district court ordered the area closed is uncertain because, prior to
the court's decision, the state mental hospitals would not accept them. Id. at 657.
8 455 F. Supp. at 736-37.
:9 588 F.2d at 1381.
8o Id.
81 Id. at 1380.
82 The Johnson court did not specify which reported cases were more extreme than the
conditions before the court. However, several reported cases justify the court's conclusion.
See, e.g., Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 681 (1978) (district court characterized prison con-
ditions as 'dark and evil").
93 588 F.2d at 1381. Maryland's inmate population had been increasing rapidly in re-
cent years. In 1976 alone the population increased sixteen percent. 450 F. Supp. at 655.
:4 588 F.2d at 1381.
8I Id.
88 Id.
87 Sweet v. South Carolina Dept. of Corrections, 529 F.2d 854, 861 (4th Cir. 1975); see,
e.g., Hite v. Leeke, 564 F.2d 670, 671 (4th Cir. 1977) (double celling alone at recently com-
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as in Johnson, overcrowding seems to be the critical factor which aggra-
vates prison conditions to the point of unconstitutionality. Prison condi-
tions become cruel and unusual punishment prohibited by the eighth
amendment when overcrowding results in a substantial denial of medical
facilities, 98 recreation, protection " and proper sanitation.
Once prison conditions are found to be unconstitutional, a court must
determine what relief is appropriate. In considering the appropriate rem-
edy, the Johnson court implicitly recognized two degrees of unconstitu-
tional cruel and unusual punishment: that which requires immediate re-
lief, and that which can be tolerated until it is practical to correct.
Conditions in the Special Confinement Area and in the six-cell isolated
confinement section were unconstitutional to the extent that immediate
injunctive relief was necessary. 10 The overcrowded conditions in the gen-
eral prison area also were unconstitutional, but the court found that the
conditions could be tolerated for an additional eighteen months. 10 ' In
reaching this conclusion, the Fourth Circuit properly deferred to the
pleted $12 million modern facility not in itself unconstitutional); Burrascano v. Levi, 452 F.
Supp. 1066, 1068-69 (D. Md. 1978) (failure to give prisoner one day's medication for mild
hypertension not unconstitutional; leaky ceilings and dirty floors not constitutionally signifi-
cant); West v. Edwards, 439 F. Supp. 722, 723, 725 (D.S.C. 1977) (triple-celling not uncon-
stitutional). But see Battle v. Anderson, 564 F.2d 388, 395 (10th Cir. 1977) (crowding
reached such proportions that it is per se unconstitutional). Although not a constitutional
requirement, minimum space for privacy has been held to be a psychological necessity. See
Nacci, Teitelbaum, Prather, Population Density and Inmate Misconduct Rates in the Fed-
eral Prison System, 41 FED. PROB. 26, 30-31 (June 1977).
98 A cause of action for denial of medical care cannot be brought under 42 U.S.C. §
1983 (1976) unless there has been a deliberate indifference to a prisoner's serious illness or
injury. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104-05 (1976); see Loe v. Armistead, 582 F.2d 1291,
1296 (4th Cir. 1978) (pretrial detainee was treated at a hospital twenty-two hours after he
broke his arm); Webster v. Jones, 554 F.2d 1285, 1286 (4th Cir. 1977) (doctor claims that he
examined inmate several times supports summary judgment for prison authorities); Sweet v.
South Carolina Dept. of Corrections, 529 F.2d 854, 864 (4th Cir. 1975) (medical care ade-
quate where two medical technicians visited cell block three times a day); Russell v. Sheffer,
528 F.2d 318, 319 (4th Cir. 1975) (questions of medical judgment not subject to judicial
review). However, repeated examples of denial and delay of medical treatment bespeak a
deliberate indifference to the medical needs of prisoners. See Todaro v. Ward, 565 F.2d 48,
52 (2d Cir. 1977) (delay in access to a physician two weeks to two months not uncommon);
Loaman v. Helgemoe, 437 F. Supp. 269, 312 (D.N.H. 1977). See generally, Comment, Ac-
tionability of Negligence Under Section 1983 and the Eighth Amendment, 127 U. PA. L.
REv. 533, 559-61 (1978).
Inmates also are entitled to some psychological or psychiatric treatment. Bowring v.
Godwin, 551 F.2d 44, 47 (4th Cir. 1977). The Fourth Circuit observes no distinction between
the right to medical care for physical ills and the psychological or psychiatric counterpart.
Id.; see Vinnedge v. Gibbs, 550 F.2d 926, 928 (4th Cir. 1977).
Is See Woodhous v. Commonwealth of Virginia, 487 F.2d 889, 890 (4th Cir. 1973) (con-
finement in a prison where violence and terror reign actionable); see also, Williams v. Ed-
wards, 547 F.2d 1206, 1211 (5th Cir. 1977) (overcrowding and lack of security were noted as
the cause of deplorable conditions in a Louisiana State Penitentiary where 270 stabbings
and 20 deaths occurred during three years of hearings).
100 See text accompanying notes 86-88 supra.
101 588 F.2d at 1381.
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judgment of the prison officials. 10 2 Prison administrative officials should
be accorded wide discretion to adopt and execute necessary policies and
practices. 0 s The problems of prison administration are complex and are
not readily susceptible to resolution by court decree.1
0 4
In addition, there are limits on a federal court's equitable powers. 0 5 A
federal court must focus upon three factors in determining the appropri-
ate remedy for unconstitutional conditions.' The remedy should be re-
102 Id. Other federal courts have fashioned comprehensive judicial remedies which ex-
ceed the district court's orders in Johnson. In Battle v. Anderson, 564 F.2d 388 (10th Cir.
1977), the Tenth Circuit rejected Oklahoma's plan, and ordered an inmate reduction of 100
inmates per month at one facility and fifty per month at another until reduced to an accept-
able level. Id. at 396. On remand the district court constructed a thirty-two point compre-
hensive decree that detailed specific dates of compliance, including those of ground breaking
for new inmate housing, closings of existing housing, minimum permissible square footages
of living area per inmate and the termination of double celling. Battle v. Anderson, 457 F.
Supp. 719, 738-40 (E.D. Okla. 1978).
The Fifth Circuit, in affirming a district court order requiring Louisiana to submit a
long-range plan for constitutional operation of the prison within 180 days, also affirmed an
order requiring 950 guards at one unit and forbidding any inmate additions. Williams v.
Edwards, 547 F.2d 1206, 1213, 1215 (5th Cir. 1977). However, in Newman v. Alabama, 559
F.2d 283, 289 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 438 U.S. 915 (1978), the Fifth Circuit held that
the district court went too far in ordering a "Human Rights Committee" composed of
thirty-nine individuals to monitor the district court's orders and to take any action neces-
sary to accomplish the committee's function. Id. at 289. The Fifth Circuit reasoned that
prison officials cannot be expected to perform in an efficient manner if they are required to
comply with the dictates of thirty-nine members. Id. Consequently, the Fifth Circuit or-
dered one monitor for each prison with authority to make observations. Id. at 290; see Cos-
tello v. Wainwright, 397 F. Supp. 20, 34-35 (M.D. Fla. 1975) (defendant Director of Division
of Corrections must reduce inmate population to emergency levels within one year and to
normal capacity within eighteen months, which coincides with construction of planned new
facility). See generally Prison Reform, supra note 3, at 374-388; Comment, Equitable Reme-
dies Available to a Federal Court After Declaring an Entire Prison System Violates the
Eighth Amendment, 1 CAP. U. L. REV. 101 (1972).
"0I Bell v. Wolfish, 99 S. Ct. 1861, 1878 (1978) (class action by pretrial detainees). See
also Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 228-29 (1976) (fourteenth amendment does not entitle
state prisoner to a hearing when he is transferred to a prison where conditions are less
favorable).
104 See Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 404-05 (1974) (first amendment as applied
to the states by the fourteenth amendment bars a California regulation relating to prisoner
mail). Most of the problems of American prisons require expertise, comprehensive planning,
and the commitment of resources which are within the province of the legislative and execu-
tive branches of government, particularly where state institutions are concerned. Id. Conse-
quently, courts are ill-equipped to deal with problems of prison reform. Id.
20I See Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267, 280 (1977) (school desegregation decree).
100 Id. Milliken was applied to a court decree regarding prisoners' rights in Hutto v.
Finney. 437 U.S. 678, 713 (1978) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). In Hutto, the Supreme Court
affirmed a district court order that a prisoner's maximum confinement in punitive isolation
can not exceed thirty days. Id. at 688. Justice Rehnquist, dissenting, noted that the thirty
day rule, which was prophylactic, did not relate to the offensive conditions. Id. at 712. The
described conditions of the confinement cell did not become unconstitutional on the thirty-
first day. Id. Similarly, the prison conditions in Maryland did not become unconstitutional
on the 349th day. The Supreme Court's affirmation of the district court's "prophylactic"
thirty-day rule in Hutto lends support to the district court's order in Johnson. However,
Hutto may be distinguishable from Johnson. The district court in Hutto did not immedi-
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lated to the alleged unconstitutional conditions.1 7 Furthermore, the rem-
edy should be designed to restore the victims of unconstitutional
conditions to the position they would have been in, absent such condi-
tions.108 In addition, the federal court must consider the interests of state
and local authorities in managing their own affairs.109 Under the latter
factor, the Fourth Circuit properly could find that the general prison con-
ditions in Johnson were unconstitutional, but defer to the interests of the
state and local authorities in fashioning an appropriate remedy.10
While prisoners are concerned about prison conditions, they often are
more concerned about release from prison. One of the most important
interests of a prisoner is parole,"1 since parole is the predominant mode
of release.11 2 When a prisoner is considered for parole, files maintained by
prison authorities on each prisoner1 s are often more significant to the
parole board than the inmate himself.114 An inmate's interest in his file
ately impose its detailed remedy, although the conditions in the Arkansas penal system,
characterized as "dark and evil," deserved remedial orders. Id. at 681-83. Rather, the dis-
trict court first ordered a general remedy in 1969, instructing the director to "make a sub-
stantial start ... ." Id. at 683. Finally, the district court" concluded in 1976 that specific
remedies were required, including the thirty-day rule. Id. Thus the Supreme Court's affir-
mation of the specific relief must be considered with the fact that the relief was not ordered
until the constitutional violations persisted for at least seven years. The district court's or-
ders in Johnson were rendered before giving Maryland an opportunity to remedy the
conditions.
107 433 U.S. at 280.
108 Id.
109 Id.
110 In Johnson v. Levine, 588 F.2d 1378, the court did not find that the Maryland offi-
cials acted in good faith. Cf. Hutto v. Finney, 437 (U.S. 678, 684 (1978) (Arkansas officials
failed to comply with court order for seven years); see note 106 supra.
1 Parole is the conditional release of a prisoner from a penal institution after he has
served part of his sentence. Note, Prisoner Access To Parole Files: A Due Process Analysis,
47 FORDHAM L. REv. 260, 260 n.2 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Parole Files]. See also L.
CARNEY, PROBATION AND PAROLE: LEGAL AND SocIAL DIMENSIONS 154, 177 (1977) [hereinafter
cited as CARNEY].
" CARNEY, supra note 111, at 177.
13 A typical prisoner's file contains his previous criminal record, a statement of the
offense with which he was charged, the offense of which he was convicted, physical, mental,
and psychiatric reports, and a disciplinary report listing all infractions of prison rules com-
mitted by the inmate. Parole Files, supra note .111, at 264; see, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. §
148.59 (Repl. Vol. 1978).
114 See Parole Files, supra note 111, at 264. In some states, the prisoner is not allowed
to appear at the review. See, e.g., Williams v. Missouri Bd. of Probation & Parole, 585 F.2d
922 (8th Cir. 1978), vacated, 61 L.Ed. 2d 293 (1979) (prior to review, a Missouri parole
officer interviews the inmate and files a report in the parole fie). The parole board, more
often than the sentencing judge, determines how long a prisoner remains incarcerated. See
Parole Files, supra note 111, at 260. In 1970, for example, 72% of the 83,000 felons released
from prison were paroled. CARNEY, supra note 111, at 177. The parole board has broad dis-
cretion in determining who is to be granted parole. See Boddie v. Weakley, 356 F.2d 242,
243 (4th Cir. 1966). There is no right to judicial review of the Parole Board's exercise of its
discretionary powers. Id. The Fourth Circuit has held that parole authorities should be
granted broad latitude for experimentation and the use of discretion. Franklin v. Shields,
569 F.2d 800 (4th Cir. 1978) (en banc), aff'g in part and rev'g in part, 569 F.2d 784 (4th Cir.
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becomes acute when he becomes aware of the possibility that the file con-
tains errors that may result in denial of parole.115 However, providing in-
mates with access to their files to determine the accuracy of information
within the fies must be balanced with counterveiling state interests in
maintaining the confidentiality of sources who contribute information to
the parole board11 and in minimizing the administrative burden of parole
boards.
117
In Paine v. Baker 15s the Fourth Circuit attempted to balance a pris-
oner's need for access to his prison file with the state's need to minimize
administrative burdens and maintain the confidentiality of sources. The
Paine court held that a prisoner has no statutory or constitutional right
of physical access to his prison files, but does have a limited due process
right to have false information expunged from such files.1 9 Inmate Paine
sought access to his prison file maintained by the North Carolina Depart-
ment of Corrections.'20 The district court held that Paine had a statuto-
rily protected right of access to his prison file, reasoning that since the
records were made available by state statute "to almost anybody," the
state could not reasonably deny access to the inmate himself.1 21 The dis-
1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 1003 (1978). See generally Parole Files, supra note 111, at 264.
115 Justice Marshall contends that there are many substantial inaccuracies in inmates'
files. Greenholtz v. Inmates of Nebraska Penal and Cor., 99 S. Ct. 2100, 2117 (1979) (Mar-
shall, J., dissenting); see, e.g., Kohlman v. Norton, 380 F. Supp. 1073 (D. Conn. 1974) (pa-
role denied because file erroneously indicated that applicant had used a gun in commiting
robbery); State v. Pohlabel, 61 N.J. Super. 242, 160 A.2d 647 (1960) (presentence report
erroneously showed that prisoner was under a life sentence in another jurisdiction). In
Greenholtz, the inmate was denied parole because the Parole Board believed that he should
enlist in a self-improvement program, although the inmate was already in such a program.
79 S. Ct. at 2117 n.15.
116 A district court has held that the need for confidentiality of sources outweighs possi-
ble interests of inmates in locating and correcting factual errors. Sites v. McKenzie, 423 F.
Supp. 1190, 1195 (N.D. W.Va. 1976). The confidentiality of sources is important in develop-
ing the history of the interviewees. Id. at 1196-97. Disclosure of the sources could result in
danger to third persons if their identity became known to an inmate reviewing his file. Brief
of the Attorney General of North Carolina at 13, Paine v. Baker, 595 F.2d 197 (4th Cir.
1979). The sources might refrain from frank expression of opinion if they believe the pris-
oner might have access to their statements. Id.
7 During the fiscal year 1973-1974, the Virginia Parole Board considered, 3,792 appli-
cations for parole. Franklin v. Shields, 569 F.2d 784, 795, aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 569
F.2d 800 (4th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 1003 (1978). See generally Holup v. Gates,
544 F.2d 82 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 941 (1977) (remanded to district court to
balance any due process right to files with burden of state in redacting the files); Note, The
Application of Due Process and State Freedom of Information Acts to Parole Release
Hearings, 27 SYRACUSE L. REv. 1011, 1027 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Parole Release
Hearings].
118 595 F.d 197 (4th Cir. 1979).
119 Id. at 200.
1o Id. at 198. Paine fied a request for production of documents pursuant to FED. R.
Civ. P. 34. Id. The district court construed the request as a complaint under 42 U.S.C. §
1983 (1976). Id. at 199. The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's construction of the
pro se request. Id. According to Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972), federal district courts
are to construe liberally papers filed by prisoners proceeding pro se. Id. at 520; see note 58
supra.
121 595 F.2d at 199. In North Carolina, information compiled for the use of the Secre-
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trict court further held that Paine had a constitutionally protected right
of access to his prison file before or after disciplinary proceedings involv-
ing forfeiture of statutory privileges.
122
Construing Paine's amended complaint, which was not considered by
the district court because of a clerical error, to state that information in
the file was false and should be expunged, 128 the Fourth Circuit reversed
the district court's statutory interpretation as inconsistent with a prior
interpretation by the North Carolina Supreme Court." ' Relying on
Franklin v. Shields,125 the Fourth Circuit also reversed the district court's
holding that a prison inmate has a constitutionally protected right of ac-
cess to his prison file. 1"6 In Franklin, the Fourth Circuit held that there
was no constitutional requirement that a prisoner has access to his files
before a parole hearing.1"7 The Franklin court found that the parole
board need only furnish a statement of reasons for denial of parole.128
The Fourth Circuit reasoned that matters such as access to prison files
and the right to receive a personal hearing were better left to the discre-
tion of the parole board."29 In Paine, the Fourth Circuit further reasoned
that allowing a prisoner general access to his parole file would create an
overwhelming administrative burden."30
The Fourth Circuit dismissed Paine's amended complaint because of a
failure to allege that prison officials had deprived him of a constitutional
right."'3 The deprivation of constitutional rights is a jurisdictional prereq-
uisite to a cause of action under section 1983." 2 However, in dictum, the
Fourth Circuit stated that a claim of constitutional magnitude grounded
in the due process clause is raised in certain limited circumstances by an
inmate's seeking to have false information removed from his prison
tary of Correction and the Parole Commission and maintained in a single central file system
is made available to law-enforcement agencies, courts, correctional agencies, or other offi-
cials requiring criminal identification data, crime statistics or other information respecting
crimes and criminals. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 148-74, 148-76 (Repl. Vol. 1978).
122 595 F.2d at 200.
123 Id. at 199. Paine's assertion regarding his parole was submitted as a Motion for
Leave to File Amended Complaint. Due to a clerical error, the district court did not receive
this motion. Id. at 199 n.3. The Fourth Circuit agreed to consider the motion on appeal. Id.
124 595 F.2d at 200. Federal courts are bound by the interpretation of a state statute by
the state's highest court. Ferguson v. Manning, 216 F.2d 188 (4th Cir. 1954). The North
Carolina Supreme Court affirmed a holding by the North Carolina Court of Appeals that the
prison records were not subject to inspection by the inmates, but only by those persons
specifically named in the statute. Goble v. Bounds, 281 N.C. 307, 188 S.E.2d 347, affg, 13
N.C. App. 579, 186 S.E.2d 638 (1972).
125 569 F.2d 800, 801 (4th Cir. 1978) (en banc), aff'g in part, reu'g in part, 569 F.2d 784
(4th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 1003 (1978).
126 595 F.2d at 200.




13' 595 F.2d at 200.
132 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976); see 595 F.2d at 202-03; note 1 supra.
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files.' 33 Balancing the inmate's need for an accurate prison file with the
additional burden on prison administration,1 3 4 the Paine court deter-
mined that a prisoner must make three allegations to state a cognizable
claim of right of access to his files. 3 5 First, the inmate must allege that
particular information is in his files. 36 Second, the inmate must allege
that the information is false, not simply prejudicial. 3 7 Third, the inmate
must allege that the parole board relied upon the information to a consti-
tutionally significant degree. 3 8 The inmate need not wait until the parole
board renders an adverse decision. 3 9 Instead, the inmate need allege only
that prison officials are likely to rely on the false information. 40
133 595 F.2d at 200.
114 The administrative burden of providing access to prison files in North Carolina is
evidenced by the fact that the Department of Corrections maintains a central file of the
records of 15,000 inmates housed in eighty separate locations. Id.
135 Id. at 201.
"I Id. A requirement of particularity is required to discourage "fishing expeditions."
An inmate cannot simply allege that "something must be wrong." Id.
137 595 F.2d at 201. A disagreement with an opinion or psychiatric evaluation contained
in the file would not be sufficient to state a claim where "some evidence" supports the pa-
role determination. Id.; see Williams v. Ward, 556 F.2d 1143, 1160-61 (2d Cir.), cert. dis-
missed, 434 U.S. 944 (1977) (no showing that plaintiff suffered any prejudice from lack of
access to files where he knew prior to the parole hearing that his mental health was placed
in issue by at least some materials in his files).
s 595 F.2d at 201-02. The Paine court noted that reliance to a constitutionally signifi-
cant degree has two dimensions. Id. at 202. First, what is constitutionally significant de-
pends on the nature of the administrative decisions made on the basis of the erroneous
information. If the inmate's conditional liberty is at stake because of possible denial of pa-
role or statutory good time credits, or revocation of probation or parole, the due process
clause applies and such complaint by the inmate should be sustained. Id.; see Wolff v. Mc-
Donnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974) (certain due process requirements apply where an inmate may
suffer a deprivation of statutory good time credits by prison authorities). See generally
Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 480 (1972) (revocation of parole deprives inmate of "con-
ditional liberty," not absolute liberty). A complaint may state a cognizable claim even when
due process is irrelevant if an adverse decision would have collateral consequences touching
on the prisoner's liberty interests. 595 F.2d at 202. For example, a decision adversely affect-
ing a transfer to another facility or a status classification may be cognizable. Id. However, a
purely administrative decision, such as one concerning internal work assignments, would not
affect any liberty interests and generally would not constitute a valid claim. Id. Any doubt
should be resolved in favor of the inmate. Id.
The nature of the false information is a second factor in considering what is constitu-
tionally signfificant. Id. A technical error, regarding a factor which would not be reasonably
relied upon by a decision-maker will not state a valid claim, while factors of greater signifi-
cance may be relied upon and should be expunged. Id.; see Townsend v. Burke, 334 U.S.
736, 740 (1948) (requirement of fair play); Brombley v. Crisp, 561 F.2d 1351, 1364 (10th Cir.
1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 908 (1978) (power to expunge records is a narrow one reserved
for extreme cases); United States v. Doe, 556 F.2d 391 (6th Cir. 1977) (federal courts can
require expunction of records).
139 595 F.2d at 201-02. Typically, the inmate will not know what is in his file until the
parole board gives the inmate a statement of the reasons for denial of parole required under
Franklin v. Shields, 569 F.2d 800, 801 (4th Cir. 1978) (en bane), aff'g in part and reo'g in
part, 569 F.2d 784 (4th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 1003 (1978).
140 595 F.2d at 202.
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The Fourth Circuit outlined certain procedures an inmate must follow
before petitioning the court under section 1983141 to expunge false infor-
mation from his prison file.1 4 2 An inmate must notify prison officials in
writing that he believes his prison file -contains false information, specifi-
cally identifying what information is believed to be false and what the
true facts are.14 3 If the prison officials fail to respond within a reasonable
time or if the prison officials state that the information is present in the
files but refuse to expunge the information from the file because the in-
formation is claimed to be true, the prisoner has a cognizable claim under
section 1983.'" The prison officials should inform the prisoner of the ba-
sis for considering the challenged information to be correct and the prison
officials should place the inmate's letter in his file. 4 5 The inmate does not
have a cognizable claim if the prison officials state that the file does not
contain the allegedly false information since the court presumes good
faith on the part of prison authorities.
4 6
The status of a prisoner's right of access to his fies is clouded by the
Supreme Court's recent holding in Greenholtz v. Inmates of Nebraska
Penal & Correctional Complex,1
4 7 decided two months after Paine.
4 8
141 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976); see note 1 supra.
142 595 F.2d at 202-03. The elements necessary for recovery under section 1983 are that
the defendant, under color of state law, deprived the plaintiff of a right secured by the
United States Constitution or laws of the United States. See Adickes v. Kress & Co., 398
U.S. 144, 150 (1970) (reverse discrimination by school alleged as violation of plaintiff's four-
teenth amendment rights); Harbert v. Rapp, 415 F. Supp. 83, 86 (W.D. Okla. 1976) (sex
discrimination in employment). Exigent adversity is an essential condition precedent to fed-
eral court adjudication under section 1983. See Mendez v. Heller, 530 F.2d 457, 461 (2d Cir.
1976) (federal court will not entertain jurisdiction on hypothetical assumption that if plain-
tiff sued for divorce in state court, the action would be dismissed). The deprivation of civil
rights must have occurred prior to seeking relief under section 1983. Parker v. Letson, 380
F. Supp. 280, 282-83 (N.D. Ga. 1974) (teacher already discharged). The jurisdictional predi-
cate to a section 1983 claim should be distinguished from exhaustion of remedies. An inmate
need not exhaust all remedies in bringing a claim under section 1983 as is required for a
habeas corpus petition. McCray v. Burrell, 516 F.2d 357, 364-65 (4th Cir. 1975), cert. dis-
missed, 426 U.S. 471 (1976). Exhaustion of state remedies is not required if the deprivation
of civil rights has already occurred. See Parker v. Letson, 380 F. Supp. at 283.
143 595 F.2d at 203:
144 Id. The Fourth Circuit determined that a reasonable time for prison officials to re-
spond to a prisoner's request to expunge information from his files is sixty days. Id. at 203
n.5.
:5 Id. at 203.
14 Id.
147 99 S. Ct. 2100 (1979).
148 The Fifth Circuit has held that refusal to allow a state prisoner access to his papers
on file is not unconstitutional. Craft v. Texas Bd. of Pardons and Parole, 550 F.2d 1054 (5th
Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 426 (1978); Shaw v. Briscoe, 541 F.2d 489 (5th Cir. 1976),
cert. denied, 430 U.S. 933 (1977). However, the Fifth Circuit held in Thomas v. Shaw, 497
F.2d 123 (5th Cir. 1974), that a pro se prisoner convicted of robbery stated a claim for relief
where he alleged that the defendant court clerk knowingly and falsely made an entry on the
prisoner's record that the prisoner had been involved in a rape. Id. The Second Circuit, like
the Fourth Circuit, holds that there are some limited due process rights regarding parole
determinations. Williams v. Ward, 556 F.2d 1143, 1160 (2d Cir.), cert. dismissed, 434 U.S.
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The Supreme Court held in Greenholtz that there are no general consti-
tutional rights to parole or parole proceedings. 14 9 Whether any due pro-
cess rights attach to parole determinations depend upon whether there is
an expectancy of release created by the particular state's parole stat-
utes.150 The Greenholtz court specifically held that the particular struc-
ture of Nebraska's parole statute15 1 creates a statutory expectation of re-
lease which is entitled to some measure of constitutional protection.
52
The Supreme Court's finding in Greenholtz that due process does not
attach to parole release proceedings turns on the distinction between pa-
role release and parole revocation.158 Previous Supreme Court decisions
extended due process rights to parole revocation hearings," probation
revocation hearings, 55 and prison disciplinary hearings.58 The Green-
holtz Court reasoned, however, that there is a crucial difference between
being deprived of a liberty one has, as in parole revocation determina-
tions, and being denied a conditional liberty one desires, as in parole re-
lease determinations. 157 The difference lies in the nature of the deci-
944 (1977). In Williams v. Ward, the Second Circuit noted that a prisoner might be able to
show that reliance on a material fact in his file prejudiced his parole determination to the
extent that access is necessary to the detailed evidence in his file. Id. See also Holup v.
Gates, 544 F.2d 82 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 941 (1977) (remanded to district
court to balance administrative burden with interest of prisoners including the extent of
actual mistakes in files). The Eighth Circuit granted prisoners broad rights of access to their
files prior to Greenholtz. Williams v. Missouri Bd. of Probation & Parole, 585 F.2d 922 (8th
Cir. 1978), vacated, 61 L.E.2d 293 (1979).
"D Id. at 2104.
150 Id. at 2106-08. The Greenholtz Court cautioned that each state's statutes must be
considered on a case-by-case basis. Id.
151 NEB. REV. STAT. § 83-1,114(1) (1976). The Nebraska parole statute provides that
whenever the Board of Parole considers the release of a committed offender who is eligible
for release on parole, the Board shall order his release unless the release should be deferred
because of certain specific statutory reasons.
152 99 S. Ct. at 2106. The Court upheld Nebraska's~procedure which afforded the in-
mate an opportunity to be heard and informed of why he failed to qualify for parole. Id. at
2108. The Supreme Court determined that the Constitution requires nothing more. Id.; see
text accompanying notes 126-146 supra.
153 99 S. Ct. at 2105.
I Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972).
'15 Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (1973).
11 Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974) (state statute creates a liberty interest pro-
tected by due process guarantees).
7 99 S. Ct. at 2105. In a dissenting opinion, Justice Marshall argued that the due
process clause also protects interests that individuals do not currently enjoy. Id. at 2113
(Marshall, J., dissentibg). Liberty interests are implicated when an inmate stands to lose his
good-time credits, even though the forfeiture of the liberty interest deprives the prisoner of
freedom he expects to obtain in the future. Id. However, the majority distinguished Wolff
on the ground that the state statute in Wolff created a liberty interest protected by due
process guarantees. Id. at 2106. The majority opinion's distinction of Wolff is consistent
with the Supreme Court's holding in Greenholtz that due process considerations do not
arise when one does not presently enjoy liberty unless there is a statutory expectation of
liberty.
FOURTH CIRCUIT REVIEW
sion. " A parole revocation determination, to which limited due process
rights attach,115 involves a factual question of whether the parolee vio-
lated one or more of the conditions of parole.160 A parole release determi-
nation is more subtle and depends on many purely subjective appraisals
by the parole board." Thus conditional liberty may be denied without
due process, but may not be revoked without some limited form of due
process.
Greenholtz is instructive on the issue of whether there is constitu-
tional protection regarding an inmate's access to his files. 62 The Ne-
braska parole board largely bases parole decisions on the inmate's file.163
An inmate is allowed to appear before the Parole Board at the first of two
hearings to present statements and to insure that the records before the
board properly relate to his case.'" The Supreme Court held that this
procedure adequately safeguards against serious risks of errors and satis-
fies due process. 1 5
Greenholtz narrowed the scope of Paine. In Paine, the Fourth Circuit
noted that a prisoner has a right to have false information expunged from
his files if the allegedly false informationis relied upon to deny parole,
since a liberty interest is at stake and due process is called into play.1 66
The Fourth Circuit further stated that other administrative actions such
as status classifications or transfers to other facilities have collateral con-
sequences that affect a prisoner's liberty interests sufficiently to allow a
prisoner to challenge the information in his files.167 Neither a denial of
parole nor other administrative actions alone, however, would be suffi-
cient to require some procedural safeguards under Greenholtz.16 8 There
first must be an expectation of liberty based on the state's parole stat-
ute.1 69 Without such expectation of liberty, Paine is inapplicable to ac-
158 Id. at 2105.
159 See notes 138 supra.
160 99 S. Ct. at 2105.
161 Id; see Wiley v. United States Board of Parole, 380 F. Supp. 1194, 1200 (M.D. Pa.
1974) (parole release is a prognostic determination that involves discretionary application of
knowledge from many fields, including psychology, sociology, penology, and criminology);
Dawson, The Decision To Grant Or Deny Parole: A Study In Parole Criteria In Law and
Practice, 1966 WASH. U.L.Q. 243, 299-300.
182 The Greenholtz court noted that access to prison files was not at issue. 99 S. Ct. at
2108 n.8.
16s Id. at 2108.
I Id. At least once each year the Nebraska Board of Parole conducts an initial review
hearing in which the Board examines every inmate's entire record. Id. at 2102. The Board
then holds an informal hearing where the inmate is personally interviewed. Id. The Board
schedules a final hearing if it determines that the inmate is a likely candidate for release. Id.
The inmate may present evidence, call witnesses and be represented by counsel at the final
hearing. Id.
165 Id. at 2108. Under Greenholtz, protective procedures which protect against serious
errors satisfy due process requirements. Id.
166 595 F.2d at 202.
187 Id.; see note 138 supra.
2" See text accompanying notes 147-161 supra.
189 Id.
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tions of the state in parole determinations. Moreover, courts could not
require procedural safeguards for other administrative decisions which
touch only collaterally on the prisoner's liberty interest, such as an ad-
ministrative decision to transfer in inmate to another institution or to
reclassify his prison status.17 0 If some doubt exists as to what extent due
process applies to parole release determinations based on a statutory ex-
pectancy of release, there is even more doubt whether due process applies
at all to administrative decisions which only touch on a liberty interest.
However, North Carolina, as well as the other states in the Fourth Cir-
cuit, provides some form of statutory expectancy of parole under Green-
holtz.'7 ' Thus the right of an inmate to have erroneous information ex-
punged from his files under Paine72 probably applies to all of the states
in the Fourth Circuit, at least where a potential denial of parole is con-
cerned. The premise in Paine that due process attaches to North Caro-
1 0 See note 138 supra. In Greenholtz, the Supreme Court reversed the Eighth Circuit's
requirements imposed on the Nebraska Board of Parole, including a requirement of a full
formal hearing, with advance written notice and full written explanation of facts and rea-
sons for denial of parole. 99 S. Ct. at 2103. Greenholtz confirms the Supreme Court's judi-
cial restraint in the area of parole release decisions. Id. at 2104.
An alternative to judicial rule-making would be for the legislators to enact statutes that
provide what the legislators believe to be the proper balance between the right of prisoner's
access to his files and the interests of the state. The federal government's statute is a good
example of such a legislative rule. See 18 U.S.C. § 4208(b)(2) (1976). At least thirty days
prior to any parole proceeding, the federal government offers federal prisoners reasonable
access to a report or document to be used by the parole commission in making a parole
determination, with three statutory exceptions. Id. A prisoner does not have access to diag-
nostic opinions which could lead to serious disruption at the institution, confidential
sources, and other information which, if disclosed, could lead to harm to any person. Id. at §
4208(c). If the commission deems the information to fall within one of the three exceptions,
the commission then must summarize the basic contents of the material under appropriate
circumstances. Id. See also 28 C.F.R. § 2.55 (1978). At least one federal court noted the
federal statute and regulation with approval. Williams v. Missouri Bd. of Probation & Pa-
role, 585 F.2d 922 (8th Cir. 1978), vacated, 61 L.E.2d 293 (1979).
17 Similar to the Nebraska statute, see note 151 supra, North Carolina's parole statute
provides that the Parole Commission must consider the desirability of parole for each per-
son, sentenced for a maximum term of eighteen months or longer, at least sixty days prior to
his statutory eligibility for parole or prior to the expiration of the first year of the sentences
if the prisoner is eligible for parole at any time. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1371 (Cum. Supp.
1979). The North Carolina statute also provides specific criteria to consider whether to re-
lease the prisoner on parole. Id. Subsequent judicial precedent will have to be considered to
determine whether North Carolina's statutory scheme provides the Greenholtz expectancy
of release. Cf. MD. CODE ANN. art. 41, § 122 (Repl. Vol 1978) (duty of Board of its own
initiative to request Division to make investigation whenever the prisoner shall have served
one fourth of his term); S.C. CODE § 24-21-620 (1976) (Board shall review case of prisoner
after a prisoner has served one third of his sentence); VA. CODE § 53-251 (Cum. Supp. 1979)
(every first offender shall be eligible for parole after serving one fourth of the imprisonment
term); W. VA. CODE § 52-12-13 (Cum. Supp. 1979) (parole board shall have the authority to
release any prisoner on parole whenever it is of the opinion that the best interests of the
State and prisoner would be served). See Franklin v. Shields, 569 F.2d 784, 795 (4th Cir.)
(statutory right in Virginia).
172 595 F.2d at 202.
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lina's parole proceedings was correct, though the premise arises from the
state's statute rather than from the nature of parole.
Any further judicial rule-making in the area of parole-release determi-
nations should be made with caution. States subject to the holding of
Paine may circumvent the decision by showing that the state's procedure
adequately safeguards against serious errors. For example, a state may
provide personal interviews with the inmate prior to a final hearing for
parole to insure that the records before the parole board properly relate
to his case under Greenholtz.7 3 A state may even abandon or curtail pa-
role if judicial rules become too cumbersome,'17 4 because states have no
duty to establish a parole release system.1 7 5 Alternatively, a state may
circumvent Paine by repealing any statutory expectancy of parole.
In general, the recent Fourth Circuit cases in the area of prisoners'
rights have demonstrated both an active and a practical judicial role. The
court in Williams v. Leeke 17 extended Bounds to local jails, 17 but inti-
mated that a state may limit access to legal research for prisoners posing
a high security risk.1 7 8 In Johnson v. Levine, 7 9 the court reached a practi-
cal decision by deferring to the plan proposed by the Maryland prison
authorities. 80 Finally, in Paine v. Baker,'8' the Fourth Circuit attempted
to balance a prisoner's need for access to his files with the state's inter-
ests, ' 8 2 though the extent of the holding was limited by the subsequent
Greenholtz opinion.8 3 The recent decisions by the Fourth Circuit have
established guidelines for prison officials and for inmates, though there
are unresolved issues which only further litigation will resolve. Further




Although a criminal defendant has no constitutional right to plea bar-
gain,' the process of exchanging a guilty plea for a mutually satisfactory
173 99 S. Ct. at 2108.
174 Id. at 2107.
75 Id. at 2104.
176 584 F.2d 1336 (4th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 99"S. Ct. 2825 (1979).
117 See text accompanying notes 41-48 and 55-61 supra.
'78 See text accompanying notes 28-40 supra.
170 588 F.2d 1378 (4th Cir. 1978).
:'o See text accompanying notes 83-95 supra.
595 F.2d 197 (4th Cir. 1979).
182 See text accompanying notes 133-146 supra.
183 See text accompanying notes 147-166 supra.
Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545, 561 (1977). Weatherford and Bursey were arrested
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disposition of a case between defendant and prosecutor resolves a major
portion of the criminal docket each year.2 The defendant's surrender of
important constitutional rights3 during the plea bargaining process raises
questions of prosecutorial conduct and ethics during the negotiation of
pleas.' Supreme Court recognition of plea bargaining as both legitimate'
and indispensable6 in the American criminal justice system, coupled with
the lack of uniform guidance in this area,7 have prompted the development
of standards to govern the administration of this practice in the federal
system.8 While courts have ruled on the voluntariness' and accuracy0 of
plea bargains, recent case law focuses on judicial remedies for prosecutorial
breaches of plea bargains with the defendant."
together for vandalism of a South Carolina Selective Service office. Weatherford was an
undercover agent and concealed his status during subsequent meetings with Bursey and
Bursey's attorney. Id. at 547. Weatherford eventually testified against Bursey and thereby
helped secure Bursey's conviction. Id. at 549. On appeal, Bursey contended that Weather-
ford's continued duplicity lost Bursey the opportunity to plea bargain. The Supreme Court
found no merit in this contention, holding that there is no constitutional right to plea bargain.
The prosecutor need not enter into plea negotiations if he prefers -to go to trial. Id. at 561.
1 Roughly 90% of all defendants plead guilty. Although the number of defendants enter-
ing guilty pleas in accordance with plea agreements varies with the seriousness of the crime,
the percentage of plea bargains is uniformly substantial. See J. BOND, PLEA BARGAINING AND
GUILTY PLEAS §1.02 (1978) [hereinafter cited as BOND].
The fifth amendment provides that a defendant has a right to remain silent and not
incriminate himself. U.S. CONST. amend. V. The sixth amendment of the Constitution affords
a defendant the right to go to trial and the right to be confronted with the witnesses against
him. U.S. CONST. amend VI. The defendant sacrifices these rights in plea negotiation and
agreement. See BOND, supra note 2, §2.06.
' See Alderstein, Ethics, Federal Prosecutors, and Federal Courts: Some Recent
Problems, 6 HOFSTRA L. REv. 755, 778-92 (1978).
1 See Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 753 (1970). In the face of a maximum penalty
of death if a jury verdict should so recommend, petitioner Brady pleaded guilty when he
discovered that his codefendant would plead guilty and be available to testify against him.
Brady's guilty plea was accepted after the trial judge twice questioned him as to the voluntar-
iness of his plea. Id. at 743. In affirming Brady's conviction and sentence of 30 years imprison-
ment, the Supreme Court commended the exchange of a guilty plea for leniency in sentencing
and described plea bargaining as advantageous to both defendant and prosecutor and inher-
ent in the criminal law and its administration. Id. at 752-53. See generally Note, The Guilty
Plea As A Waiver of "Present But Unknownable" Constitutional Rights: The Aftermath of
the Brady Trilogy, 74 CoLuM. L. REv. 1435 (1974).
' Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 260 (1971)(plea bargaining essential to adminis-
tration of justice and should be encouraged).
' See Bond, supra note 2, §§ 3.01(1) & 3.01(2).
' See FED.R.C iM.P. 11, as amended by Act of July 31, 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-64, § 3(5)-
(10).
, See, e.g., McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459, 472 (1969) (trial judge obligated to
ascertain personally from defendant whether he understood nature of charges against him);
Sierra v. Government of Canal Zone, 546 F.2d 77, 79 (5th Cir. 1977)(district court judge must
carefully question defendant to determine full understanding of guilty plea).
" See, e.g., United States v. Rushing, 456 F.2d 1294, 1294 (5th Cir. 1972) (failure of trial
court to establish factual basis for guilty plea held reversible error); United States v. Birming-
ham, 454 F.2d 706, 708 (10th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 969 (1972)(trial court must
establish factual record for guilty plea).
H See, e.g., United States v. Ewing, 480 F.2d 1141, 1143 (5th Cir. 1973)(government's
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In Santobello v. New York, 12 the Supreme Court held that when a plea
rests in any significant degree on a promise or agreement of the prosecutor,
so that the plea was part of the inducement or consideration, that promise
must be fulfilled. 3 Characterizing plea bargaining as an essential compo-
nent of the administration of justice, the Court commended the benefits
of judicial economy which the procedure assures." The Court stressed the
importance of fairness in securing an agreement between an accused and
a prosecutor, 5 and concluded that petitioner's remedy for prosecutorial
breach of a plea bargain 6 was either specific performance of the plea agree-
ment or a withdrawal of the guilty plea."
Since Santobello, the Supreme Court has withdrawn from extending
broad fairness considerations to the plea negotiation process by limiting
the circumstances giving rise to improper government conduct during plea
opposition to probation in violation of its agreement required that defendant be given oppor-
tunity to submit new probation motion before different judge); United States v. Hallam, 472
F.2d 168, 169 (9th Cir. 1973) (government must fulfill its part of plea bargain where defendant
has performed his part); United States v. Graham, 325 F.2d 922, 925 (6th Cir. 1973)(where
government has not performed its part of plea agreement, defendant may elect between
withdrawal of plea or specific enforcement of plea agreement as remedy). See generally
Westen & Westin, A Constitutional Law of Remedies For Broken Plea Bargains, 66 CAL. L.
REv. 471 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Westen & Westin]; Note, The Legitimation of Plea
Bargaining: Remedies For Broken Promises, 11 AM. CRam. L. Rv. 771 (1973); Note, Plea
Bargaining-Specific Performance of a Prosecutor's Jnfulfillable Promise: A Right or a
Remedy?, 9 CONN. L. REV. 483 (1977); Note, Criminal Law-Enforcing Unfulfillable Plea
Bargaining Promises, 13 WAKE FOREsT L. REV. 842 (1977).
'2 404 U.S. 257 (1971).
"Id. at 262. Petitioner Santobello was indicted on two felony counts, promoting gam-
bling in the first degree and possession of gambling records in the first degree. Santobello first
entered a plea of not guilty on both counts, but after negotiation with the assistant district
attorney, he agreed to plead guilty to the lesser-included offense of possession of gambling
records in the second degree. This offense carried a maximum one year sentence, but the
prosecutor agreed to make no recommendation as to sentence. Id. at 258. The district court
accepted Santobello's plea of guilty and set a date for sentencing. Substantial delays resulted
in a new defense counsel, a new judge, and a new prosecutor. At the sentencing hearing, the
prosecutor recommended the maximum one year sentence, which the judge subsequently
imposed, in violation of the plea agreement. Id. at 258-60.
" Id. at 260-61. The Court in Santobello drew attention to the desirable elements of plea
bargaining by noting its prompt and substantially final disposition of most criminal cases.
Plea bargaining lessens pre-trial confinement and the consequential bad effects of enforced
idleness. It protects the public from criminals who might otherwise be out on bail, and, by
shortening the time between charge and disposition, it enhances the rehabilitative prospects
of the guilty. Id. at 261.
15 Id.
11 Id. at 262. The Santobello Court stated that petitioner "bargained" and negotiated for
a particular plea and that he had a right to fulfillment of that bargain. Id. Consequently,
plea bargaining case law has developed its standards for recognizing and enforcing plea
agreements through analogies to common law contract doctrines. See Westen & Westin, supra
note 11, at 528-39.
1 404 U.S. at 263. The Court remanded Santobello to the state court with the choice of
either allowing the peititoner to withdraw his guilty plea or requiring specific performance of
the original plea agreement. Id. The Santobello Court thus characterized fairness in the plea
bargaining context in terms of contract law rights and remedies.
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bargaining. The Court has held that confessions made subsequent to an
agreed plea bargain are not per se inadmissible. 8 A mere allegation by
plaintiff that a plea bargain was breached is not sufficient to trigger judi-
cial scrutiny of the defendant-prosecutor relationship, 9 and a prosecutor
is free to carry out threats made during plea negotiations.20 The Fourth
Circuit recently revived the basic fairness considerations of Santobello in
Cooper v. United States.2' The Cooper court held that an unambiguous
plea proposal, offered by the government to a defendant through his coun-
sel, must be fulfilled if the defendant unequivocally communicates his
assent to the proposal within a reasonable time.
2 2
The defendant Cooper was charged with bribery and obstruction of
justice~l after a series of telephone conversations revealed his intention to
accept a bribe in lieu of his responsibilities as a government informer.
2 4
Approximately two months before the defendant's trial, an assistant
United States attorney met with defense counsel and negotiated a plea
agreement.2 Upon receiving his client's subsequent approval of the pro-
posal, defense counsel promptly tried to notify the prosecuting attorney of
the defendant's acceptance. 6 By the time the defendant's attorney reached
the assistant United States attorney, the prosecutor's superior had in-
structed him to withdraw the proposal. 27 Despite repeated protests, defense
" See Hutto v. Ross, 429 U.S. 28, 30 (1976) (although existence of plea bargain may have
influenced respondent to give statement, counsel clearly informed respondent that plea bar-
gain was enforceable whether or not respondent confessed).
"'See Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 79 (1977)(trial court must make assurance of
legitimacy of plea bargaining, question both lawyers, and keep verbatim records of guilty-
plea proceedings to obtain judicial determination of existence of agreement and whether it
was ignored).
2 See Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 360-65 (1978) (prosecutor may carry out plea
bargaining threat to have defendant reindicted on habitual offender charge if defendant
declines to plead guilty on prosecutor's offered terms). See generally Comment, Broden-
kircher v. Hayes: Prosecutorial Discretion During Plea Bargaining, 27 BuFrAro L. Rv. 563
(1978); Comment, Bordenkircher v. Hayes: Ignoring ProsecutorialA buses in Plea Bargaining,
66 CAL. L. REv. 875 (1978).
21 594 F.2d 12 (4th Cir. 1979).
22 Id. at 19.
z 594 F.2d at 13; see 18 U.S.C. § 201(e)(1976)(bribery of public officials and witnesses);
18 U.S.C. § 1502 (1976)(resistance to extradition agent).
24 594 F.2d at 13-14.
Id. at 15. The government's proposed plea agreement provided that the defendant
would remain incarcerated, continue to cooperate with the federal authorities in on-going
narcotics trials, and plead guilty to one count of obstruction of justice. The government would
bring the defendant's cooperation to the attention of the sentencing judge and dismiss all
other counts of the indictment. Id.
24 Id. The defendant's attorney met with the assistant United States attorney at approxi-
mately 11:00 a.m. on May 11, 1977. Defense counsel quickly communicated the plea proposal
to the defendant and after obtaining the defendant's approval, tried to reach the prosecutor
beginning at noon that day. Id.
2 Id. At 1:30 p.m., the assistant United States attorney, who earlier negotiated with
defense counsel, met with his superior who instructed the withdrawal of the plea proposal.
When Cooper's attorney finally reached the assistant United States attorney between 2:30
and 3:30 p.m., he was notified immediately that the offer had been withdrawn. Id.
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counsel was prohibited from accepting the government's earlier offer.3
Cooper was convicted and sentenced to a total of fifteen years imprison-
ment."
On appeal, the defendant assigned as errors the trial proceeedings 3
and the district court's refusal to compel enforcement of the government's
proposed plea agreement.' The Fourth Circuit found no error in the con-
duct of the trial, 2 but regarded the district court's denial of the motion to
compel enforcement of the plea proposal as reversible constitutional
error.3 Since the district court relied on classic contract law principles, 34
the Fourth Circuit narrowed its focus to defining the extent to which con-
tract law analogies may draw the parameters of constitutional fairness
during the plea bargaining process.35
The Fourth Circuit reasoned that constitutional "fairness" demands a
wider scope of considerations than the law of contracts.36 Although contract
law analogies are useful in some circumstances,"7 traditional contract law
analysis of the defendant's situation was inadequate to afford Cooper a
remedy for the violation of his constitutional rights.38 The Cooper court
2 Id.
29 Id.
11 Id. at 13. The defendant Cooper was acting as a Drug Enforcement Administration
informer when he offered his removal as a witness against one whose indictment he helped
secure for a bribe. Id. at 13-14. Cooper's contentions that a taped telephone conversation was
inadmissible and that an immunized witness' attorney should have been sequestered during
testimony were both found to be without merit. Id. at 14.
1' Id. at 13.
32 Id.
33 Id.
34 Id. at 16 n.5. Upon denying Cooper's motion to compel enforcement of the plea pro-
posal, the district court relied on basic contract law in stating that an offer can be withdrawn
prior to actual acceptance by the opposite party. Id. at 16.
3 Id.
36 Id. at 16-17. The Fourth Circuit derived its constitutional fairness approach to
Cooper's situation from the Santobello case. Id. at 15-16. In Santobello, the Supreme Court
reversed a state court decision. Although the Court did not specifically state the source of its
constitutional holding, the decision has been interpreted as one grounded on the fourteenth
amendment due process clause. See note 13 supra; Westen & Westin, supra note 11, at 474-
75 n.10, 476 n.16, & 518 n.161.
*1 594 F.2d at 17. The Fourth Circuit did not repudiate any express or implicit reliance
on contract law analogies in its earlier decisions. See United States v. Hammerman, 528 F.2d
326, 330-31 (4th Cir. 1975)(unkept plea bargain enforced where government's promise relied
on by defendant); Harris v. Superintendent, 518 F.2d 1173, 1174 (4th Cir. 1975)(guilty plea
held invalid where defendant believed prosecutor could recommend particular sentence and
such recommendation not made); United States v. Brown, 500 F.2d 375, 378 (4th Cir. 1974)
(government held in breach of plea agreement where prosecutor only half-heartedly recom-
mended agreed-upon sentence); United States v. Carter, 454 F.2d 426, 428 (4th Cir.
1972) (where defendant pleaded guilty to misdemeanor for promise of immunity, indictment
of second prosecutor dismissed).
u 594 F.2d at 16. In determining the extent to which contract law may be drawn upon
to define the limits of a defendant's constitutional right to fairness during the plea bargaining
process, the Fourth Circuit acknowledged that the defendant demanded a right extending
beyond any provided by contract law analogy. Id. at 17 n.6. The court stated that an asserted
withdrawal of the proposal preceded the defendant's attempted acceptance of the plea agree-
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therefore maintained that developing constitutional doctrine should not be
limited by common law analogies."
The Cooper court further circumscribed the utility of contract law anal-
ogies by describing them as a reliable inclusive test for the existence of a
constitutional right and violation, but unreliable as an exclusive boundary
for the defendant's constitutional rights during the plea bargaining pro-
cess.4" Prosecutorial conduct that would ordinarily constitute breach of
contract or give rise to promissory estoppel will almost always reflect con-
stitutional unfairness.4' Constitutional fairness, however, may require con-
siderations beyond the law of contracts.2 Under appropriate circumstan-
ces, a constitutional right to enforcement of a plea agreement may arise
before a technical contract is formed, based on reasonable expectations of
the defendant in reliance upon the government's firmly advanced propos-
als.43 The Fourth Circuit concluded that the enforcement of a defendant's
reasonable expectations formed in reliance upon the honor of the govern-
ment prosecutor would be determined on a case-by-case basis.4
Cooper's analysis of constitutional rights during plea negotiations rests
on substantive due process guarantees" and the sixth amendment right to
counsel.46 The effective assistance of counsel hinges directly on the defen-
dant's confidence in his own attorney together with his reliance upon the
government's fair dealings.4 7 The court found that broken promises by the
government undermine the defendant's confidence in his attorney's capa-
bility and therefore jeopardize the effectiveness of counsel's assistance."
The government, therefore, must negotiate with scrupulous fairness during
its bargaining for guilty pleas. 9
ment. Thus, no right had arisen, within the definitions of contract law, for the government
to violate. Moreover, the remedies of enforcement of the bargain or promissory estoppel were
unavailable since there was neither a right nor a detrimental reliance on any firm agreement.
Id. at 16.
1' 594 F.2d at 17. See Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 401 n.8 (1977); Stoner v. Califor-
nia, 376 U.S. 483, 488 (1964); Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 513 (1961); Jones v.
United States, 362 U.S. 257, 266 (1960).
' 594 F.2d at 17.
" Id.; see text accompanying note 38 supra.
42 594 F.2d at 17.
Id. at 17-18.
Id. at 18.
' Id. The court stated that the relevance of substantive due process guarantees as a
source of the constitutional right involved was too plain to require discussion. The court
suggested that the due process clause of the fifth amendment embodies a broad constitutional
right to fundamental fairness. Id. at 18 n.8.
11 Id. The court stated that the sixth amendment right to the effective assistance of
counsel is less direct than the substantive due process guarantees but nonetheless important.
Id.
'4 Id.; see Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 415 (1977)(concurring opinion).
594 F.2d at 18-19.
" Id. at 19. The court noted the formalization of plea negotiations through counsel under
recently amended FED.R.CRIM.P. 11(e)(1). This rule provides for full disclosure of all plea
negotiations before the trial judge and general supervision of the plea bargaining process by
the courts.
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Having established broad guidelines of constitutional fairness during
the plea bargaining process, the Fourth Circuit examined the facts to
determine if Cooper's constitutional rights were violated. The government
prosecutor made a reasonable and unambiguous proposal without any re-
servation related to a superior's approval." The proposal was promptly
communicated to the defendant whose immediate approval entitled him
to the assumption that communication of his assent to the government
would consummate the plea agreement. 5' Defense counsel informed the
government of the defendant's approval within a few hours and was pro-
hibited from making a formal acceptance by the sheer fortuity of the
government's withdrawal.52 The Fourth Circuit held that a superior's
second-guessing the judgment of a duly authorized subordinate was an
insufficient reason for withdrawal of such a proposal in the face of proffered
acceptance. 53
The Cooper court's analysis of the existence of a constitutional right
and violation concluded by weighing the practical consequences attendant
to both the government and defendant positions in the plea bargaining
process.54 Since a defendant is constitutionally entitled to that process
reasonably due under all circumstances, 5 reasonableness will be deter-
mined by considering the practical burdens imposed on the government in
order to ensure the constitutional rights of the defendant.5 The Fourth
Circuit outlined a scheme of procedural guidelines for the Department of
Justice which would protect the government's interests in the plea bargain-
ing process and safeguard a defendant's constitutional rights. 7
Cooper's success in obtaining specific performance of a modified ver-
sion of the original plea agreement 5' expands the majority view among the





' Id.(citing Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. at 262).
s, 594 F.2d at 19. The Fourth Circuit stated that the limits of reasonableness are to be
found by weighing the practical burdens imposed on the government by its recognition of the
constitutional right to fairness during plea negotiations against the practical consequences
for this defendant and others similarly situated resulting from its non-recognition. Id.
1, Id. at 19-20. The Fourth Circuit articulated standards for the offices of the United
States attorneys, stating that no right can arise in a defendant until plea discussions are
voluntarily entered into by authorized agents. The court stated that government agencies
must withhold or limit the actual and circumscribe the apparent authority of subordinates if
necessary. Reservations relating to higher level approval should be routinely incorporated in
all proposals, or specifically in some, and protection against perjured testimony of the making
and acceptance of proposals should be achieved by routine requirements of signed memo-
randa. Id.
11 Id. at 20. The court determined that the only remedy available was specific perform-
ance of the plea proposal to the extent possible. Since the considerable lapse of time and
intervening circumstances rendered the original plea agreement impracticable, see note 25
supra, the court remanded with instructions that the defendant be allowed to enter a plea of
guilty to one of the counts of obstruction of justice upon which he was convicted and dismissal
of the remaining counts of the indictment. The government was to be relieved of any prior
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courts recognizing defendant remedies for government breach of a plea
bargain. While formal requirements have barred the claims of certain de-
fendants," other courts have provided defendants with remedies for unkept
plea bargains.6" A minority view reflects both an unwillingness to introduce
contract law analogies into federal criminal procedure"' and a stern view
toward the defendant's alleged "agreements" with the prosecutor's office.2
obligations respecting sentencing, and further proceedings were to take place before a district
judge not involved in the original proceeding. 594 F.2d at 21.
11 See United States v. Miller, 565 F.2d 1273, 1275 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 959
(1977) (no breach of plea bargain where government promised only to make no sentencing
recommendation but reserved and exercised right to comment on defendant's cooperation);
United States v. Dixon, 504 F.2d 69, 72 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 963 (1975) (no review
of alleged breach of plea bargain where trial court record of plea negotiations not made);
Dugan v. United States, 521 F.2d 231, 233 (5th Cir. 1975)(defendant must present credible
affidavits that raise substantial inference that unkept plea bargain was made in order to
obtain evidentiary hearing); United States v. Goodrich, 493 F.2d 390, 393 (9th Cir.
1974) (prosecution of overt act by defendant not encompassed within technical promise made
by government is not breach of plea agreement); Ballinger v. United States, 470 F.2d 739,
740 (9th Cir. 1972)(defense counsel's statement to defendant that guilty plea would insure
term of probation does not call prosecutor's conduct into question); United States v. Frontero,
452 F.2d 406, 411 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (defendant cannot rely on promise of prosecutor having no
authority to make sentencing promises); United States v. Simpson, 436 F.2d 162, 164 (D.C.
Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 873 (1973)(defendant cannot claim coercion undercutting
guilty plea merely because of reliance on attorney's advice); United States v. Briscoe, 432
F.2d 1351, 1359 (D.C. Cir. 1970)(inaccurate representations on deportability by unauthorized
government agent do not render defendant's guilty plea invalid).
11 See United States v. Thomas, 580 F.2d 1036, 1038 (10th Cir. 1978) (where government
breached promise not to sentence defendant until all outstanding indictments were returned,
defendant entitled to withdrawal of guilty plea or vacation of sentence until all indictments
returned); United States v. Shanahan, 574 F.2d 1228, 1230-31 (5th Cir. 1978)(defendant
allowed to have sentence vacated and cause remanded for resentencing by another district
judge where prosecutor breached plea agreement with respect to recommendation of sent-
ence); United States v. Scharf, 551 F.2d 1124, 1129 (8th Cir. 1977) (where trial court did not
establish record of plea agreement and its precise terms, evidentiary hearing directed to
determine terms of plea bargain and whether it was breached); United States v. Crusco, 536
F.2d 21, 26 (3d Cir. 1976) (prosecutorial breach of promise to take no position on sentencing
allows defendant to withdraw his guilty plea); United States v. Gerard, 491 F.2d 1300, 1303
(9th Cir. 1974) (prosecutorial breach of promise to make recommendation concerning sentenc-
ing and to grant probation to prosecution witness so that defendants were denied opportunity
to attack credibility entitled defendants to new trial); Correale v. United States, 479 F.2d
944, 947 (1st Cir. 1973) (government breach of agreed-upon sentencing recommendation war-
ranted sentencing readjustment calculated to approximate specific performance of original
plea agreement).
11 United States v. Selikoff, 524 F.2d 650, 654 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 951
(1976)(principles of contract inapposite to ends of criminal justice).
62 See, e.g., Williams v. Smith, 591 F.2d 169, 172 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 99 S.Ct. 2845
(1979) (sentencing misinformation given by government to state defendant held not disruptive
of state court guilty plea where accurate information would not have made any difference in
defendant's decision to enter plea); United States v. Alessi, 536 F.2d 978, 981 (2d Cir.
1976) (absent factual showing that government made certain promises to defendant, court is
under no duty to enforce an alleged plea agreement); United States v. James, 532 F.2d 1161,
1163 (7th Cir. 1976)(federal agent's assurances to defendant not considered an agreement
precluding federal government from prosecuting defendant); United States v. Nathan, 476
F.2d 456, 459 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 823 (1973)(defendant's failure to carry out
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Cooper represents a broadening of constitutional rights in the plea bargain-
ing process by granting a remedy in the pre-agreement, pre-performance
context.
The broad remedial view of a defendant's constitutional rights in the
plea bargaining process expressed by the Cooper court embodies policy
considerations of governmental integrity and fair dealings between the
government and the people. The Fourth Circuit's vindication of society's
interest in the fair administration of justice63 resembles a recent line of case
law requiring the government to keep other promises. These promises in-
clude agreements to produce evidence, 4 to honor a deferred prosecution,65
to observe a grant of immunity," to abide by the results of a polygraph
test,"7 and to avoid interrogation of one promised insulation from question-
ing in a prosecutor's affidavit. Cooper joins these and other decisions in
a recent trend interpreting Santobello as a signpost pointing toward in-
creased government responsibility.69
Cooper v. United States represents an expansion of the defendant's
constitutional rights in the negotiation of pleas. The Fourth Circuit placed
the burden of fairness in the plea bargaining process squarely on the shoul-
ders of the government prosecutors, requiring their dealings with the de-
fendant to be of scrupulous integrity. Cooper is a progressive decision in a
continuing judicial effort to upgrade the reliability and professional char-
acter of conduct between the prosecutor and the defendant.
PHILIP DoMIc CALDERONE
D. Deadlocked Juries
Certain circumstances may prompt a trial judge to inquire about the
numerical division of an undecided jury. The court's examination may be
promise made to government nullifies existence of any claimed agreement with government);
United States v. Lombardozzi, 467 F.2d 160, 161-63 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1108
(1973) (ill-advised comments on sentencing by government agent and assistant United States
attorney to defendant did not rise to level of Santobello promise).
' 594 F.2d at 20.
" See United States v. Millet, 559 F.2d 253, 256-57 (5th Cir. 1977).
, See United States v. Garcia, 519 F.2d 1343, 1345 (9th Cir. 1975).
" See United States v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 551 F.2d 1106, 1111 (9th Cir.
1977).
,7 See People v. Reagen, 395 Mich. 306, 235 N.W.2d 581, 587 (1975).
See In Re Snoonian, 502 F.2d 110, 112 (1st Cir. 1975).
" See, e.g., United States v. Vale, 496 F.2d 365, 367-68 (5th Cir. 1974); United States v.
Scanland, 495 F.2d 1104, 1106 (5th Cir. 1974); State v. Carlisle, 111 Ariz. 233, 236, 527 P.2d
278, 281 (1974); Sturgis v. State, 25 Md.App. 628, 636, 336 A.2d 803, 807 (1975).
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in order to arrange a recess' or to gauge the jury's progress during a long
deliberation.2 Where multiple defendants are involved, the trial judge may
accept the jury's verdict with respect to one defendant and inquire about
the numerical division regarding the other defendant.3 The court's numeri-
cal division inquiry, however, is usually addressed to a deadlocked jury.'
In Brasfield v. United States,5 the Supreme Court held the court's inquiry
during deliberations into a jury's numerical division is reversible error per
se.
6
The Brasfield Court reasoned that an examination into the jury's nu-
merical division was both useless and coercive. A practice which might
result in an improper influence on the jury through the possible coercion
of minority jurors could not be sanctioned.7 The Court characterized the
' See Beale v. United States, 263 F.2d 215, 217 (5th Cir. 1959)(judge's question to deter-
mine jury's numerical division held to be actuated by solicitude for jury, to arrange suitable
lunch hour, and not by desire to pry into or influence their deliberations); Butler v. United
States, 254 F.2d 875, 876 (5th Cir. 1958)(trial court's inquiry as to numerical division of jury
made for purposes of arranging lunch held non-coercive).
2 See United States v. Hayes, 446 F.2d 309 (5th Cir. 1971). In an elaborate criminal trial,
the judge asked the jury how they stood numerically during the third day of deliberation. The
jury informed the court of its numerical division, continued its deliberations into a fourth day,
and finally convicted the defendant. The Fifth Circuit overturned the conviction, holding that
Brasfield v. United States, 272 U.S. 448 (1926) required automatic reversal. 446 F.2d at 312;
see note 7 infra.
I See United States v. Prentiss, 446 F.2d 923 (5th Cir. 1971). On its second day of
deliberations, the jury announced a guilty verdict for one of two defendants. The judge
inquired as to the jury's numerical division regarding the other defendant. After answering
the court's inquiry, the jury continued to deliberate and eventually returned a guilty verdict
against the second defendant. The judge's numerical inquiry was held not a sufficient ground
for reversal. Id. at 925.
1 See Marcus, The Allen Instruction In Criminal Cases: Is The Dynamite Charge About
To Be Permanently Defused?, 43 Mo. L. REv. 613, 618-19 nn.37-41 (1978) [hereinafter cited
as Marcus]. No-verdict situations became the subject of special instructions from the bench
during the mid-nineteenth century. See Commonwealth v. Tuey, 62 Mass. (8 Cush.) 1, 2
(1851)(Massachusetts court instructed deadlocked jury on duty of jurors to consider each
other's opinions and distrust one's own point of view in effort to see other side). By 1896, the
United States Supreme Court formalized the use of a special instruction for dead-locked
juries in United States v. Allen, 164 U.S. 492, 501-02 (1896). See note 19 infra. The Allen
charge, or "dynamite charge," is a frequently used weapon for state and federal court assaults
on the hung jury. See Marcus, supra at 617-23, 633 n.111.
272 U.S. 448 (1926). In Brasfield, the petitioners were convicted in federal district court
for conspiracy to possess and transport intoxicating liquors in violation of the National Prohi-
bition Act. Id. at 449. The conviction was affirmed by the Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit. Brasfield v. United States, 8 F.2d 472, 473 (9th Cir. 1925).
1 272 U.S. at 449-50. In Brasfield, the Court clarified its holding in Burton v. United
States, 196 U.S. 283 (1905). The Burton Court, reversing a conviction on other grounds,
criticized an inquiry into the numerical division of the jury as improper on the part of the
presiding judge. Id. at 307.
272 U.S. at 450. Although the Court acknowledged that the effect of a numerical inquiry
upon a jury cannot properly be known and may vary widely in different situations, the Court
maintained that generally such an inquiry has a tendency to be coercive since it may force
minority jurors to resign their convictions for the sake of a decision. Id. at 450. The Court
stated that every influence other than the evidence and the law as expounded in a proper
charge should be excluded from the jury. Id.
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numerical inquiry as a threat to the fair and impartial conduct of the trial
and found that its use was, by itself, sufficient grounds for automatic
reversal."
Brasfield ended the federal court practice of inquiring into the numeri-
cal division of a deadlocked jury Concern by the Supreme Court over the
proper relationship between federal authority and states' rights 0 has cre-
ated an awareness among the lower federal courts of the necessary distinc-
tion between rules of federal court supervision" and those of constitutional
dimension.2 The applicability of Brasfield's no-inquiry rule in state court
trials has become a controversial issue. 3 The question of whether, Brasfield
is a decision of judicial administration" and thus applicable only to the
Id. at 450.
The Brasfield Court noted the conflicting interpretations of Burton v. United States,
196 U.S. 283 (1905), in the circuit courts of appeals. Some circuits found non-compliance with
the Burton no-inquiry rule reversible error, while others viewed the Burton criticism as
advisory only. 272 U.S. at 449-50. Brasfield ended the confusion generated by Burton by
holding that inquiry into the numerical division of a jury by a federal judge was reversible
error per se. Id. at 450.
" See H. MEYER, THE HISTORY AND MEANING OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 224-42
(1977); Haigh, Defining Due Process of Law: The Case of Mr. Justice Hugo L. Black, 17 S.D.
L. REv. 1, 1-39 (1972); Redlish, A Black-Harlan Dialogue On Due Process And Equal Protec-
tion: Overheard In Heaven And Dedicated To Robert B. McKay, 50 N.Y.U. L. REv. 20, 21-
46 (1975).
" The federal circuit courts of appeals have maintained state court indep~endence from
decisions of judicial administration over the federal courts. See United States ex rel. Anthony
v. Sielaff, 552 F.2d 588, 590 & n.1 (7th Cir. 1977)(where conduct of state trial was fair, court
viewed Supreme Court's decision in Jenkins v. United States, 380 U.S. 445, 446 (1965) as one
of judicial administration rather than constitutional due process); Youker v. Gulley, 536 F.2d
184, 187 (7th Cir. 1976) (state may regulate requirements of own employees without violating
first or fourteenth amendments); Wallace v. Kern, 499 F.2d 1345, 1351 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
420 U.S. 947 (1974)(state may determine for itself specific time requirements of speedy trial);
Kirby v. Warden, 296 F.2d 151, 152 (4th Cir. 1961)(comments of state trial judge held not
within review of federal courts).
22 See, e.g., Nesmith v. Alford, 318 F.2d 110, 120 (5th Cir. 1963)(state arrest of whites
and blacks eating together was improper under federally paramount constitutional principles
of due process and equal protection).
'1 See Marcus, supra note 4, at 618-19 nn.37-41; Note, On Instructing Deadlocked Juries,
78 YALE L. J. 100, 132 &133 nn. 95-98 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Deadlocked Juries]. Some
courts recognize the trial court's inquiry solely as to the numerical division of the jury as
reversible error. See United States v. Cheramie, 520 F.2d 325, 333 (5th Cir. 1975); Jacobs v.
United States, 279 F.2d 826, 832 (8th Cir. 1960); United States v. Mack, 249 F.2d 321, 323
(7th Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 356 U.S. 920 (1958); United.States v. Samuel Dunkel & Co.,
173 F.2d 506, 510 (2d Cir. 1949); Spaugh v. United States, 77 F.2d 720, 722-23 (9th Cir. 1935);
Berger v. United States, 62 F.2d 438, 439 (10th Cir. 1932); State v. Aragon, 89 N.W. 91, 547
P.2d 574, 580 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 89 N.W. 206, 549 P.2d 284 (1976); People v. Wilson,
390 Mich. 689, 213 N.W.2d 193, 195 (1973); Commonwealth v. Robinson, 102 Pa. Super. Ct.
46, 156 A. 582, 584 (1931). But see People v. Carter, 68 Cal.2d 810, 69 Cal. Reptr. 297, 303-
04, 442 P.2d 353, 359-60 (1968); Goldwire v. State, 128 Ga.App. 472, 197 S.E.2d 155, 156
(1973); Sharplin v. State, 330 So.2d 591, 596 (Miss. 1976); Linscomb v. State, 545 P.2d 1272,
1274 (Okla. Crim. App. 1976).
" The United States Supreme Court has supervisory authority over the lower federal
courts. See U.S. CONsT. art.Im, §§ 1 & 2. Exercise of this authority results in decisions of
judicial administration, applicable only to the federal courts. Decisions grounded in judicial
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federal courts, or is grounded on the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment' and therefore applicable also to the states, involves issues of
judicial authority and constitutional law. The Fourth Circuit recently ad-
dressed this controversy in Ellis v. Reed."
Appellant Ellis was arrested for embezzlement and tried by a jury in a
North Carolina state court. 7 Following a three-day trial, the jury returned
deadlocked after several hours of deliberation. The judge inquired into
their numerical division and then delivered a modified version of the Allen
charge." The court urged the jury to consider each juror's opinion and work
administration over the federal courts are exemplified by Supreme Court rulings on evidence
and jury trial procedures. In McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 341 (1943), the Court
stated that its promulgation of certain rules of evidence was not prompted by considerations
of constitutional fairness, but rather by the Court's supervisory authority over the administra-
tion of criminal justice in the federal courts. Similarly, in Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 31
(1963), the Court recognized that it was the states' responsibility to devise their own methods
of administering criminal justice so long as those methods met acceptable constitutional
standards. In Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972), the Court declined an opportunity to issue
procedural rules on a state's conduct of speedy trials, stating that such a result would engage
the Court in legislative or rulemaking activity outside its adjudicative functions. Id. at 523.
11 Certain Supreme Court rulings are grounded on considerations of fundamental fair-
ness, and the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. This power is used to invali-
date state deprivations of an individual's constitutional rights. See Niemotko v. Maryland,
340 U.S. 268, 270 (1951). In Niemotko the Court struck down a Maryland procedure denying
appellate review on the sufficiency of evidence where two Jehovah's witnesses were denied
the expression of their first amendment rights. A South Carolina conviction for breach of the
peace was overturned in Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229 (1963). The Court felt
compelled to overlook state court authority when the petitioner's constitutionally protected
rights of free speech, free assembly, and freedom to petition for redress of grievances were
infringed. Id. at 235. Similarly, New Hampshire's refusal to honor the fourth amendment's
detached and neutral evaluation of a search warrant requirement compelled the invalidation
of a state statute permitting police authorization of search warrants in Coolidge v. New
Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 453 (1971). These decisions are of constitutional proportion and are
fully applicable to the states through the admonition of the fourteenth amendment, which
provides "No State shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due
process of law." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV §1.
596 F.2d 1195 (4th Cir. 1979).
17 Id. at 1196.
Id.
" In Allen v. United States, 164 U.S. 492 (1896), the Court reviewed a jury instruction
identical to the one given in Commonwealth v. Tuey, 62 Mass. (8 Cush.) 1 (1851). 164 U.S.
at 501. See note 4 supra. Approving the instruction, the Allen Court summarized as follows:
While undoubtedly, the verdict of the jury should represent the opinion of each
individual juror, it by no means follows that opinions may not be changed by
conference in the jury-room. The very object of the jury system is to secure unanim-
ity by a comparison of views, and by arguments among the jurors themselves. It
certainly cannot be the law that each juror should not listen with deference to the
arguments and with distrust of his own judgment, if he finds a large majority of
the jury taking a different view of the case from what he does himself. It cannot be
that each juror should go to the jury-room with a blind determination that the
verdict shall represent his opinion of the case at that moment; or, that he should
close his ears to the arguments of men who are equally honest and intelligent as
himself.
164 U.S. at 501. This language from the Allen case is referred to as the Allen charge. See
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together without the surrender of any personal convictions in trying to
reach a decision."0 After the judge's statements, the jury quickly returned
a guilty verdict.21 Ellis was convicted of embezzlement and the North
Carolina court of appeals affirmed the conviction.2 2 On habeas corpus re-
view, the Fourth Circuit held that Brasfield's prohibition of trial court
inquiry into the numerical division of the jury was intended to formulate
a policy for only the federal courts, and is not applicable per se to the state
courts.?
In concluding that the Brasfield rule was one of judicial administration
over the federal courts and not grounded on due process considerations, the
Fourth Circuit first analyzed the language of the Brasfield opinion.2 1 Prior
Supreme Court criticism of the numerical division inquiry led to the
Brasfield Court's absolute condemnation of the inquiry as inconsistent
with the essential fairness and impartial conduct of the trial and possibly
coercive in its effect upon a divided jury.2 Although the "essential fair-
ness" language in Brasfield could be interpreted to impart a rule of consti-
tutional dimension, 2 the Fourth Circuit concluded that the Brasfield hold-
ing was not constitutionally grounded.? The Ellis court reasoned that
Brasfield should be read in conjunction with the Supreme Court's earlier
criticism of the numerical division inquiry by the trial judge. The Court
felt that such an inquiry was impermissible in the "proper administration
of the law. 2 Since no constitutional provisions were cited in Brasfield,0
the Fourth Circuit concluded that a textual analysis of the Brasfield opin-
ion signifies a supervisory rather than a constitutional rule2
generally Marcus, supra note 4; Note, Due Process, Judicial Economy and the Hung Jury: A
Reexamination of the Allen Charge, 53 VA. L. REV. 123 (1967); 42 TENN. L. REV. 803 (1975).
0 596 F.2d at 1196. The trial judge did not quote from Allen v. United States, 164 U.S.
492 (1896), but gave a brief instruction on the importance of judicial economy and the duty
of jurors to reconcile their differences. In the course of the instruction, the judge twice dis-
claimed any desire to force or coerce the judgment of any juror. 596 F.2d at 1196.
21 596 F.2d at 1196.
State v. Ellis, 33 N.C.App. 667, 236 S.E.2d 299, 306 (1977).
" 596 F.2d at 1200.
24 Id. at 1197; see text accompanying notes 5-8 supra.
" The Supreme Court first spoke on the trial court's inquiry into the numerical division
of the jury in Burton v. United States, 196 U.S. 283 (1905). In reversing a federal court
conviction on the grounds of insufficient evidence and improper jury instructions, the Burton
Court criticized the trial judge's inquiry into the numerical division of the jury stating "we
do not think that the proper administration of the law requires such knowledge or permits
such a question on the part of the presiding judge." Id. at 307. This language in Burton was
interpreted differently by the various federal circuits. See Brasfield v. United States, 272 U.S.
at 449-50.
272 U.S. at 450.
596 F.2d at 1197.
2 Id. at 1197-98.
21 Id.; see Burton v. United States, 196 U.S. at 308.
596 F.2d at 1197.
22 Id. at 1198.
22 Id. at 1199-1200; see United States v. Mitchell, 322 U.S. 65, 67-68 (1944)(sole authority
of United States Supreme Court in state court proceedings is to insure proper regard for the
basic safeguards of fourteenth amendment).
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The Ellis court also considered the Supreme Court's limited corrective
powers over state criminal trials.32 Federalism 3 3 limits federal review over
state administration of trials to the due process requirements of the four-
teenth amendment. Therefore, Supreme Court intervention in a state trial
decision is warranted only when the state has transgressed the constitu-
tional guarantees of the fourteenth amendment4.3 Absent violation of rights
expressly guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment, state courts are not
bound by federal court standards of administration 5 concerning jury in-
structions, 31 unanimity of the jury,37 or number of persons oD the jury.38 The
Fourth Circuit examined these principles in the context of state jury trials
and the limited corrective powers of federal court review. 9 The Ellis court
concluded that the numerical division inquiry was an administrative mat-
ter, and that principles of federalism required the determination of its
propriety to rest with the supervisory state court, rather than within the
due process review powers of a federal court."
The Fourth Circuit follows the majority view of other state and federal
courts4' unwilling to apply Brasfield's per se reversal rule to state courts.
2
Ellis adopts the totality of the circumstances test, 3 fashioned for consider-
ing allegedly coercive instructions or comments to the jury, and used in
lieu of the per se approach." The Fourth Circuit did not consider the trial
3 Federalism is a doctrine of constitutional law which embodies the proper balance
between powers of federal and state government. See U.S. CONST. amend. X; THE FmlAusL'r
Nos. 39 & 43 (J. Madison); G. DigTZE, THE FEDERAUST: A CLASSIC ON FEDERALISM AND FREE
GOVERNMENT 124-26 (1960).
See Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 168 (1952).
See Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276, 288 (1930)(sixth amendment right to jury
trial in federal cases requires a jury of twelve persons and unanimous verdict).
'" See Cupp v. Naughten, 414 U.S. 141 (1973). The Cupp Court held that an instruction
to the jury that every witness is presumed to speak the truth in a trial in which the defendant
elected not to testify did not offend the requirements of due process. Id. at 150. Federal court
disapproval of such an instruction was not a directive binding on state courts. Id. at 146.
" See Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356, 359 (1972)(9 of 12 majority verdict upheld
under Louisiana law where Supreme Court ruled that jury unanimity has never been requisite
of due process of law).
" See Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 102-03 (1970)(although federal juries must consist
of twelve persons, 6-person jury held permissible under Florida law).
"' 596 F.2d at 1199-1200.
" 596 F.2d at 1200. The Fourth Circuit stated that since an inquiry during deliberations
as to the numerical division of a jury is in the nature of a supplemental instruction, the
inquiry was essentially procedural. Id. Cf. Cupp v. Naughten, 414 U.S. 141, 145 (1973)(jury
instruction disapproved by federal courts may be used by state court as long as fourteenth
amendment due process rights not violated).
" See text accompanying note 13 supra & note 50 infra.
42 596 F.2d at 1200. The dissent read Brasfield as relying*on fourteenth amendment due
process, viewing the "coercive" and "fair and impartial conduct of the trial" language in
Brasfield as condemning the numerical inquiry practice on constitutional grounds. Id. at
1201-02.
13 Id. at 1198-99. The totality of the circumstances test was developed in Jenkins v.
United States, 380 U.S. 445 (1965). The Jenkins Court found reversible error when a judge's
comment, viewed in its context and under all circumstances, was coercive. 380 U.S. at 446.
See generally Erikson, Fair Trial and Free Press: The Practical Dilemma, 29 STAN. L. REv.
485, 487 (1977).
1 596 F.2d at 1199.
FOURTH CIRCUIT REVIEW
court's inquiry as to the numerical split of the jury as coercive within the
totality of the circumstances. '- The jury was twice warned not to surrender
any of their personal convictions after the numerical inquiry was made,"
and the Ellis court found these warnings an ample safeguard against any
constitutionally impermissible coercion.47
Ellis v. Reed is consistent with the interpretation most jurisdictions
have given the Brasfield case.4" Brasfield's no-inquiry rule has been applied
per se in the federal courts," while habeas corpus petitions by state con-
victs raising the numerical issue have been examined in light of the totality
of the circumstances. 0 Certain states have approved the rationale of
Brasfield and therefore adopted its no-inquiry rule independently of any
federal constitutional requirement.-" Only one state court accepts the
Brasfield holding as constitutionally binding through the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment.2
The Ellis decision reflects the necessary preservation of state court
independence from federal decisions of judicial administration. 51 Supreme
Court rulings urging the limited supervisory authority of federal courts
over state decisions4 have gained acceptance among the federal courts.-5
" Id. at 1200.
" Id. at 1196. The Ellis court looked with favor on the trial judge's repeated warning that
no juror should surrender any personal convictions in reaching a decision. Id. at 1200.
, Id. at 1200.
' See text accompanying notes 49-52 infra.
' See, e.g., United States v. Noah, 594 F.2d 1303, 1304 (9th Cir. 1979); United States v.
Hayes, 446 F.2d 309, 312 (5th Cir. 1971); Jacobs v. United States, 279 F.2d 826, 832 (8th Cir.
1960), United States v. Mack, 249 F.2d 321, 323-24 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 356 U.S. 920
(1957); United States v. Samuel Dunkel & Co., 173 F.2d 506, 510-11 (2d Cir. 1949), cert.
denied, 340 U.S. 930 (1951).
0 In Marsh v. Cupp, 392 F.Supp. 1060, 1063 (D.Ore. 1975), affl'd, 536 F.2d 1287 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 981 (1976), the district court held that the Brasfield rule was
based on the supervisory powers of the Supreme Court, and affirmed a state court conviction.
The conviction was challenged, in part, because the judge made an inquiry about the numeri-
cal split of the jury. The court viewed all of the circumstances of the trial, however, and found
them noncoercive. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the lower court's ruling under the
totality of the circumstances, although it erroneously stated that absence of any mention in
the jury's answer to a numerical division inquiry about whom the jury favored precluded any
problem under Brasfield. 536 F.2d at 1291 n.9.
Jones v. Norvell, 472 F.2d 1185 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 986 (1973), presented
facts indicating an invasion of jury secrecy, inquiry into the numerical division of the jury, a
coercive jury charge, and a speedy return of a verdict subsequent to the charge. 472 F.2d at
1186. The court held that the totality of the circumstances required a new trial. Id.
5' See Kersey v. State, 525 S.W.2d 139, 141 (Tenn. 1975)(Brasfield holding adopted as a
supervisory and administrative rule for Tennessee state courts); People v. Wilson, 390 Mich.
689, 213 N.W.2d 193, 195 (1973)(Brasfield rationale acknowledged to support state court
determination that inquiry as to numerical division of the jury is always coercive).
12 State v. Aragon, 89 N.M. 91, 547 P.2d 574, 580 (1976)(Brasfield was grounded in due
process and is applicable to states).
13 See note 11 supra.
" See, e.g., Murphy v. Florida, 421 U.S. 794, 797-98 (1975)(supervisory rule on undue
press influence over jury in federal trial not applicable to states); United States v. Augen-
blick, 393 U.S. 348, 352 (1969)(rules of evidence promulgated by Supreme Court are not
necessarily grounded in due process and therefore applicable to states).
5 See, e.g., United States ex rel. Thomas v. New Jersey, 472 F.2d 735, 741 (3d Cir.), cert.
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Ellis v. Reed correctly views the Brasfield rule prohibiting inquiry as
to the numerical division of the jury as supervisory over the federal courts
and inapplicable to state criminal trials. The totality of the circumstances
test is sufficiently broad to safeguard against constitutional error at the
trial level, "8 and provides the defendant with a wide range of challenges on
habeas corpus review. 57 Interpretation of Brasfield as a constitutional hold-
ing is not warranted by the language of the opinion.58 While the Brasfield
Court did not expressly define its prohibition of numerical inquiries as
supervisory, subsequent use of the rule has remained almost exclusively in
the federal arena." The Fourth Circuit's continuance of this precedent in
Ellis v. Reed, therefore, reflects the majority view.6"
PHILIP DoMINIc CALDERONE
E. Federal Nexus in Electronic Surveillance
In Berger v. New York,' the United States Supreme Court interpreted
the fourth amendment to limit narrowly states' power to eavesdrop elec-
tronically on citizens, thereby preventing trespassory invasions into con-
stitutionally protected areas.2 Subsequently, in Katz v. United States,'
the Court extended fourth amendment protection to conversations made
while the speaker justifiably expected privacy, regardless of the particular
physical location of the communication.4 Congress adopted Title III of
denied, 414 U.S. 878 (1973)(although use of Allen charge prohibited in district courts, state
courts are free to choose); Davis v. Craven, 485 F.2d 1138, 1140 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied,
417 U.S. 933 (1974)(Supreme Court rule on federal judge's authority to comment on evidence
was supervisory over federal courts and not applicable as constitutional rule to state courts);
Farmer v. Kosan, 400 F.2d 1256, 1258 (2d Cir. 1971) (New York state courts possess authority
to determine "petty" and "serious" crimes after Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 148
(1968)).
11 See text accompanying notes 43-44 supra.
57 See text accompanying notes 44-45, & 50 supra.
5' See text accompanying notes 24-31 supra.
' See text accompanying notes 49-52 supra.
So See text accompanying notes 41-42 supra.
1 388 U.S. 41 (1967). In Berger, an order pursant to New York law permitted installa-
tion of a recording device in an office. Id. at 44-45; see N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW (McKinney) §
813-(a) (1958) (repealed 1970). The United States Supreme Court found the statute too
broad because it did not require either a showing that any particular offense had been or is
being committed, or a particularized description of the conversation sought. See 388 U.S. at
55-58.
' 388 U.S. at 54-56.
- 389 U.S. 347 (1967). In Katz the petitioner was convicted of transmitting wagering
information across state lines. FBI agents recorded petitioner's conversations in a phone
booth by placing a recording device on the outside of the booth. Reversing the conviction,
the Court held that the fourth amendment protects people, not places, and that the govern-
ment's eavesdropping violated privacy upon which the petitioner justifiably relied. See id. at
350-53.
389 U.S. at 350-51. The term "justifiable expectation of privacy" derives from Katz,
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the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 (the Act) to
combat organized crime within the limits imposed by the Supreme Court
in Katz and Berger.7 Accordingly, the Act prohibits interception8 of oral
communications9 on premises which operate to affect interstate com-
merce.10 Oral communications are defined as any oral communication ut-
tered by a person exhibiting a justifiable expectation that such communi-
cation is privileged.11 Congress did not, however, specifically limit the
statute's purview to government eavesdropping. Thus, in United States v.
Burroughs,"' the Fourth Circuit held the anti-bugging provisions of the
Act applicable lo private citizens.13 Recently, in United States v.
Duncan,14 the Fourth Circuit reexamined the Act in light of Burroughs
and the Act's constitutional basis.
The government charged Duncan under section 2511(1)(b)(iv)(A) of
the Act' 5 with electronically intercepting conversations of IRS and FBI
agents auditing the North Carolina bank of which Duncan was presi-
dent.16 Duncan allegedly installed a radio transmitter in the third floor
where the Court stated that there is a subjective expectation of privacy recognized as rea-
sonable by society. See id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). This standard was considered to
be a fair one by which to determine whether an individual has "justifiably relied" on pri-
vacy. Id. at 363; see Comment, The Reasonable Expectation of Privacy- Katz v. United
States, a Postscriptum, 9 IND. L. REv. 468, 471 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Expectations].
5 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2520 (1976).
6 S. REP. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in [1968] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws 2112, 2153, 2157 [hereinafter cited as SENATE REPORT].
7 18 U.S.C. § 2516 (1976) establishes the procedure for law enforcement officials' use of
electronic surveillance. The principal goal of these surveillance standards is compliance with
the constitutional requirements set out in Katz and Berger. SENATE REPORT, supra note 6,
at 2161-62; Comment, Title III and the Classic Triangle: Should the Immunity Doctrine
Apply to Interspousal Electronic Surveillance?, 12 CREIGHTON L. REV. 1209, 1223 (1979);
see notes 1 & 3 supra. The statutory definition of "oral communication" tracks the Katz
constitutional concept of privacy. United States v. Pui Kan Lan, 483 F.2d 1202, 1206 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 984 (1973); see note 4 supra.
8 18 U.S.C. § 2510(4) (1976) defines interception as the "aural acquisition of the con-
tents of any wire or oral communication through the use of any electronic, mechanical, or
other device." The Act purportedly applies its prohibitions to any person. See id. § 2510(6);
text accompanying note 13 infra.
9 18 U.S.C. § 2511(1) (1976).
10 18 U.S.C. § 2511(1)(b)(iv)(A) (1976).
11 Id. at § 2510(2).
12 564 F.2d 1111, 1115 (4th Cir. 1977).
13 Id., see Federal Nexus in Electronic Surveillance, Fourth Circuit Review, 36 WASH.
& LEE L. REV. 494, 496 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Federal Nexus]. The Burroughs court
extended the Act's applicability to private citizens even though Katz and Berger curtailed
only government eavesdropping. See notes 1 & 3 supra.
24 598 F.2d 839 (4th Cir. 1979).
"' 18 U.S.C. § 2511(1)(b)(iv)(A) (1976). The statute states that any person who willfully
uses or procures any other person to use any device to intercept any oral communication
when such use takes place on the premises of any business or commercial establishment, the
operations of which affect interstate commerce, shall be fined not more than $10,000 or
imprisoned not more than five years, or both. Id.
16 598 F.2d at 846. In September 1971, IRS agents began an audit of the Northwestern
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bank building office used by the federal agents. 17 At trial, the district
court convicted Duncan of electronically eavesdropping on the IRS. s On
appeal to the Fourth Circuit, Duncan argued on three general grounds
that the government failed to establish that his activities violated the
Act."'
First, Duncan argued that the IRS agents did not exhibit a justifiable
expectation that their conversations were not subject to interception.2 As
grounds for claiming that no justifiable expectation existed, Duncan ar-
gued that he consented to the eavesdropping in his capacity as presi-
dent,2 1 that the agents suspected the possibility that their conversations
Bank, bank president Duncan, and related taxpayers. Id. The bank provided the agents
with an office in the Northwestern Bank building which they used until 1973. In 1977, FBI
agents investigated the bank, conducting their operations from the same office. Id.
17 Id. The bank assigned the IRS agents a small office on the third floor of the bank
and gave the agents the keys to both the office door and a filing cabinet within the office. Id.
Duncan and another bank employee installed a microphone in the ceiling of the office as-
signed to the agents. Id. At Duncan's instructions, a bank employee monitored and recorded
conversations of the agents and delivered the tapes to Duncan. Id. The monitoring contin-
ued until January, 1973, when the agents moved to another building. The Fourth Circuit
stated that the agents changed buildings partly due to suspicion that they were being spied
upon, but there was no mention of how or why the agents became suspicious of the possible
eavesdropping. See id. In March of 1977, FBI agents arrived at the bank to investigate the
manner in which Duncan handled his personal checking account. Id. As a result of the in-
vestigation, Duncan was also charged with misapplication of bank funds. Id.
1I Id. at 847. Duncan pleaded guilty, pursuant to pleabargaining, to the charge of con-
spiracy to eavesdrop on the IRS. Id. Duncan was also convicted of misapplication of bank
funds. To establish misapplication of bank funds the government must prove that bank
funds were converted to the use of the defendant or through the defendant to a third party.
Id. at 858 (citing Johnson v. United States, 95 F.2d 813, 816 (4th Cir. 1938)). A defendant
who only temporarily deprives the bank of the possession, use, or control of funds also vio-
lates the statute. 598 F.2d at 858 (citing Agnew v. United States, 165 U.S. 36, 56-57 (1897)).
Duncan's checking account was classified as "no activity" so that the computer would reject
all the items drawn on it. Each check was then posted by hand. When any of Duncan's
checks reached the "cash-items" clerk, she paid them without debiting Duncan's account.
Periodically, Duncan collected the checks held by the bank, sent some back through the
computer in such a manner as they would not be rejected again, and replaced the others
with a debit memo. 598 F.2d at 846. Duncan thus wrote himself noninterest bearing, un-
secured loans. Id. at 847. No sentence was imposed in the FBI case, but convictions for
misapplication of bank funds and eavesdropping on the IRS carried a total fine of $22,000
and a three year prison sentence. Id.
'" See text accompanying notes 20, 26-27 infra.
20 598 F.2d at 849.
21 Id. at 851. Duncan argued that his consent to the interception negated any expecta-
tion of privacy by the agents. Id. In presenting this theory, Duncan relied on a footnote in
Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 179 n.11 (1969), which arguably permits those who
are overheard on another's premises when the owner is absent to object unless the owner
consented to the interception. 598 F.2d at 851. The Fourth Circuit dismissed the objection
as "cryptic dictum." Id.; see text accompanying notes 31, 42-44 infra. The Alderman foot-
note dealt only with official intrusions made with the owner's permission and has been inter-
preted to limit an owner's ability to authorize interceptions on his premises when the par-
ties to the intercepted conversations are the owner's criminal associates. Fishman, The
Interception of Communications Without a Court Order: Title III, Consent, and the Ex-
pectation of Privacy, 51 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 41, 58 (1976).
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were monitored,22 that the bank's adverse relationship with the IRS put
the agents on notice of possible eavesdropping,2 that the agents were
strangers on the premises,2 4 and that the agents' voices could be heard
outside their office.2 5 Second, Duncan contended that the prosecution
failed to prove a nexus between interstate commerce and his eavesdrop-
ping because the eavesdropping did not directly affect interstate com-
merce as required by the Act.2  Third, the appellant maintained that the
agents' office did not qualify as premises of a commercial establishment
which affects interstate commerce.2
The Fourth Circuit dismissed all three grounds on which Duncan
urged reversal and affirmed the conviction.2 8 The court inferred that the
agents exhibited a subjective expectation of privacy in their avowed pur-
pose of conducting a "confidential investigation, '2e and held that expecta-
tion justifiable.3 0 The court held that Duncan's consent to the eavesdrop-
22 598 F.2d at 849-50. Duncan's theory was based on Justice Stewart's statement in
Katz that what a person knowingly exposes to the public is not protected by the fourth
amendment, even though it may be in that person's home or office. Id. at 851; accord,
United States v. Elder, 446 F.2d 587, 588 (9th Cir. 1971) (park ranger walking by campers'
tent and hearing "Pass the match for the hash" justifiably looked in tent window and seized
contraband).
23 598 F.2d at 851-52. To prove hostility between the bank and the IRS, Duncan intro-
duced testimony that the photocopy of a refund check procured by the bank through litiga-
tion with the IRS hung on a wall in the bank's parent corporation. Id.; see text accompany-
ing notes 45-46 infra.
24 598 F.2d at 852. Duncan relied on United States v. Pui Kan Lam, 483 F.2d 1201 (2d
Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 984 (1973), to argue that the agents were strangers at the
bank and as strangers could not justifiably expect privacy. 598 F.2d at 852; see text accom-
panying notes 47-50 infra.
25 598 F.2d at 852. Duncan argued that if a person standing in the hallway outside the
agents' office could overhear the intercepted conversations, then the jury must acquit him.
Id. n.10; see text accompanying notes 51-52 infra.
26 Id. at 853. The Fourth Circuit requires proof of a federal nexus to convict a private
person under 18 U.S.C. § 2511 (1). United States v. Burroughs, 564 F.2d 1111, 1115 (4th Cir.
1977). Furthermore, an oral communication is not protected under § 2511(1)(b)(iv) absent
an. effect on interstate commerce. 564 F.2d at 1113; see Federal Nexus, supra note 13, at
496-97 & n.21. But see text accompanying notes 54-55 infra. See generally 28 VAND. L. REv.
1348, 1350-52 (1975).
27 598 F.2d at 839. Duncan maintained that the third floor office used by the IRS agents
did not qualify as bank "premises," contending that the word "premises" as used in 18
U.S.C. § 2511(1)(b)(iv) (1976) refers only to those portions of the building actually used by a
business whose operations affect interstate commerce. 598 F.2d at 855.
28 See 598 F.2d at 849-56.
29 Id. at 849. By establishing a subjective expectation of privacy, the agents satisfied the
first of the two-part inquiry into justifiable expectations. An oral communication is not pro-
tected from interception unless the speaker has a subjective expectation of privacy under
circumstances which justify that expectation. See note 4 supra.
30 598 F.2d at 849. In holding that the IRS agents' expectation of privacy was justified,
the Fourth Circuit reasoned that the bank assured the agents privacy by supplying the keys
to both the office and the filing cabinet therein. Id. The court also noted that the agents
gave no one permission to monitor their conversations and permitted no one to regularly
stand outside their frequently open door. Id.
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ping could not negate the agents' justifiable expectation of privacy
because the Act's prohibitions should not be avoided at the discretion of
the premises' owner.3 1 Further, the Fourth Circuit reasoned that, al-
though actual knowledge by the agents of eavesdropping might render an
expectation of privacy unjustified, mere suspicion of such a possibility
would not.32 The court then held that public policy prevented a history of
bad relations between the bank and the IRS from negating the agents'
justifiable expectations of privacy.33 The court likewise dismissed the
claim that the agents, as strangers on the premises, could not justifiably
expect privacy, reasoning that because the agents occupied the office for
over a year they were not stangers.3 4 Finally, the court dismissed as un-
duly favorable to the appellant any jury instruction requiring acquittal if
any of the agents' conversations could be overheard outside of their
office.35
Responding to Duncan's claim that the government failed to prove a
nexus between interstate commerce and the eavesdropping, the court
held that the occurrence of the interception on the bank premises estab-
lished the required nexus. 6 The Fourth Circuit did not consider whether
the interceptions themselves affected interstate commerce, reasoning that
the nexus between interstate commerce and eavesdropping is established
properly whenever the interceptions occur on the premises of any busi-
ness which affects interstate commerce.3 7 The court then rejected
Duncan's claim that the agents' office was not bank premises, observing
that the bank itself used other rooms on the same floor and reasoning
that areas in which the bank conveyed no recognizable property interest
should retain the title "bank premises" for purposes of the Act.38 The
court further reasoned that any other construction of the statute would
deprive temporary guests of protection which occupants of the premises
would otherwise receive.39 In affirming Duncan's conviction, the Fourth
Circuit thus broadly prohibited electronic surveillance by properly relying
on congressional intent 0 and the progeny of Katz.4
The court's holding that the agents demonstrated a justifiable expec-
31 Id. at 851; see note 21 supra.
32 598 F.2d at 850; see note 22 supra.
33 598 F.2d at 852. The Duncan court reasoned that any basis in precedent for
Duncan's claim that bad relations between the bank and the IRS justified the eavesdrop-
ping was limited to situations involving police custody. Id.; see text accompanying note 45
infra.
, See 598 F.2d at 852. The Fourth Circuit distinguished the case upon which Duncan
relied to argue that the agents were strangers to the bank premises. See text accompanying
notes 47-50 infra.
35 598 F.2d at 852; see note 25 supra; text accompanying notes 51 & 52 infra.
36 598 F.2d at 855.
37 Id.; see text accompanying notes 53-59 infra.
38 598 F.2d at 855.
39 Id.
40 See text accompanying notes 55-59 infra.
41 See text accompanying notes 42-52 infra.
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tation of privacy accords in all aspects with the common law development
of the fourth amendment. Third party consent to intrusion is not analo-
gous to situations in which the consenter and interceptor are the same
person.42 The dicta upon which Duncan relied to claim he could consent
to the eavesdropping dealt only with government intrusions made with
the owner's permission." However much one may be held to assume the
risk of governmental intrusion, it does not follow that Duncan's intrusion
could defeat an expectation of privacy.
4 4
Adverse relations between the bank and the IRS also did not vitiate
the agents' expectations of privacy because the police custody cases urged
as controlling by Duncan are based not on adverse relations per se, but
rather on a societal decision that one's expectation of privacy while in
police custody may not be "reasonable. ' '45 Therefore, when there is no
public need for surveillance, the mere fact that adversity exists between
two parties will not render an expectation unjustifiable.
46
42 See 598 F.2d at 851; note 21 supra.
43 See note 21 supra.
44 The needs of government for surveillance can frustrate even a reasonable expectation
of privacy. See Note, From Private Places to Personal Privacy: A Post-Katz Study of the
Fourth Amendment Protection, 43 N.Y.U.L. REv. 968, 983 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Pri-
vate Places]. Thus, an expectation of privacy may be reasonable and still be unjustified if
the balance between public needs and private rights swings heavily toward the need for
police surveillance. See id. Cf. Note, A Reconsideration of the Katz Expectation of Privacy
Test,. 76 MICH. L. Rav. 154, 157 (1976) (arguing that if test for protected conversations is
having actual expectation of privacy, government could manipulate expectations through
notice to the public) [hereinafter cited as Reconsideration]. As a corollary to the proposition
that an expectation might be reasonable and yet unjustified in light of societal demands, one
might argue that the agents' expectation of privacy, although unreasonable, could be justifi-
able because Duncan had no socially recognizable right to eavesdrop. See 18 U.S.C. § 2510
(1976); text accompanying note 11 supra (defining oral communication in terms of justifia-
ble expectations). See generally Reconsideration, supra, at 157. Also, consent by an owner
to the interception of conversations to which he is not a party on his premises should not
normally be sufficient to overcome the conversants' expectations of confidentiality if the
conversation is privileged. Expectations, supra note 4, at 58; see 18 U.S.C. § 2517(4) '(1976).
45 598 F.2d at 852; see id. at 850 n.7 (citing People v. Califano, 5 Cal. App. 3d 476, 85
Cal. Rptr. 292 (1970), and People v. Santos, 26 Cal. App. 3d 397, 102 Cal. Rptr. 678 (1972)).
The court apparently used the word "reasonable" interchangeably with "justifiable" in this
instance. The word "reasonable", however, is used in two different senses. The term has
been employed in connection with that expectation which is reasonable without accounting
for law enforcement needs. See generally Private Places, supra note 44, at 983. The term
"reasonable" may also connote an expectation which is reasonable within the context of the
law, and is therefore justifiable. See United States v. Fisch, 474 F.2d 1071, 1078-79 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 921 (1973) (justifiable expectation is one which society is pre-
pared to recognize as reasonable). Therefore, the two different uses of "reasonable" is im-
portant because a reasonable expectation which does not account for law enforcement needs
is not always justifiable. See Reconsideration, supra note 44, at 160-61. See generally The
Supreme Court, 1967, 82 HARv. L. R.v. 63, 192 (1968).
46 See 598 F.2d at 851-52. Duncan's argument that adversity between the IRS and the
bank prevented the agents from asserting a justifiable expectation of privacy would allow
one party legally to intercept communications of another simply by creating hostility be-
tween the two parties.
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Equally inapplicable to establishing a violation of the Act are cases
holding that strangers on the premises may not reasonably expect pri-
vacy. Duncan cited a case in which an apartment resident, in cooperation
with police, allowed into his apartment four strangers suspected of nar-
cotics dealings with the previous tenant.47 The suspects, who used false
pretenses to gain admittance and then searched the premises for hidden
contraband, did not have a justifiable expectation of privacy.4 Accord-
ingly, evidence obtained through electronic interception by the govern-
ment was admissible against the suspects.49 In Duncan, however, the
agents occupied an office specifically provided for their use. Therefore,
because a factor in determining justifiable reliance on privacy should be a
person's exclusive use or control of an area,50 the IRS agents were not
strangers to the premises in the same sense as were the uninvited narcot-
ics suspects. The court rejected Duncan's final argument for unjus-
tifiability by holding that the jury need not acquit even if the intercepted
conversations were audible outside the office with the unaided ear.51 Sim-
,7 Id. at 852 (citing United States v. Pui Kan Lam, 483 F.2d 1202, 1206 (2d Cir. 1973)).
48 United States v. Pui Kan Lam, 483 F.2d 1202, 1206 (2d Cir. 1973).
4 See id. at 1205.
o See Private Places, supra note 44, at 983-84. Although the fourth amendment pro-
tects people and not places, the place in which one is located does affect whether an expec-
tation of privacy is justifiable. See id.; note 51 infra.
" 598 F.2d at 852; see note 25 supra. In United States v. McIntyre, 582 F.2d 1221 (9th
Cir. 1978), the court held that even if conversations in a business office can be overheard
through an open door, the conversations might still be protected as "oral communications."
Id. at 1224 (cited in United States v. Duncan, 598 F.2d 839, 853 (4th Cir. 1979)). In McIn-
tyre, the appellant "bugged" McGann's office and argued that because some of McGann's
conversations could be overheard outside the open office door, McGann did not justifiably
expect privacy. 582 F.2d at 1223-24. The court held that McGann did have a justifiable
expectation, noting that McGann subjectively expected privacy and that his conversations
were difficult to overhear outside the office even with the door open. Id. at 1224.
However, that Duncan's requested instruction was unduly favorable to him does not
address whether the agents justifiably expected privacy notwithstanding evidence that some
of the conversations were audible outside the office. In United States v. Fuller, 441 F.2d 755
(4th Cir. 1971), the Fourth Circuit held that a person cannot expect that his conversation in
a telephone booth will not be heard and repeated if he speaks loudly enough to be overheard
by the unassisted ear of someone outside the booth. Id. at 761; see United States v. Fisch,
474 F.2d 1071, 1077 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 921 (1973) (police in hotel room next
to petitioner's did not violate fourth amendment when they overheard conversations by "lis-
tening at the keyhole" without any electrical equipment). Fuller and Fisch, however, apply
to Duncan only by analogy because eavesdropping with the unaided ear does not fall within
the definition of interception for the purposes of Title III. See 18 U.S.C. § 2510(4) (1976);
note 7 supra. See also United States v. Carroll, 332 F. Supp. 1299, 1301 (D.D.C. 1971) (over-
hearing and recording one end of a telephone conversation after it passed through wall was
interception of oral communications). In determining justifiability, the court must consider
all of the relevant facts. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967). In concluding there
was sufficient evidence to find that the agents exhibited a justifiable expectation of privacy
despite evidence that their voices were sometimes overheard by persons outside the room,
598 F.2d at 853, the Fourth Circuit implied that to require further precautions was an un-
due burden on the agents. Although Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), held gener-
ally that the fourth amendment protects people and not places, id. at 351, spatial considera-
tions are at least important in determining objective reasonableness of expectations.
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ply because a conversation can be overheard by the human ear does not
always justify its interception by electronic means.52
After the Fourth Circuit rejected Duncan's arguments regarding ex-
pectations of privacy, the court dismissed Duncan's claim that the evi-
dence failed to show the necessary link between the eavesdropping and
interstate commerce.5 3 The court's refusal to read Burroughs to require
that the activity sought to be prohibited under section 2511(1)(b)(iv)(A)
must in each instance directly affect interstate commerce is entirely con-
sistent with that case, as well as with the express language of the Act.
Although Burroughs states that sections 2511(1)(b)(i)-(iv) specifically re-
quire a direct effect on interstate commerce, the statement demonstrates
only that those sections require some sort of federal nexus, and not that
the activity itself must directly affect interstate commerce.5 Further, the
language of section 2511(1)(b)(iv)(A) requires only that the interception
occur on the premises of a business establishment which affects interstate
commerce and does not require the presence of industrial espionage to
establish a federal nexus.55  Although Congress intended section
2511(1)(b)(iv) to prevent interception of trade secrets, 6 the extent of the
statute's prohibitive effect is not clear. As an introduction to its discus-
sion of Title JI1, a Senate Committee described the problem it faced in
terms of business-related espionage, but summarized its findings in very
broad terms, observing that new techniques in electronic interception en-
Expectations, supra note 4, at 471; cf. Reconsideration, supra note 44, at 172-74 (arguing
Katz did not wholly displace old property test with expectations test, but created expecta-
tions test to supplement core of protected areas). The jury thus properly considered that the
agents' office was "tiny" and "unventilated" in deciding whether an open office door pre-
cluded a justifiable expectation of privacy. 598 F.2d at 852.
52 See United States v. McIntyre, 582 F.2d 1221, 1224 (9th Cir. 1978); note 51 supra.
53 598 F.2d at 854-55.
" See United States v. Burroughs, 564 F.2d at 1113; note 26 supra. In Burroughs the
court reasoned that § 2511(1)(a) of the Act applies only where there is a federal nexus even
though that section does not explicitly require such proof. See 564 F.2d at 1113. The court
compared subsections (1)(a) and (1)(b)(i)-(iv) and claimed that the latter explicitly requires
a showing of a direct effect on interstate commerce to establish a federal nexus. The court,
however, made the comparison only to demonstrate that § 1(b)(i)-(iv) requires some federal
nexus, rather than the particular nexus of a direct effect on interstate commerce. Therefore,
because the bare language of (1)(b)(iv)(A) requires only that the prohibited activity occur
on business premises the operation of which affects interstate commerce, a federal nexus
consistent with Burroughs can be established without showing a direct effect on interstate
commerce.
55 Duncan claimed that § (1)(b)(iv) was intended only to prohibit interception of trade
secrets, and therefore only industrial espionage will establish the required nexus. 598 F.2d at
853. The Fourth Circuit held that although one of Congress' objectives was the prevention
of industrial espionage, if Congress intended to so limit the application of § 2511(1)(b)(iv) it
would have explicitly done so. 598 F.2d at 854.' Therefore, the court held that the plain
language of the statute goes beyond the narrow construction urged by Duncan. Id.
58 See SENATE REPORT, supra note 6, at 2181. The Senate Report specifically states that
the "broad provisions" of § 2511(1)(b)(iv) were intended to prevent industrial espionage
through electronic interception. Id.
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danger a general right to privacy in all facets of people's lives.5 7 Because a
separate subsection, however, specifically forbids electronic interception
to obtain information concerning any commercial establishment affecting
interstate commerce, 5 the language of section 2511(1)(b)(iv)(A) implies a
broader prohibitory effect. Therefore, the required federal nexus properly
is established whenever electronic eavesdropping occurs on the premises
of a business which affects interstate commerce, even though the inter-
ception is unconnected with that business.59
Whether such a broad reading of the statute warrants inclusion of the
agents' office within the definition of bank premises remains uncertain. If
the intended scope of the statute is protection of the business enterprise,
then non-business related interceptions are only incidentally prohibited
by Congress's conclusive presumption that all interceptions on the prem-
ises of commercial establishments which affect interstate commerce have
a direct effect on interstate commerce. If the IRS agents' activities are
viewed as unrelated to bank business, then the agents are not intention-
ally protected by the statute, but only incidentally so by virtue of their
presence on the premises. In such circumstances, it is illogical to argue, as
did the Fourth Circuit, that the definition of "premises" must be ex-
panded to include the agents' office in order that "guests" be protected
by the statute.6 0 Nevertheless, there is no legal argument sufficient to find
that the agents' office was not bank premises where the bank retained all
property rights to the room.
In Duncan, the Fourth Circuit used traditional fourth amendment
analysis to find that the IRS agents justifiably expected privacy in con-
ducting their audit. The court then broadly construed Congress's power
to protect that expectation of privacy by holding that section
2511(1)(b)(iv)(A) prohibits any electronic eavesdropping on the premises
of a business which affects interstate commerce even though the intercep-
'7 See id. at 2154.
" See 18 U.S.C. § 2511(1)(b)(iv)(B) (1976).
" See 598 F.2d at 855. Duncan argued that under the Commerce Clause of the United
States Constitution Congress could prohibit only those activities which directly affect inter-
state commerce and therefore could not prohibit electronic interceptions which did not af-
fect interstate commerce. Id. at 853. The Fourth Circuit recognized that while Congress
normally allows the courts to decide whether certain intrastate activities have the prohib-
ited effect on interstate commerce, Congress can prohibit an entire class of activities when it
determines that those activities generally affect interstate commerce. Id. at 854. Accord-
ingly, the courts' role in such circumstances is to determine whether the class of activities is
properly regulated. Id. If the class is properly regulated, then the court may not exclude
from regulation those individual activities which alone would not establish the requisite
nexus. Id. The Fourth Circuit reasoned that since Congress intended to prohibit intercep-
tion of business secrets, prohibiting all interception on the premises of those businesses af-
fecting interstate commerce was rational and appropriate. Id. at 855.
'0 Although persons outside the intended scope of a statute may be protected inciden-
tally by reason of legislation covering a whole class of activities, where there is no incidental
protection the reach of the statute should not be judicially extended to protect those not
intentionally covered by the statute.
FOURTH CIRCUIT REVIEW
tion itself does not directly affect interstate commerce. Therefore, in Bur-
roughs and Duncan, the Fourth Circuit extends the Act to protect a gen-
eral right to privacy.
ROBERT G. McLusKY
F. Conspiracies: Sufficiency of Proof and the Validity of Special
Parole Terms
The Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 19701
prohibits conspiracy2 to distribute a controlled substance.3 The penalty
1 21 U.S.C. §§ 801-1193 (1976 & Supp. II 1978).
2 The Comprehensive Drug Abuse and Control Act of 1970 (Act) does not specifically
define conspiracy, but the accepted common law definition of conspiracy is the agreement
between two or more persons to commit a crime. Marcus, Conspiracy: The Criminal Agree-
ment in Theory and Practice, 65 GEo. L. REv. 925, 925 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Marcus].
To establish a conspiracy the prosecution must show an agreement between two or more
persons and an intent to achieve an objective which is either unlawful itself or attained
through unlawful means. W. LAFAvE & A. Scorr, CRIMINAL LAW, § 61, at 453 (1977) [herein-
after cited as LAFAvE & Scor]. The elements of an act and the intent to act are difficult to
analyze separately because the act of agreement requires not only an intention to engage in
some illegality, but also an intent to agree. Note, Conspiracy: The Requisite Proof-State v.
Dent 56 NEB. L. REv. 896, 896 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Requisite Proof]. Some jurisdic-
tions require an overt act in furtherance of the agreement, but once the agreement is estab-
lished virtually any act will suffice. Id. (citing LAFAVE & ScOTT, supra at 476-78). Thus, the
gist of conspiracy is the agreement. LAFAvE & Scorr, supra, § 61, at 460. But see Harno,
Intent in Criminal Conspiracy, 89 U. PA. L. REv. 624, 646 (1941) (gist of conspiracy is not
agreement, but rather intent to commit act) [hereinafter cited as Harno]. Theoretically the
prohibition of conspiracy serves two purposes. It permits interruption of criminal activity
prior to completion of the crime and protects society from group criminality on the supposi-
tion that the conspiratorial agreement is itself dangerous. Marcus, supra, at 929.
3 21 U.S.C. § 846 (1976). Section 846 prohibits conspiracy to violate § 841(b) which
forbids distribution of a controlled substance. See 21 U.S.C. § 841(b) (1976). Section 812
lists controlled substances and divides them into separate schedules to establish appropriate
punishments. 21 U.S.C. § 812 (1976).
To convict a defendant of conspiracy to. distribute illegal goods, he must be charged
with knowledge of the illegal end use of the goods as well as knowledge that the illegal use is
to be accomplished through a conspiracy. In United States v. Falcone, 311 U.S. 205 (1940),
the Court affirmed reversal of a conviction for conspiracy because even though the appellant
knew he sold goods to be used in the illegal manufacture of liquor, he did not know that the
liquor operation was a conspiracy. Id. at 206-11. Evidence regarding the volume of sales
from the defendant to the manufacturer was too vague to imply that the defendant had
constructive knowledge of the conspiracy. The Court left open the issue of whether large
volume sales alone could ever establish such knowledge. Id. at 209-11.
The question of whether sales volume could imply knowledge of a conspiracy was set-
tled three years later in Direct Sales Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 703 (1943). In Direct
Sales the defendant, a drug mail order wholesaler, regularly sold large amounts of morphine
sulfate to a physician over an extended period. The Court held that the defendant must
have known that the doctor could not be using the drug legally for his own private medical
practice. Id. at 713. The volume, regularity, and duration of the sales were thus dispositive
of the defendant's knowledge of a conspiracy to distribute. See id. at 711, 713. These factors
were stressed because morphine, while legal, was closely regulated, and any buying of abnor-
mally large amounts should have put the wholesaler on notice of the plan to distribute. See
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for conspiracy to distribute heroin is imprisonment, fine, or both, not to
exceed the maximum punishment prescribed for actual distribution.4 The
punishment for distribution of heroin is a maximum fifteen year prison
term, a fine of not more than $25,000, or both.5 Additionally, any impris-
onment for distribution automatically carries a special parole term of at
least three years.6 Courts have had difficulty, however, determining the
sufficiency of evidence which will support a conviction for conspiracy to
distribute narcotics7 and delineating the maximum authorized sentence
for a drug conviction.8 In United States v. Burman,9 the Fourth Circuit
dealt with both issues.
Joseph and Julia Walker were heroin retailers in Miami, and Burman
retailed and distributed the drug in Baltimore.10 The Walkers and Bur-
man were indicted with nine others for conspiracy to distribute heroin
imported from Mexico.11 At trial the government made no attempt to
prove that the Walkers and Burman knew each other or had specific
knowledge of heroin dealings in any city except their own.12 Instead, the
prosecution argued that knowledge of and participation in one overall
conspiracy could be inferred from the volume of heroin purchased by the
defendants over a three year period.13 Based upon that inference, Burman
and the Walkers were convicted and sentenced in separate trials1 4 for
id. at 711. Controlled substances such as heroin have no legal use, and the item itself there-
fore provides conclusive evidence of knowledge of illegal use. To prove a conspiracy, then,
all that need be shown is that a sale of a controlled substance constitutes more than the
amount needed by the buyer for his personal use. See id. However, these considerations
apply only to chain conspiracies. See generally notes 26 & 30 infra. In order to prove a
wheel conspiracy, the government must prove that the defendant not only knew others were
involved, but also that the defendant knew others performed the same function as himself.
See text accompanying notes 29-31 infra.
- 21 U.S.C. § 846 (1976).
- 21 U.S.C. § 841(b) (1976). Section 841(b) establishes the punishments for distribution
of Schedule I and II substances. Heroin is a Schedule I substance. See 21 U.S.c. §
812(c)(b)(10).
6 21 U.S.C. § 846 (1976).
See generally LAFAvE & ScoTT, supra note 2, § 61, at 456-58; Requisite Proof, supra
note 2, at 897. One problem regarding conspiracies is determining when one person's ven-
ture has been adopted by another so that the venture can be considered the product or
object of a joint agreement. Developments in the Law - Criminal Conspiracy, 72 HAv. L.
REv. 920, 933 (1959)[hereinafter cited as Developments]. Because the elements of conspir-
acy are difficult to analyze, see note 2 supra, there is much uncertainty as to the quantum of
evidence necessary to prove the elements of conspiracy. LAFAv & ScoTr supra note 2, § 61,
at 456. See text accompanying notes 26-51 infra.
' See text accompanying notes 52-70 infra.
9 584 F.2d 1354 (4th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1118 (1979).
10 Id. at 1356.
" Id. at 1355. The appellants were indicted for conspiracy to distribute heroin under 21
U.S.C. § 846 (1976). Id.
12 584 F.2d at 1356-57.
IS Id. at 1357.
Although the twelve indicted defendants were scheduled for a joint trial in Balti-
more, all except Burman and the Walkers pleaded guilty to various charges. Id. at 1356. The
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conspiracy to distribute heroin under title 21, section 846 of the United
States Code.15 In addition to a prison sentence, Burman's punishment in-
cluded a fifteen year special parole term.10
On appeal, the appellants raised two grounds for relief. First, all ap-
pellants asserted that a fatal variance existed between the indictment for
participation in a single narcotics distribution organization and the proof
of that participation adduced at trial11 Burman and the Walkers argued
that the government's evidence showed separate conspiracies for heroin
transactions, related only by dispersal through a single importing group.18
Second, Burman claimed the court was without power to impose a special
parole term for his conspiracy conviction.19 The Fourth Circuit held both
that the government's evidence sufficiently proved a single unified con-
spiracy and that Burman's special parole term is a required part of any
prison sentence imposed under section 846.21
In holding the evidence sufficient to establish a single conspiracy, the
Fourth Circuit concluded that the appellants had reason to know from
the nature of the contraband and from the vastness and regularity of
their own dealings that smuggling and other illegal activities were requi-
jury found the Walkers guilty of conspiracy, but the court declared a mistrial in Burman's
case. Id. In a second trial one month later, a jury found Burman guilty of conspiracy. Id.
' Id. at 1355.
Id.
17 Id. at 1356. The appellants contended that the government's proof showed only sepa-
rate conspiracies, and not the single organizational conspiracy charged in the indictment. Id.
The claim of fatal variance rested on the argument that prejudicial evidence associating the
appellants with the nefarious deeds of others was improperly admitted against them merely
because of an overly broad indictment. Id.
The claim of fatal variance regarding conspiracies has as its roots the so-called co-con-
spirator's exception to the hearsay rule. See generally Bergman, The Coconspirators' Ex-
ception: Defining the Standard of the Independent Evidence Test Under the New Federal
Rules of Evidence, 5 HOFSTRA L. REv. 99 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Bergman]. This excep-
tion permits the admission of statements and acts of alleged coconspirators as evidence if
the declaration or act was made during the course, and in furtherance of, the conspiracy
charged. Anderson v. United States, 417 U.S. 211, 218 (1974); see Bergman, supra, at 99.
However, if the government does not prove that all conspirators are part of the same con-
spiracy, then the others' acts cannot be imputed to the defendant. See Glasser v. United
States, 315 U.S. 60, 74-75 (1942); Bergman, supra, at 99.
When a conviction is based on the theory that all the defendants were members of a
single conspiracy, and a court subsequently finds that multiple conspiracies existed, a fatal
variance is established. See Note, Federal Treatment of Multiple Conspiracies, 57 COLUM.
L. REv. 387, 396 (1957) [hereinafter cited as Federal Treatment]. Not every variance is
necessarily fatal; any error which does not affect "substantial rights" is disregarded. Id. at
397 (citing FED. R. CRIM. P. 52(a)); see Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 82-84 (1935).
However, when co-conspirators are tried together an individual defendant is more likely to
be convicted because of his association through joinder with other conspirators. See Blu-
menthal v. United States, 332 U.S. 539, 559 (1947); LAFAvE & Scor, supra note 2, § 61, at
458-59.
:8 584 F,2d at 1356.
" Id. at 1357.
20 Id. at 1356.
21 Id. at 1358.
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sites in making the appellants' activities possible.2 Yet the court did not
require a finding that the appellants had reason to believe in the interde-
pendence of the various satellite retailers. Thus, the court blended the
traditional distinction between "'wheel" and "chain" conspiracies.2 3 Under
established concepts, a chain conspiracy consists of a vertically aligned
business organization starting typically with an importer and extending
downward through a wholesaler, a retailer, and a distributor.2 4 Wheel
conspiracies involve several persons (spokes) engaged in similar relation-
ships with the same individual or group (hub).25 For example, one retailer
will supply several distributors in different locations.
The distinction between chain and wheel conspiracies is important be-
cause the required proof of intent for each type of conspiracy is different.
In chain conspiracies, intent to participate is inferable solely from the
nature of the enterprise.26 The participant is presumed to know that
others make his dealings possible.2 7 An overt act -in furtherance of the
enterprise may establish intent to participate in the conspiracy simply
from the presumed knowledge of the interdependence of the "links. '2 In
wheel conspiracies, however, one spoke's knowledge of the existence of
other spokes should not suffice to prove a single unified conspiracy be-
cause a single spoke operating independently of other spokes participates
only in an unconnected chain conspiracy 2 9 Unless one spoke knows that
his own activities depend on other spokes, he should not be charged with
participation in a conspiracy with the other spokes because he has not
agreed to participate in a conspiracy linking all the spokes with a unifying
rim.30 Therefore, under traditional analysis, the fact that the appellants
22 Id. at 1356.
22 See generally Harno, supra note 2, at 635, 646-47; Federal Treatment, supra note
17, at 388-92.
24 See LAFAvE & Scorr, supra note 2, § 62, at 480-81. Chain conspiracies are character-
ized by specialized activities successively completed. Federal Treatment, supra note 17, at
389-90.
2 See LAFAVE & Sco'rr, supra note 2, § 62, at 481; Federal Treatment, supra note 17,
at 389-90.
2 United States v. Bruno, 105 F.2d 921, 922 (2d Cir.), rev'd on other grounds, 308 U.S.
287 (1939). In Bruno the defendants' knowledge of the importance and existence of remote
links was inferred from the fact that the operation was a chain conspiracy because the suc-
cess of the defendants' involvement depended on the success of the whole operaton. Id. at
922. See LAFAvE & ScoTT, supra note 2, § 62, at 480-81; Federal Treatment, supra note 17,
at 390. Thus, because knowledge of the existence of other links in chain conspiracies is
inferable from the nature ofthe enterprise,. intent is inferable from any act in furtherance of
conspiratorial objectives. See generally Federal Treatment, supra note 17, at 390.
"' See United States v. Moten, 564 F.2d 620, 624 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 974
(1977) (citing United States v. Bynum, 485 F.2d 490 (2d Cir. 1973), vacated on other
grounds, 417 U.S. 903 (1974)).
28 See LAFAvE & ScoTT, supra note 2, § 62, at 480-81; text accompanying note 26.
29 See LAFAvE & Scorr, supra note 2, § 62, at 481; ORCHARD, AGREEErr IN CRIMINAL
CONSPIRACY 2 (1974) [hereinafter cited as ORCHARD]. o
3o ORCHARD, supra note 29, at 336-37. Unlike many crimes, conspiracy requires proof of
specific intent to conspire, and mere recklessness will not satisfy the mens rea requirement.
See Harno, supra note 2, at 635. But see ORCHARD, supra note 29, at 337. If a defendant is
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had reason to know that illegal activities were necessary to their opera-
tions establishes only the existence of separite chain conspiracies be-
tween each spoke and the hub.31 In such a case, evidence of acts by other
spokes should not be admissible against an individual spoke. 2
In testing the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the convictions of
Burman and the Walkers, the Fourth Circuit considered whether each
defendant knew or had reason to know that other spokes existed. 3 Rely-
ing on the decisions of other circuits,3 ' the Fourth Circuit reasoned that
proof of a large-scale distribution of narcotics gives rise to an inference of
participation in a single conspiracy by satellite retailers (spokes).35 The
court therefore stated that knowledge of the existence of other spokes can
be inferred from the operation's size and duration, and from the amounts
involved." The court then held that the same factors imply participation
in a single wheel conspiracy.37 As support for holding that evidence of
held responsible for the activities of other spokes even though he had no knowledge of such
activities, the defendant is accountable for an offense having a wider scope than that in
which he intended to participate. Id. at 337. Even where a - defendant knows of the existence
of other satellite retailers, he should only be liable for acts furthering his agreement to con-
spire and not for unrelated criminal acts of any co-conspirator. A showing of interdepen-
dence is therefore necessary to insure that a defendant is liable only for the conspiracy he
intended. Thus, the element common to both wheel and chain conspiracies, and on which
turns the determination of liability, is not a participant's knowledge of the existence of
other participants, but a presumed or actual belief in interdependence. See LAFAvE &
Scorr, supra note 2, § 62, at 480 (citing United States v. Bruno, 105 F.2d 921 (2d Cir.),
rev'd on other grounds, 308 U.S. 287 (1939) (evidence insufficient to show each member
knew success of own involvement depended on success of whole operation)). Although
knowledge alone of the existence of other participants generally supports a finding of inter-
dependence in chain conspiracies, see note 3 supra, the same knowledge is less likely to
support a finding of interdependence between remote spokes in a wheel conspiracies. See
LAFAvE & Scorr, supra note 2, § 62, at 481. Therefore, interdependence should not be as
readily presumed in wheels as it is in chain conspiracies. See id. at 481. However, courts
have inferred a belief of interdependence from specific facts in wheel conspiracies. See, e.g.,
United States v. Bruno, 105 F.2d at 922. Commentators have interpreted Bruno to stand for
the proposition that if the hub perceives his own dealings with each spoke as part of a
comprehensive operation, then the mere knowledge by a spoke that there are others simi-
larly situated will alone justify a conclusion that the spoke agreed to the unified plan as
envisaged by the hub. See, e.g., LAFAvE & Scorr, supra note 2, § 62, at 481; Federal Treat-
ment, supra note 17, at 388-93.
SI See note 30 supra.
'2 See note 17 supra.
:3 584 F.2d at 1356.
4, Id.; see text accompanying notes 38-39 infra.
35 584 F.2d at 1356.
'3 Id. at 1357.
37 Id. at 1356. See generally United States v. Walker, 430 F. Supp. 609 (D. Md. 1977).
Whether Burman's trial court created a conclusory presumption that knowledge of the exis-
tence of other spokes implies a belief in interdependence is unclear. At trial, the court in-
structed the jury that it could find the defendants guilty of separate conspiracies instead of
the overall conspiracy charged. Id. at 613. However, because the basis on which the jury
could find separate conspiracies was not specifically laid out, a finding that a spoke knew of
the existence of other spokes might foreclose a finding of separate conspiracies. See gener-
ally id. at 613-14.
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large-scale drug trafficking implies a spoke's knowledge of the existence of
other spokes and that this knowledge implicates one in a wheel conspir-
acy, the Fourth Circuit cited cases from the Second" and Ninth Cir-
cuits.3 9 These cases, however, do not entirely support the Fourth Circuit's
holding.
The Second Circuit held that evidence of extensive narcotics dealing
permits the inference that a satellite retailer knew of the existence of
others performing the same function, 0 but the Second Circuit cases un-
derlying this assertion do not adequately support such a presumption.
The cases upon which the Second Circuit's inference is based involved
either chain conspiracies, or wheel conspiracies in which the spokes had
actual knowledge of each other's existence. 41 Chain conspiracy rationale is
inapplicable to wheels because in chains knowledge of other participants'
activities is inferred from the nature of the operation,42 whereas wheels
are differentiated from chains precisely because knowledge by one spoke
of another spoke's existence cannot be inferred from the nature of the
operation.4 3 Furthermore, cases in which evidence proved that spokes ac-
tually knew of other spokes' operations do not create an inference that
3 See United States v. Moten, 564 F.2d 620 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 974 (1977);
see note 40 infra.
39 584 F.2d at 1356; see United States v. Perry, 550 F.2d 524 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
431 U.S. 918 (1977); note 45 infra.
40 See United States v. Moten, 564 F.2d 620, 625 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 974
(1977). Moten involved large scale trafficking in heroin and cocaine. The satellite retailers,
operating in three cities, claimed participation in separate conspiracies rather than in the
single conspiracy charged. Id. at 624. The court held a single conspiracy proved, using chain
conspiracy rationale to claim that all participants had reason to know others were involved.
Id. at 624-25. The appellants relied on two cases to claim that absent other evidence, pur-
chasers dealing with the same core of suppliers are not presumed to know of each other. Id.
at 626 (citing United States v. Bertolotti, 529 F.2d 149 (2d Cir. 1975); United States v.
Miley, 513 F.2d 1191 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 842 (1975)). The court distinguished
these cases as involving only small amounts of drugs in a short period or not involving drugs
at all. 564 F.2d at 626. As grounds for holding that large-scale narcotics trafficking may
imply that a spoke knew other spokes existed, the court cited Second Circuit precedent. Id.
at 625-26; see, e.g., United States v. Taylor, 562 F.2d 1345, 1351 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 432
U.S. 909 (1977).
11 See, e.g., United States v. Taylor, 562 F.2d 1345, 1351 (2d Cir. 1977) (actual interac-
tion between spokes); United States v. Magnano, 543 F.2d 431, 434-35 (2d Cir. 1976), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 1091 (1977) (appellants had actual knowledge that horizontal scope of
scheme was larger than own involvement); United States v. Tramunti, 513 F.2d 1087, 1106
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 832 (1975) (single conspiracy proved where evidence showed
mutual interdependence and assistance between spokes); United States v. Mallah, 503 F.2d
971, 985-86 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 995 (1975) (single conspiracy proved where
evidence showed commingling of assets and mutual dependence between the spokes);
United States v. Agueci, 310 F.2d 817, 822, 826-27 (2d Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 959
(1963) (satellite retailers knew each other, and their operations were interdependent); ac-
cord, United States v. Bynum, 485 F.2d 490, 495-97 (2d Cir. 1973), vacated on other
grounds, 417 U.S. 903 (1974) (satellite distributors knew other distributors operated through
same hub); United States v. Cirrillo, 468 F.2d 1233, 1238 (2d Cir. 1972)(chain conspiracy).
"I See text accompanying notes 26-31 supra.
43 See text accompanying notes 24-25 supra.
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spokes know of one another because no need for the inference arises. In
addition to employing Second Circuit precedent to impute knowledge to
the spokes, the Burman court did not require a finding that the convicted
spokes each have a reasonable belief that their activities in part depended
on the successful operation of the other spokes.44 The Ninth Circuit case
cited in Burman, however, did not eliminate proof of interdependence as
a requirement for a wheel conspiracy conviction, but rather held that the
facts alone proved interdependence.
45
The Ninth Circuit's requirement that the government prove defen-
dants had reason to believe in the interdependence of spokes is based
upon Blumenthal v. United States.46 In Blumenthal, three liquor sales-
men who did not know each other were convicted of conspiracy in an
elaborate price fixing scheme based on their presumed knowledge that
other salesmen were involved.47 The Supreme Court held that because
each participant knew the volume of liquor sold by his supplier was larger
than the amount handled by the participant individually, the three sales-
men knowlingly contributed to the success of the overall organization. 48
Thus, the Ninth Circuit's requirement that spokes have reason to believe
in interdependence might be satisfied by finding that a spoke knew other
4 See 584 F.2d at 1356-57.
45 See United States v. Perry, 550 F.2d 524, 529 (9th Cir. 1977). Perry involved a co-
caine and heroin smuggling operation. The appellants, satellite retailers, relied on Kotteakos
v. United States, 328 U.S. 750 (1946), to claim prejudicial and fatal variance between the
indictment and the proof at trial. 550 F.2d at 531. In Kotteakos, 32 persons were indicted
for a single conspiracy to violate the National Housing Act by inducing lending institutions
to make loans which would be offered to the Federal Housing Administration for insurance
on the basis of fradulent information. 328 U.S. at 752. Seven defendants were convicted at
trial. Id. at 753. Although the government admitted that the evidence proved eight or more
unrelated conspiracies with a single broker, evidence of dealings between the broker and
defendants other than petitioner was admitted against the petitioner. Id. at 754-55. The
Supreme Court reversed, holding that the danger of guilt transferance was so great as to
prejudice substantial rights of the defendants. Id. at 776-77.
The Ninth Circuit in Perry noted that the government must prove that each defendant
knew or had reason to know the scope of the organization involved, and had reason to be-
lieve his own benefits depended on the success of the entire venture. 550 F.2d at 530-31.
The Perry court distinguished Kotteakos on its facts, maintaining that the defendants in
Kotteakos had no interest in whether any scheme except his own succeeded. Id. at 531. This
differed from Perry, the court stated, where each of the defendants had reason both to know
of the existence of other satellite retailers and to believe that the benefits he received proba-
bly depended upon the success of the entire venture. Id. at 531. The court did not, however,
indicate specific evidence which supported its holding, reasoning only that the jury could
rationally conclude that a single conspiracy existed. Id. at 529. Therefore, whether there is
any difference in the proof needed to show that defendants had reason to know of the exis-
tence of other spokes and the proof required to infer that defendants believed in interde-
pendence is not clear.
46 332 U.S. 539 (1947); see United States v. Baxter, 492 F.2d 150, 158 (9th Cir. 1973),
cert. denied, 416 U.S. 940 (1974); accord United States v. Perry, 550 F.2d 524, 529 (9th Cir.
1977).
47 332 U.S. at 558.
48 Id. at 559.
1980]
584 WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW [Vol. XXXVII
spokes participated in the same distributive organization. 49 The spokes in
Blumenthal, though, had actual knowledge that their individual dealings
constituted only a part of a larger scheme. Therefore, the case does not
support a holding that a spoke may be presumed to know of the size of an
organization based only on the volume of his individual dealings with a
supplier. The extent of an individual's personal dealings with a supplier,
absent other knowledge, supports only an inference that a chain conspir-
acy existed.50
The Fourth Circuit thus confused the traditional distinction between
chain and wheel conspiracies. The court, by permitting evidence of large-
scale narcotics trafficking alone to establish a spoke's participation in a
wheel conspiracy, unjustifiably allows the prosecution the procedural ad-
vantages of liberal joinder and the co-conspirator's hearsay exception.,,
By perpetuating the confusion between wheels and chains, the Fourth
Circuit allows these procedural advantages to work against persons who
are joined under the charge of wheel conspiracy, when in fact the same
persons should be tried in smaller groups under chain conspiracy charges.
After upholding Burman's conspiracy conviction, the court considered
the propriety of imposing the special parole term which accompanied
Burman's prison sentence. The statutes involved in the sentencing con-
tain an ambiguity which recently has been used to support holdings that
a special parole term cannot be imposed for conspiracy to violate the
narcotics laws.52 Title 21, section 841(b) provides that a person convicted
of distributing heroin can be imprisoned for no more than fifteen years,
fined no more than $25,000, or both.53 Additionally, if the person receives
a prison sentence, a special parole term of at least three years is
mandatory.54 The punishment for conspiracy to distribute heroin under
section 846 is imprisonment or fine or both, not to exceed the maximum
4 Whether the proof required to show that a spoke have reason to believe in interde-
pendence of several spokes is significantly different from the proof needed to demonstrate
reason for a spoke to believe that other spokes exist is unclear. See note 45 supra. However,
the Fifth Circuit has read Blumenthal to require some showing of interaction between the
spokes as to a common illegal object. See United States v. Levine, 546 F.2d 658, 663 (5th
Cir. 1977).
00 See text accompanying notes 26-31 supra.
11 LAFAvE & Scorr, supra note 2, § 61, at 455-58. The prosecution can bring conspiracy
charges in any jurisdiction where either the agreement was made or any overt act in further-
ance of the conspiracy by any of the alleged conspirators occurred. Id. at 456 (citing Hyde v.
Shine, 199 U.S. 62 (1905); Hyde v. United States, 225 U.S. 347 (1912)). Once a conspiracy is
established, the government must produce only "slight evidence" to connect the defendant
with that conspiracy. See generally Comment, Connecting Defendants to Conspiracies: The
Slight Evidence Rule and the Federal Courts, 64 VA. L. Rv. 881 (1978). Also, when several
defendants are charged in a single conspiracy, they may be required to defend against the
charges in a single trial. LAFAv & ScoTT, supra note 2, § 61, at 458. Joint trials, however,
lend themselves to an impermissible transfer of guilt across conspiratorial lines. See Blu-
menthal v. United States, 332 U.S. 539, 559 (1947).
" See, e.g., Fassette v. United States, 444 F. Supp. 1245, 1246-47 (C.D. Cal. 1978).
5 21 U.S.C. § 841(b) (1976).
See Id. § 841(b) (1976).
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penalty prescribed under section 841.55 Section 846 thus sets its penalties
by reference to section 841. However, section 846 does not mention a spe-
cial parole term, whereas section 841 requires a special parole term where
a prison sentence is imposed.
56
Burman argued for strict construction of section 846, maintaining that
section 846's language limits penalties for conspiracy to fines and impris-
onment only.5 7 The government contended that Burman's construction of
section 846 is overly technical and would thwart the statute's intended
purpose of preventing renewed drug dealings by past offenders s58 The
Fourth Circuit held that not only is the special parole term appropriate
for violation of section 846, but is required whenever imprisonment is or-
dered.5 9 The court reasoned that under section 841(b) a special parole
term is required whenever imprisonment is imposed, and that the terms
"imprisonment or fine or both" in section 846 have meaning only by ref-
erence to the sentences imposed under section 841.60
The issue of whether section 846 requires, permits, or forbids the ad-
dition of a special parole term is hopelessly entangled in ambiguity. At-
tempts to discern congressional intent have been of little value.61 As a
result, two contradictory lines of precedent on the parole term issue exist
within the federal court system. The Burman court's position regarding
the imposition of a special parole term for a conspiracy conviction under
section 846 has been adopted by other federal courts. The Eighth Circuit,
relying specifically on Burman, held that the special parole term has 'no
separate existence as a possible penalty because it does not accompany a
fine and it may not be imposed alone.6 2 The Tenth Circuit reasoned that
Congress viewed the parole term as an element of the word "imprison-
ment," and concluded that whenever imprisonment is a part of a sen-
See Id. § 846 (1976).
66 See Id. §§ 841(b); 846 (1976).
5 584 F.2d at 1357. Burman contended that although § 846 refers to § 841(b) for the
terms of punishment for conspiracy to distribute heroin, a violation of § 846 does not permit
imposition of a special parole term, which is neither imprisonment nor a fine, although such
a term would be required for distribution of heroin. Id.
11 584 F.2d at 1357. The government urged that all penalties under § 846 are to be set
by exclusive reference to § 841(b), which imposes a mandatory special parole term whenever
imprisonment is a part of the sentence. Id. Elimination of the parole term, the government
argued, would subject "large scale heroin distributors" to less punishment than small scale
offenders. Id.
The govermiient's argument that eliminition of the parole term would allow less pun-
ishment for larger scale distributors than for small volume offenders is groundless. Nothing
prevented the government from seeking convictions of the Burman defendants for actual
distribution under § 841(b). Thus, while elimination of a parole term from § 846 would
subject large scale conspirators to less punishment than actual distributors, it would not
subject large scale distributors to less punishment because actual distribution is prohibited
by § 841 and not by § 846.
59 584 F.2d at 1358.
60 Id.
" See text accompanying notes 63-69 infra.
"2 United States v. Sellers, 602 F.2d 53, 58 (8th Cir. 1979).
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tence, a parole term is necessarily included.63 Another federal court rea-
soned that the Burman decision was based partly upon a consideration of
the relationship between sections 841 and 846 as part of a statutory
scheme to prevent renewed dealings by past offenders, and held that on
this basis alone section 846 permits imposition of a parole term.6
Other courts, however, have rejected the position taken by the Fourth
Circuit, holding instead that section 846 explicitly limits the punishment
for conspiracy to violate section 841(b) to only imprisonment and fine.
The Third Circuit specifically repudiated the argument that a parole
term can be included within the meaning of imprisonment.6 5 There, the
court argued that had Congress intended to permit the same punishments
for violations of sections 846 and 841(b), it could easily have done so.66 A
district court decision cited by the Third Circuit supported the intent
argument by reasoning that in federal practice there is commonly a dif-
ference between the maximum punishment allowed for substantive viola-
tions and that permitted for conspiratorial violations relating to the same
substantive offense. 7 Focusing on congressional intent, the same district
court cited a discussion of section 846's predecessor by the House Inter-
state and Foreign Commerce Committee.6 The court held that the House
Report buttressed the argument that reference in section 846 to the
"maximum punishment" for substantive offenses under section 841(b) re-
fers only to the maximum amount of fine and imprisonment which could
be prescribed, and does not include any special parole term.69
The Burman court's confusion as to both the penalties and the proof
of conspiracy is indicative of the confusion inherent in the statutes. The
Fourth Circuit, by using the chain conspiracy rationale to determine the
government's burden of proof for prosecutions of wheel conspiracies, per-
6 United States v. Jacobson, 578 F.2d 863, 868 (9th Cir. 1978).
United States v. Wells, 470 F. Supp. 261, 218 (S.D. Iowa 1979).
65 United States v. Mearns, 599 F.2d 1296, 1298 (3d Cir. 1979).
66 Id.
6 Fassette v. United States, 444 F. Supp. 1245, 1247 n.* (C.D. Cal. 1978); accord
United States v. Mearns, 599 F.2d 1296, 1298 (3d Cir. 1979). The Mearns court noted that
legislative history speaks of parole provisions for various substantive offenses, but "signifi-
cantly" omits such a provision in describing the punishment under 21 U.S.C. § 846 (1976).
599 F.2d at 1298, citing H.R. REP. No. 1444, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 46-51, reprinted in [1970]
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 4566, 4614-18 [hereinafter cited as H.R. REP. No. 1444].
68 Fassette v. United States, 444 F. Supp. 1245, 1247 n.1 (C.D. Cal. 1978) (citing H.R.
REP. No. 1444, supra note 67, at 4617). A House Committee, discussing the predecessor of
21 U.S.C. § 846 (1976), interpreted the penalty for conspiracy to be imprisonment or fine or
both, not to exceed the maximum "amount" allowed for the substantive offense which was
the object of the conspiracy. H.R. REP. No. 1444, supra at 4617. Focusing on the word
"amount", the Fassette court held that the House Report supports the argument that statu-
tory reference in § 846 to the "maximum punishment" prescribed for substantive offenses
refers to the maximum "amount" of fine and imprisonment which could have been pre-
scribed, and not to a special parole term. 444 F. Supp. at 1248. Although the comment by
the House Committee mentions only imprisonment or fine, because the statement is no
more than a paraphrasing of the statute itself, it offers little in the way of elucidation.
65 Fassette v. United States, 444 F. Supp. at 1248; see note 68 supra.
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mits conviction of an alleged participant in a wheel conspiracy even
though the participant actually believed his activities had no relation to
those of other satellite retailers.7 0 Furthermore, the Fourth Circuit has
construed the sentencing statute in the government's favor by holding
that a special parole term is required in conspiracy convictions which in-
clude imprisonment.71 Until the Supreme Court clarifies its position on
the substantive crime and Congress amends the penalty statute, such
confusion is likely to continue.
ROBERT G. McLusKY
G. What is an Interrogation?
A criminal defendant is entitled to legal counsel at every stage of the
adversary proceeding.' The right to counsel extends from the initiation of
formal charges against a defendant 2 to a hearing on the revocation of pro-
bation.' Recent development of the scope of the right to counsel has fo-
70 See notes 29-31 supra:
' See notes 59-60 supra.
U.S. CONST. amend. VI, in pertinent part, states "In all criminal prosecutions, the
accused shall . . . have the Assistance of Counsel for his defense." In Powell v. Alabama,
287 U.S. 45 (1932), the Supreme Court established the sixth amendment right to counsel in
a capital case as an element of due process under the fourteenth amendment. Id. at 71-73.
The majority in Powell stated that the necessity of counsel was so vital that an attorney,
retained or court-appointed, was necessary at every critical stage of the adversary proceeding.
Id. at 69-73. In Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938), the Court required appointment of
counsel in all federal cases absent an intentional and competent waiver of the sixth amend-
ment right. Id. 'at 467-68. The right to appointed counsel was somewhat limited in Betts v.
Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942), which held that the right to appointed counsel in the non-federal,
non-capital case context would be interpreted on a-case-by-case basis. Id. at 473. The Su-
preme Court established the absolute right to retained counsel in Chandler v. Fretag, 348 U.S.
3, 9 (1954) and Ferguson v. Georgia, 365 U.S. 570, 596 (1961), and later overruled Betts,
holding the sixth amendment right to counsel fundamental under the due process clause of
the fourteenth amendment and available to all state and federal defendants for every crime.
See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344-45 (1963). For a discussion of the history and
development of the right to counsel, see Clarke, Gideon Revisited, 15 Amz. L. REv. 343 (1973);
LaFrance, Criminal Defense Systems for the Poor, 50 NOME DAmE LAw. 41 (1975); Comment,
Assuring the Right to an Adequately Prepared Defense, 65 J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 302, 302-314
(1974).
2 See Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682 (1972). The Court in Kirby refused to afford the
defendant the right to counsel during a pre-indictment police station "show-up" identifica-
tion. Id. at 689. The Court explained that the initiation of adversary judicial criminal pro-
ceedings meant the formal charge, preliminary hearing, indictment information or arraign-
ment for purposes of the right to counsel. Id. at 689-90.
3 See Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 790-91 (1973).
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cused on post-indictment interrogation of an accused in the absence of a
lawyer.'
The Supreme Court's focus in the post-indictment interrogation cases
has shifted from a general evaluation of all the facts surrounding a police
interrogation5 to a specific inquiry concerning the defendant's right to
counsel during the post-indictment process.6 In Massiah v. United States,7
the Court held that the defendant's right to counsel was violated by the
use at trial of post-indictment statements deliberately elicited from the
defendant in the absence of counsel.8 The Massiah Court emphasized the
vital importance of an attorney's assistance during the period between
indictment and trial,9 and condemned both surreptitious interrogation and
jailhouse questioning absent the presence of counsel. 0 Deliberate govern-
ment elicitation of incriminating statements where the defendant was una-
ware of government monitoring received firm criticism in the Massiah
opinion."
The Supreme Court again considered a defendant's right to counsel in
See text accompanying notes 5-18 infra.
See Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315 (1959). The Spano Court overturned a New York
state conviction relying on a confession elicited by police interrogation in the absence of
counsel. Id. at 324. Petitioner Spano was indicted for murder and surrendered himself to the
authorities. His retained counsel told Spano to answer no questions and left him in the
custody of police officers. The police questioned Spano continually and persistently for almost
eight hours before he confessed. Id. at 322. The Court, after considering all the circumstances
surrounding the post-indictment questioning, concluded that the government's undeviating
intent to elicit a confession absent counsel violated the defendant's sixth amendment rights.
Id. at 323-24.
' See Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201, 206 (1964).
7 377 U.S. 201 (1964).
Id. at 206-07. Massiah was indicted for violating federal narcotics law. He retained
counsel, pleaded not guilty, and was released on bail. Id. at 201. His co-defendant cooperated
with the government by allowing the installation of a radio transmitter in his car. Id. at 202.
During a conversation in the co-defendant's car, Massiah made several incriminating state-
ments which were transmitted by radio to a hidden federal agent. Id. at 203. These state-
ments, made in the absence of counsel, were introduced at trial and Massiah was convicted.
Id. See generally Enker & Elsen, Counsel for the Suspect: Massiah v. United States and
Escobedo v. Illinois, 49 MINN. L. Rv. 47 (1964); Note, Right to Counsel, 17 BAYOR L. REv.
448 (1965); Note, Interrogation in the Absence of Counsel, 19 Sw. L. J. 384 (1965).
1 377 U.S. at 204-05. The Massiah Court reiterated the constitutional principle estab-
lished in Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932), that the right to counsel is a requirement of
fundamental fairness under the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. The Court
emphasized that the assistance of an attorney is perhaps most important and critical between
the time of arraignment and the trial itself. 377 U.S. at 205; see 287 U.S. at 68-69. During
this period of consultation, thoroughgoing investigation and preparation, the defendant's
rights, particularly during interrogation, must be protected through the able assistance of
counsel. 377 U.S. at 205-06; see Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315, 324-26 (1959)(Douglas,
Black, Brennan and Stewart, JJ., concurring).
"1 377 U.S. at 206. The Massiah Court reasoned that its holding barring post-indictment
government elicitation of incriminating statements absent counsel would have value only if
it applied to indirect and surreptitious interrogations as well as those conducted in the
jailhouse. Id.
" 377 U.S. at 206. See also United States v. Massiah, 307 F.2d 62, 72-73 (2d Cir. 1962).
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post-indictment proceedings in Brewer v. Williams.'2 The Brewer Court
held that statements made by a defendant were inadmissible when such
statements were deliberately elicited from the defendant in the absence of
counsel after adversary proceedings had commenced.'3 Affirming Massiah,
the Brewer Court interpreted Massiah to require legal representation for
an individual against whom adversary proceedings had begun when the
government interrogates him." Interrogation in Brewer occurred when a
police officer delivered a speech to the defendant, deliberately aimed at
eliciting incriminating statements in the absence of counsel.'5 The Court
held that this purposeful police effort to elicit information from the defen-
dant, absent counsel, violated Massiah and clearly abridged the defen-
dant's sixth amendment right to counsel."6 The Brewer Court concluded
its affirmance of Massiah by stating that the distinction between surrepti-
tious elicitation of incriminating remarks in Massiah and the known police
interrogation in Brewer was constitutionally irrelevant.'7
Analysis of the post-indictment right to counsel after Brewer has cen-
tered around the issue of interrogation.' 8 The Supreme Court's treatment
of Massiah in the Brewer opinion raises the issue of what constitutes inter-
rogation in the absence of counsel and what types of post-indictment gov-
ernment contact with the defendant are impermissible under the Massiah
doctrine. The Fourth Circuit recently spoke on the post-indictment right
to counsel in Henry v. United States, 9 holding inadmissible incriminating
12 430 U.S. 387 (1977). See generally Kamisar, Foreword: Brewer v. Williams-A Hard
Look at a Discomforting Record, 66 GEO. L. J. 209 (1977); Comment, Brewer v. Williams:
The End of Post-Charging Interrogation, 10 Sw. L. REV. 331 (1978); Note, The Declining
Miranda Doctrine: The Supreme Court's Development of Miranda Issues, 36 WASH. & LEE
L. REV. 259 (1979); 11 CREIGHTON L. REv. 997 (1978).
,2 430 U.S. at 400-01. In Brewer, the defendant Williams was a recent escapee from a
mental hospital and a deeply religious person. He was suspected of kidnapping a 10-year old
girl in Des Moines, Iowa. Williams eventually turned himself in to the police at Davenport,
Iowa, where he was arraigned for the abduction. Before being transported from Davenport to
Des Moines, defendant's counsel in both cities instructed Williams to refrain from conversing
with the police until he conferred with his attorney is Des Moines. The police assured Wil-
liams and his two attorneys that the defendant would not be questioned until he met with a
lawyer. During the 160-mile car trip from Davenport to Des Moines, the police elicited
incriminating statements from Williams in the absence of counsel. Id. at 390-93.
" Id. at 401.
,s Id. at 392-93, 399. Detective Leaming, one of the police officers who transported Wil-
liams from Davenport to Des Moines, exploited his knowledge of Williams' deeply religious
nature by making a speech commonly referred to as the "Christian Burial Speech." Leam-
ing's speech outlined the difficulties of finding the little girl's body in the December snow
and the desire of her parents that she have a proper Christian burial. At trial, Learning
testified that he was trying to get all the information he could before Williams reached his
lawyer. State v. Williams, 182 N.W.2d 396, 407 (Iowa 1970).
' 430 U.S. at 400-01.
,7 Id. at 401.
" See generally Kamisar, Brewer v. Williams, Messiah, and Miranda: What is
Interrogation? When Does It Matter? 67 GEO. L. J. 1 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Kamisar].
It 590 F.2d 544 (4th Cir. 1978).
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post-indictment statements obtained from the defendant by an undis-
closed paid informer in the absence of counsel."0
The defendant Henry was indicted on a charge of armed bank robbery
and incarcerated in the Norfolk City Jail. A paid informant of the Federal
Bureau of Investigation was an inmate in the same cell block as Henry.
The informant had worked for the FBI for over a year, and told the FBI
that he occupied a cell block with Henry. The FBI instructed the informant
to be alert to any statements made by Henry concerning the charges
against him, but specifically warned the informant not to initiate conver-
sation with or question Henry regarding the bank robbery.' Henry subse-
quently spoke with the the informant, making incriminating statements
regarding his participation in the bank robbery. The informant later com-
municated this information to the FBI, and on the strength of the inform-
ant's testimony, Henry was convicted.2 After an unsuccessful appeal of his
conviction, 23 Henry moved to vacate his sentence.2 4 The district court de-




On habeas corpus review, the Fourth Circuit held the undisclosed gov-
ernment monitoring of Henry's post-indictment conversation in the ab-
sence of counsel violated his sixth amendment right to counsel.2 The
Henry court reasoned that Brewer did not limit Massiah to direct govern-
ment questioning. 28 Although Massiah condemned both surreptitious elici-
tation of evidence and jailhouse questioning as improper interrogation,29
Brewer expanded the meaning of interrogation to include situations involv-
ing neither surreptitious elicitation nor questioning, but general conversa-
tions by known police officers."0 Reading Massiah and Brewer together, the
Henry court concluded that general conversations by an informant could
constitute interrogation and thus violate the sixth amendment.31 The
Henry opinion rests on the rationale that "interrogation" is a relative
term, 32 not limited to formalized interrogation. 33 The Fourth Circuit's deci-
1o Id. at 547.
21 Id. at 545.
22 Id.
" United States v. Henry, No. 73-1413 (4th Cir. 1973) (unpublished opinion); see Henry
v. United States, 590 F.2d 544, 545 (4th Cir. 1978).
24 Henry moved to vacate his sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1976)(federal
habeas corpus).
1 Opinion unpublished; see Henry v. United States, 551 F.2d 306 (4th Cir. 1977).
28 Henry v. United States, 590 F.2d 544, 545 (4th Cir. 1978).
2? Id. at 547.
2 Id. at 546-47.
Id; see text accompanying notes 8-10 supra.
3' See 590 F.2d at 547; see text accompanying notes 12-15 supra.
3, 590 F.2d at 547. In support of its conclusion that general conversations constituted
interrogation, the Henry court noted that Massiah has been applied to post-indictment con-
versations between a defendant and known police officers. Id.
32 Id.; see United States v. Anderson, 523 F.2d 1192, 1196 (5th Cir. 1975). Anderson
described "interrogation" as a relative term in holding incriminating evidence gathered in
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sion that Massiah and the post-indictment right to counsel is not limited
to questioning, deception or inducement" curbs intentional and deliberate
government efforts to elicit post-indictment evidence in the absence of
counsel.
35
Previous Fourth Circuit decisions interpreting sixth amendment pro-
tection for an indicted defendant have limited the protection to govern-
ment acts of affirmative elicitation or inducement.3 6 These pre-Brewer
cases are similar to some federal circuit court decisions which restrict the
application of Massiah to premeditated government post-indictment con-
tact with the defendant for the purpose of eliciting incriminating state-
ments absent counsel." Some federal circuits, however, view Massiah as a
the course of a doctor's examination, where a government agent was sent to the defendant-
doctor's office for that purpose, as inadmissible under Massiah. 523 F.2d at 1196; see text
accompanying note 33 infra.
m See 590 F.2d at 547; see United States v. Anderson, 523 F.2d 1192, 1195-96. In
Anderson, the government did not engage in a question and answer session with the defendant
or conduct a formalized interrogation. Rather, the agent made representations and requests
that elicited incriminating responses from the defendant. These statements were government
induced and almost surely would not have occurred had counsel been present. Id.
34 590 F.2d at 546; see McLeod v. Ohio, 381 U.S. 356 (1965); Beatty v. United States,
389 U.S. 45 (1967). In McLeod, the defendant had been indicted but had not employed
counsel. State v. McLeod, 1 Ohio St.2d 60, 60, 203 N.E.2d 349, 350 (1964). While riding with
the police in an automobile and assisting them in locating evidence of the crime, the defen-
dant voluntarily made several incriminating statements. The supreme court of Ohio distin-
guished Massiah as a case involving statements obtained through trickery, whereas McLeod's
statements were made in the known presence of police officers. 203 N.E.2d at 351. The United
States Supreme Court did not accept the Ohio court's distinction and summarily reversed.
381 U.S. at 356.
The Fifth Circuit's opinion in Beatty sought to limit Massiah to situations where the
government has purposely approached the accused with the intention and design of inducing
him to make incriminating statements absent counsel. Beatty v. United States, 377 F.2d 181,
190 (5th Cir. 1967). Shortly after his indictment, the defendant Beatty telephoned and re-
quested a government agent to meet him. Beatty had previous contact with this agent'and
was unaware of the agent's employment with the government. The agent agreed to the
meeting and had another government agent concealed in the trunk of his car when the
meeting took place. Id. at 184. Testimony of the concealed agent as to Beatty's incriminating
remarks led to Beatty's conviction. Id. at 185. The Fifth Circuit affirmed, distinguishing the
acts of deliberate government inducement in Massiah from Beatty's voluntary request of a
meeting with the government agent, and the government's one affirmative act of concealing
another agent in the trunk of the car for purposes of monitoring the conversation. Id. at 190.
The Supreme Court summarily reversed this decision on the authority of Massiah. Beatty v.
United States, 389 U.S. 45 (1967).
" See text accompanying notes 56-60 infra.
38 See, e.g., United States v. Clark, 499 F.2d 802, 807-08 (4th Cir. 1974)(governnhent's
coercive tactics were violation of fifth and sixth amendment rights under Miranda); United
States v. Slaughter, 366 F.2d 833, 840-41 (4th Cir. 1966)(post-arrest, pre-indictment interro-
gation absent counsel condemned under Massiah and Escobedo).
" See, e.g., United States v. DeLoy, 421 F.2d 900, 902 (5th Cir. 1970)(Massiah does not
invalidate insistent, untricked post-indictment statements of properly warned defendant);
United States ex rel. Milani v. Pate, 425 F.2d 6, 8 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 867
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ban on all incriminating post-indictment statements made in the absence
of counsel," thus resembling Henry's analysis of Massiah and Brewer
together and its liberal interpretation of interrogation for purposes of sixth-
amendment protection." Confusion over the meaning of interrogation after
Brewer"0 has prompted decisions exactly contrary to the result in Henry."
The Fourth Circuit's interpretation of the post-indictment right to
counsel is somewhat strained in striking down government informant con-
versations with the defendant through an interrogation analysis. Massiah
specifically condemned the government's secret elicitation of incriminat-
ing evidence as a violation of the sixth amendment right to counsel."2
Brewer states that whether incriminating statements are elicited surrepti-
tiously or otherwise is constitutionally irrelevant."3 The Brewer opinion
also interpreted Massiah as affording a defendant the post-indictment
right to counsel when the government interrogates him." Henry's analysis
of the combined effect of Massiah and Brewer raises two problems under
the Supreme Court's analysis of the post-indictment right to counsel-the
(1970) (testimony held admissible where FBI was passive receiver of information provided by
fellow inmate of defendant on his own initiative); Arrington v. Maxwell, 409 F.2d 849, 853
(6th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 944 (1969)(post-indictment statements made to prosecuting
attorney and chief of police were voluntary and held admissible); Caton v. United States, 407
F.2d 367, 374 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 984 (1969)(arrested but un-indicted defendant
not protected by Massiah); United States v. Garcia, 377 F.2d 321, 324 (2d Cir. 1967)(Massiah
inapplicable to defendant's spontaneous or voluntary post-indictment statements in the pres-
ence of government even though counsel not present); Paroutian v. United States, 370 F.2d
631, 632 (2d Cir. 1967)(no sixth amendment violation where defendant's non-informant cell-
mate voluntarily told police defendant's incriminating statements).
I See, e.g., United States ex rel. O'Connor v. New Jersey, 405 F.2d 632, 633-34, 636 (3d
Cir.), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 923 (1969)(Massiah commands absolute post-indictment right
to counsel protection excluding any oral communications between defendant and police made
in the absence of counsel); Hancock v. White, 378 F.2d 479, 481-84 (1st Cir. 1967)(Massiah
prohibits statements voluntarily made during automobile trip to sheriff and prosecuting
attorney).
" See text accompanying notes 31-35 supra.
"' See Kamisar, supra note 18, at 32-33.
11 In Wilson v. Henderson, 584 F.2d 1185, 1191 (2d Cir. 1978), post-indictment state-
ments made by the defendant to a cellmate-informer in the absence of counsel were admitted
into evidence. The Second Circuit found that the informant's conversation under circumstan-
ces identical to Henry was not interrogation and that no Massiah right attached. Similarly,
in United States v. Hearst, 563 F.2d 1331, 1348 (9th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 1000
(1978), the Ninth Circuit held admissible defendant's post-indictment statements to a visitor
surreptitiously recorded in the absence of counsel. The Ninth Circuit found no interrogation
under Brewer and therefore no violation of Massiah. The dissent in Henry relied heavily on
the Wilson and Hearst opinions and also stressed narrow court interpretations of Massiah.
590 F.2d at 553; see text accompanying note 37 supra.
"' See text accompanying notes 10-11 supra.
" 430 U.S. at 400. Brewer's declaration that the difference between surreptitious and
overt elicitation is constitutionally irrelevant was a means of incorporating the Brewer fact
situation within the protection of Massiah. The Brewer Court sought to bring open elicitation
of incriminating statements by known policemen within the Massiah rule. Id. at 399-400. See
also text accompanying notes 13 & 15 supra.
1 430 U.S. at 401.
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constitutional irrelevancy of surreptitious as opposed to known police in-
terrogation, and the precise scope of interrogation as a prerequisite to
Massiah protection.
Once the right to counsel attaches,45 interrogation of the defendant,
whether known or surreptitious, violates the sixth amendment if counsel
is not present. Therefore, the right to the effective assistance of counsel is
an empty right if the defendant is deceived as to whether an interrogation
is taking place at all. 6 Where a defendant is unaware that the government
is interrogating him, he is unlikely to consider the question whether he
should have counsel present." Surreptitious government activities thus
undermine a defendant's sixth amendment right to counsel." Both
Massiah49 and Henry0 found that the government's secret activities vi-
tiated the defendant's sixth amendment rights.
Another source of ambiguity in the Henry decision is the court's fram-
ing of the issue in terms of "what is interrogation?"' 5' This is a limited
question in view of the controlling precedents. Massiah struck down a co-
defendant's transmission of incriminating statements to a testifying gov-
ernment agent. 5 Brewer held inadmissible evidence obtained through gen-
eral conversations with the police,53 while Henry prohibited evidence gath-
ered during general conversations with an informant. 4 Formal interroga-
tion was not an element in any of these different post-indictment situa-
tions. Thus, the "interrogation" inquiry results in ambiguity and confusion
over the applicable case law.5
The Massiah, Brewer and Henry decisions are readily explained as
protecting the indicted defendant against the government's intentional
and deliberate attempts to violate his constitutional rights. Where a viola-
tion of the defendant's sixth amendment right to counsel has been found,
the government's activities have been characterized in terms of intent.
Massiah spoke of the "deliberate elicitation" of information,58 and Brewer
found that the police officer "designedly set out to elicit information."5 In
Henry, the informant "engaged" the defendant in conversation. 5 Each of
these intentional acts proved fatal to the admissibilty of the government's
' See text accompanying note 2 supra.
' See White, Police Trickery In Inducing Confessions, 127 U. PA. L. REv. 581, 602-08
(1979).
7 Id. at 603.
' Id.
4' See text accompanying notes 10-11 supra.
590 F.2d at 547. The Henry court holds that an informant may effectively interrogate
a defendant by simply engaging the defendant in a general conversation. Id.
51 Id. at 546, 548.
52 See text accompanying note 8 supra.
s See text accompanying notes 13 & 15 supra.
' See text accompanying notes 21-22 supra.
See generally Kamisar, supra note 18.
SI 377 U.S. at 206.
430 U.S. at 399.
590 F.2d at 547.
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